Water management under scarcity and climate change: methodological proposals and analysis of policy instruments by Kahil, Mohamed Taher & Albiac Murillo, José
2016 25
Mohamed Taher Kahil
Water management under scarcity
and climate change:
methodological proposals and
analysis of policy instruments
Departamento
Director/es
Análisis Económico
Albiac Murillo, José
© Universidad de Zaragoza
Servicio de Publicaciones
ISSN 2254-7606
Director/es
Tesis Doctoral
Autor
Repositorio de la Universidad de Zaragoza – Zaguan   http://zaguan.unizar.es
UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARAGOZA
Departamento
Director/es
© Universidad de Zaragoza
Servicio de Publicaciones
ISSN 2254-7606
Director/es
Tesis Doctoral
Autor
Repositorio de la Universidad de Zaragoza – Zaguan   http://zaguan.unizar.es
UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARAGOZA
Departamento
Director/es
© Universidad de Zaragoza
Servicio de Publicaciones
ISSN 2254-7606
Mohamed Taher Kahil
WATER MANAGEMENT UNDER
SCARCITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
METHODOLOGICAL PROPOSALS
AND ANALYSIS OF POLICY
INSTRUMENTS
Director/es
Análisis Económico
Albiac Murillo, José
Tesis Doctoral
Autor
2015
Repositorio de la Universidad de Zaragoza – Zaguan   http://zaguan.unizar.es
UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARAGOZA
Departamento
Director/es
© Universidad de Zaragoza
Servicio de Publicaciones
ISSN 2254-7606
Director/es
Tesis Doctoral
Autor
Repositorio de la Universidad de Zaragoza – Zaguan   http://zaguan.unizar.es
UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARAGOZA
                                                                                                                                         
UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARAGOZA 
FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA Y EMPRESA 
DEPARTAMENTO DE ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WATER MANAGEMENT UNDER SCARCITY AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE: METHODOLOGICAL PROPOSALS AND ANALYSIS 
OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
Tesis Doctoral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mohamed Taher Kahil 
 
Zaragoza, Agosto 2015 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARAGOZA 
FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA Y EMPRESA 
DEPARTAMENTO DE ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO 
 
 
 
 
 
WATER MANAGEMENT UNDER SCARCITY AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE: METHODOLOGICAL PROPOSALS AND ANALYSIS 
OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
 
Mohamed Taher Kahil 
 
 
 
Tesis presentada para optar al grado de Doctor  
por la Universidad de Zaragoza 
 
 
 
Dirigida por el Doctor José Albiac Murillo 
 
 
 
 
 
Zaragoza, Agosto 2015  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                         
“If I am going to live below a dam I would much rather have it 
built by an engineer than an economist. Nevertheless, the 
economist comes into the picture perhaps by asking the awkward 
question as to whether the dam should have been built in the first 
place” (Kenneth Boulding, 1964)  
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Chapter 1 
 
General introduction  
 
 
1.1 Background 
Water is one of the most vital natural resources of the planet. Its importance stems from 
its role as a prerequisite for life, on the one hand, and its use as an input to economic 
production activities on the other. However, water demand has been increasing and 
continues to increase globally, as the world population grows and nations become 
wealthier. Water demands get closer and closer to the renewable freshwater resource 
availability, with water scarcity becoming a widespread problem during recent decades 
in most arid and semiarid regions around the world (Alcamo et al., 2007). There is a 
severe scarcity problem in almost all the important rivers in these regions, such as in the 
Nile, Ganges, Indus, Yellow, Yangtze, Tigris, Euphrates, Amu and Syr Darya, Murray- 
Darling, Colorado and Rio Grande (WWAP, 2006).   
Water scarcity is created gradually by the decisions on water extractions in river 
basins linked to land use and economic activities. At first, water scarcity resulted from 
surface extractions, but recently it is worsening because of the unprecedented depletion 
of groundwater brought about by falling pumping costs. Between 1960 and 2000, 
groundwater extractions climbed from 310 to 730 km
3
 per year pushing depletion up to 
150 km
3
 (Konikow, 2011). This staggering annual depletion amounts to 50 km
3
 in the 
Indus-Ganges-Brahmaputra region, 24 km
3
 in the USA, 13 km
3
 in the Tigris-Euphrates 
region, and 9 km
3
 in Northern China.  
The problems arising from water scarcity could become critical because of climate 
change impacts. In some regions, climate change is expected to reduce freshwater 
supplies from surface and subsurface water resources, and also to increase of the 
recurrence, longevity and intensity of drought events. The reduction of water 
availability will be combined with increases of water demand for human and 
agricultural uses (IPCC, 2014). The combined effects of human-induced permanent 
water scarcity and climate change impacts portend unprecedented levels of water 
resources degradation.  
The degradation of water resources is a threat to human water security and 
environmental biodiversity across the world, which so far has been addressed by large 
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investments to ensure human security in medium and high income countries. However, 
the threats to natural ecosystems are hardly accounted for (Vörösmarty et al., 2010). 
Moreover, the most ideal sites for investments have been already used, leading to 
increased costs of new investments. These facts call for a reconsideration of the current 
water institutions and policies. The reason is not only to protect ecosystems, but also to 
substitute the escalating investments that ensure human security for more sustainable 
water management options.  
The sustainable management of water is quite challenging because of the different 
types of goods and services provided by water. These goods and services can be 
classified as private goods, common pool resources, or public goods, depending on the 
degree of exclusion and rivalry in consumption.
1
 Treated drinkable water in urban 
networks is close to a private good (rivalry and exclusion), water in surface 
watercourses and aquifers is close to a common pool resource (rivalry and non-
exclusion), while water sustaining ecosystems comes close to a public good (non-rivalry 
and non-exclusion) (Booker et al., 2012). The management of water is governed by 
public policies because pure competitive markets fail to account for the common pool 
and public good characteristics of water. 
One important question for future policy debates is the identification of potential 
water management policies to address scarcity, droughts and climate change. Suitable 
policies should improve economic efficiency, achieve environmental sustainability, and 
address equity. The evaluation of the effectiveness of water policies requires the 
development of analytical tools capable to integrate the key biophysical and socio-
economic dimensions of water resources and to provide a better understanding of the 
spatial and inter-temporal effects of policy interventions.  
1.2 Types of policy instruments 
Economic theory describes three types of policy instruments that could be used to 
manage water resources. The first type is the “Pigou solution”, which is based on 
taxation of water extractions (Pigou, 1920). This is the water pricing approach that is 
being implemented in the European water policies (EC, 2012). The second type is the 
“Coase solution”, which is based on privatizing the resource and trading (Coase, 1960). 
                                                 
1
 A good is non-rival when consumption by one individual does not reduce consumption available to 
others (e.g. defense). A good is non-excludable when provision entails that its benefits are available to all 
(e.g. street lighting). 
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This is the water market approach that has been implemented in Australia. The third 
type is the common property governance, based on the evidence that coercive 
government rules fail because they lack legitimacy and knowledge of local conditions 
(Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1999). This is the institutional approach, where 
stakeholders themselves design the rules and enforcement mechanisms for the 
sustainable management of common pool resources, although this approach has been 
mostly ignored by water policy decision makers and managers. 
Mainstream water policies in some countries derive from the Dublin Statement on 
Water declaring water an economic good, and are based on so-called economic 
instruments such as water markets or water pricing. Besides the European Union and 
Australia, both water pricing and water markets are being considered at present for 
solving the acute water scarcity problems in China. These economic instruments work 
well when water exhibits private good characteristics such as in urban networks, but not 
so well when water exhibits common pool resource or public good characteristics. 
There is a strong consensus among experts that water pricing could achieve sizable 
gains in efficiency and welfare in urban and industrial water networks (Hanemann, 
1997), although implementation could face technical and political difficulties. Irrigation 
water from surface watercourses and aquifers exhibits common pool resource 
characteristics, and the use of economic instruments requires transforming the resource 
into a private good. This transformation is quite difficult, especially in arid and semiarid 
regions under strong water scarcity pressures, and would require the support of 
stakeholders. 
1.3 Previous analysis of policy instruments 
Water pricing in irrigation, to achieve water conservation, has been the subject of debate 
since the 1990s. A string of the literature finds that irrigation water pricing has limited 
effects on water conservation (Moore, 1991; Scheierling et al., 2004), and some authors 
indicate that water markets seem far more effective than water pricing for allocating 
irrigation water (Cornish et al., 2004). 
The Murray-Darling Basin is at present involved in the most active water market in 
the world, and during the last drought this market has generated benefits of nearly 1 
billion US dollars per year. A challenge to water markets is the third party effects such 
as environmental impacts, which would reduce the benefits of trading. Water markets 
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reduce streamflows because previously unused water allocations are traded, and also 
because gains in irrigation efficiency at parcel level reduce return flows to the 
environment. This reduction in return flows has been analyzed both in Australia and the 
US (Qureshi et al., 2010; Howe et al., 1986). Another worrying effect is the large surge 
in groundwater extractions. It is estimated that groundwater extractions in the Murray-
Darling Basin increased by 415 Mm
3
 per year between 2000 and 2005. This represents a 
marked acceleration in previous historical rate of growth in groundwater extraction 
which grew by only 180 Mm
3
 between 1984 and 2000. Other sources find substantially 
higher groundwater depletion in the Murray-Darling between 2002-2007 (last drought): 
extractions between 2002-2007 were 17000 Mm
3
 per year, seven times above the 
allowed limits placed on groundwater users (2400 Mm
3
), with additional groundwater 
depletion in the basin soaring up to 104 km
3
 (Blewett, 2012).  
Medellín et al. (2013) show the potential gains from water trading under droughts 
or climate change in California. The gains in the Central Valley of California are 
estimated at 1.4 billion US dollars. However, implementing these potential gains from 
trading is quite a challenge as the failure of the Water Bank experience in the 2009 
drought shows: transfers were blocked by the water exporting regions and 
environmental NGOs. The attainment of this solution seems to require stronger 
institutions, involving stakeholders‟ cooperation.  
Policies can also be irreversible. For example the “Tarifa 09”, that subsidizes 
electricity to groundwater pumping for irrigation, was instituted in 1992 in Mexico to 
support Mexican farmers compete with USA and Canadian farmers within the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Over the years that pervasive subsidy led 
to the destruction of more than 40 percent of major aquifers in Mexico. Efforts by the 
Government of Mexico to date to remove or reduce the subsidy have failed due to the 
strong opposition of the agricultural lobby (Muñoz et al., 2006). 
Recently, signs have been mounting on successful water management approach in 
Spain (Schwabe et al., 2013). This approach is institutional and relies on the river basin 
authorities. There is a strong tradition of cooperation among water stakeholders within 
basin authorities in Spain dating back centuries. Evidence on the importance of 
cooperation is provided by the case of the La Mancha aquifers (Esteban and Albiac, 
2012). Subsidies to farmers and large public funds for buying water from farmers have 
failed to reduce extractions in the Western La Mancha aquifer, while extractions have 
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been curbed in the Eastern La Mancha aquifer through stakeholders‟ cooperation within 
the basin authority. Carefully designed economic instruments have been used in the 
Eastern La Mancha aquifer to introduce more flexibility into the institutional process of 
decision making and implementation.
2
 
1.4 Review of modeling approaches for water policy analysis  
The complexity of water resource systems and the multiple challenges facing water 
stakeholders and policymakers have led to the development of new approaches to 
modeling water management and policies in the last three decades. Hydro-economic 
modeling has evolved from modeling only individual sector use at small spatial scales 
towards integrated modeling of a whole system of interrelated demand and supply 
elements. Integrated hydro-economic models are capable to efficiently and consistently 
account for the hydrologic, economic, institutional and environmental impacts of policy 
proposals to support the sustainable management of water resources (Booker et al., 
2012).   
Integrated hydro-economic models have been developed to solve different water 
management problems. Some examples of hydro-economic models application are the 
assessment of the potential of water markets to alleviate water scarcity in California 
(Vaux and Howitt, 1984), the modeling of intrastate and interstate markets for Colorado 
River water resources (Booker and Young, 1999), the analysis of the economic and 
environmental effects of limiting groundwater pumping in Texas (MacCarl et al., 1999), 
the development of an integrated hydrologic, agronomic and economic model for the 
Syr Darya basin in Central Asia (Cai et al., 2003), the assessment of the economic 
impacts of federal policy responses to drought in the Rio Grande basin (Ward et al., 
2006), and the development of portfolios of water supply transfer in order to minimize 
the costs of meeting urban demand with a specified reliability in the Lower Rio Grande 
basin (Characklis et al., 2006).  
Two main classifications of integrated hydro-economic models are presented in the 
literature based on how the hydrologic, economic, environmental and institutional 
components are integrated. The first one is „compartment modeling‟ which treats the 
different components as separate sub-models, whose individual solutions are modified 
by some coordination methods. The alternative approach is „holistic modeling‟ where 
                                                 
2
 A targeted public purchase of groundwater by the Jucar basin authority was in fact implemented during 
the last drought to confront the desiccation of the Jucar riverbed (CHJ, 2009).  
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the different components are integrated into a single consistent model, which is solved 
in its entirety, and information is transferred endogenously between the components. 
The endogenous treatment of the inter-relationships between the components allows a 
more effective combined environmental-economic analysis (Cai, 2008). 
Holistic hydro-economic models have shown growing study interest and 
importance for integrated basin management. These models are typically developed as 
constrained optimization problems. Economic measures of the benefits and costs of 
water use are included in the objective function, while hydrologic and other factors are 
generally represented as constraints. Additional constraints are used to represent water 
institutions and environmental restrictions. Such models can be used for surface water 
dominated policy issues, groundwater issues, or physical environments in which 
combined ground and surface water use are important. Multiple supply and demand 
units and infrastructures could be represented, allowing for an explicit spatial analysis 
(Booker et al., 2012).  
Despite the important achievements of previous studies, several gaps are not yet 
closed in the development of hydro-economic models. Booker et al. (2012) review the 
evolution of hydro-economic modeling and its capability for addressing system wide 
impacts. The authors indicate that hydro-economic modeling requires further advances 
in the dynamic and stochastic model dimensions, and also in the accurate understanding 
of interdependencies between the different model components. In addition, most 
existing hydro-economic models have been developed to find the best responses to 
climate and policy scenarios in basins. However, less attention has been paid to the 
strategic behavior of individual stakeholders, and their uptake of the basin-wide policy 
proposals.  
1.5 Objectives of the research and methodology  
The main objective of this research is the development and application of integrated 
hydro-economic models at basin scale. These models are used to analyze the impacts of 
climate change-induced water scarcity and droughts on the use of water in basins of arid 
and semiarid regions, and to assess the scope of options for achieving a sustainable 
management of these basins. The empirical findings of this research could assist 
policymakers in the design of sustainable water management policies at basin scale.  
                                                                                                                               Chapter 1 
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The thesis is divided into four articles (chapters 2 to 5) that present different hydro-
economic modeling approaches addressing various climate scenarios and policy 
alternatives. The Jucar basin in Spain is chosen as the case study for the four chapters. 
This basin provides a good experimental field to apply hydro-economic modeling in 
arid and semiarid regions. The purpose is studying policies to confront water scarcity 
and the impact of droughts from the impending climate change. The Jucar region is 
semiarid and the river is under severe stress with acute water scarcity problems and 
escalating degradation of ecosystems. At present this is a common situation in many 
arid and semiarid basins around the world, including basins in Southern Europe, the 
Mediterranean region, Africa, the Middle East, Southwestern United States, and 
Australia. The findings in the Jucar could have important implications for water 
management in arid and semiarid basins around the world.  
The first article (chapter 2) presents a hydro-economic model of the Jucar basin 
that links a reduced form hydrological component, with a regional economic 
optimization component and an environmental component. The reduced form 
hydrological component is calibrated to observed water allocations in normal and 
drought years using a regression approach. This new simple approach calibrates 
adequately the hydrological component and captures the basin response flexibility to 
various water availability levels when detailed hydrological information is not available 
(which is the case in many basins worldwide). The regional economic component is 
based on a detailed farm-level optimization of irrigation districts and an optimization of 
social surplus in urban water supply and demand. The environmental component 
estimates the benefits that environmental amenities provide to society in a way that 
makes them comparable with the benefits derived from other uses. This integrated 
model simulates demand nodes‟ behavior under different drought scenarios and policy 
intervention alternatives. The linkage between model components allows a rigorous 
evaluation of drought impacts under the different policy settings: allocation among 
sectors, spatial distribution, land use decisions, and private and social benefits and costs 
of water utilization.  
The second article (chapter 3) develops a game theory framework in order to 
analyze cooperative water management policies that could address scarcity and drought 
in the Jucar basin. The existing literature, while assessing solutions to drought situations 
using integrated hydro-economic models, usually overlooks one important aspect, 
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which is the strategic behavior of individual stakeholders. This gap is addressed in this 
paper by using several solution concepts and stability indexes from the cooperative 
game theory. Results demonstrate the importance of incorporating the strategic behavior 
of water stakeholders for the design of acceptable and stable basin-wide drought 
mitigation policies. The findings of this chapter provide clear evidence that achieving 
cooperation reduces drought damage costs. However, cooperation may have to be 
regulated by public agencies, such as a basin authority, when scarcity is very high, in 
order to protect ecosystems and maintain economic benefits.  
The third article (chapter 4) presents a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of 
two popular incentive-based water management policies to address climate change 
impacts on irrigated agriculture in Southern Europe: water markets and irrigation 
subsidies. There are no studies in the European context providing a comparative 
analysis of the effectiveness of these two policies for irrigation adaptation to climate 
change, and the extent to which farmers could realize potential adaptation opportunities. 
The analysis is undertaken using a modeling framework that links hydrologic, 
agronomic, and economic variables within a discrete stochastic programming model. 
This model estimates farmers‟ responses to climate change and policy interventions in 
terms of long-run choices of capital investment in cropping and irrigation systems and 
short-run decision to irrigate or fallow land. The findings in this chapter highlight that 
climate change will likely have negative impacts on the irrigated agriculture and also on 
water-dependent ecosystems in Southern Europe. However, the severity of these 
impacts will depend on the degree of adaptation at farm level, the investment decisions 
by farmers, and the government policy choices.  
The last article (chapter 5) presents a further enhancement of the hydro-economic 
model of the Jucar basin developed in chapter 1. This chapter includes the dynamic 
aspects into the hydro-economic modeling framework, following the recommendations 
by Booker et al. (2012) on the advances needed in hydro-economic modeling. This 
framework keeps track of all sources and demand nodes as water flows move from the 
headwaters to various downstream water uses. The framework integrates a spatially-
explicit groundwater flow components. The methodological contribution to previous 
modeling efforts is the explicit specification of the aquifer-river interactions, which are 
important when aquifer systems make a sizable contribution to basin resources. This 
advanced framework is used for the assessment of different climate change scenarios 
                                                                                                                               Chapter 1 
                                                                                                                                         9 
and policy choices, looking for accurate evaluations of hydrologic, land use and 
economic outcomes. The results of this chapter provide valuable information on the 
basin scale climate change adaptation paths to guide alternative policy choices.  
The contributions of this thesis relative to prior literature are both methodological 
and empirical. The hydro-economic modeling approaches presented here demonstrate 
the importance of integrated water resources modeling. This integration has 
considerable potential to support and advance environmental and economic policy 
assessments at basin scale, contributing towards the design of sustainable policies and 
management options. In addition, some methods are suggested in this research to fill the 
gaps not yet closed in the hydro-economic modeling literature. The gaps considered 
here are related first to the inclusion of the strategic behavior of individual stakeholders, 
and second to the dynamic and stochastic dimensions of the models. Empirically, the 
results of this thesis provide additional evidences on the advantages of stakeholders‟ 
cooperation for water management compared to other policy instruments, such as water 
markets and subsidies for investments in advanced irrigation technologies. The research 
provides also information on the required incentives and mechanisms to achieve a 
sustainable management of water resources in arid and semiarid basins under scarcity, 
droughts and climate change.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Modeling water scarcity and droughts for policy adaptation to climate 
change in arid and semiarid regions    
 
 
Abstract 
Growing water extractions combined with emerging demands for environment 
protection increase competition for scarce water resources worldwide, especially in arid 
and semiarid regions. In those regions, climate change is projected to exacerbate water 
scarcity and increase the recurrence and intensity of droughts. These circumstances call 
for methodologies that can support the design of sustainable water management. This 
paper presents a hydro-economic model that links a reduced form hydrological 
component, with economic and environmental components. The model is applied to an 
arid and semiarid basin in Southeastern Spain to analyze the effects of droughts and to 
assess alternative adaptation policies. Results indicate that drought events have large 
impacts on social welfare, with the main adjustments sustained by irrigation and the 
environment. The water market policy seems to be a suitable option to overcome the 
negative economic effects of droughts, although the environmental effects may weaken 
its advantages for society. The environmental water market policy, where water is 
acquired for the environment, is an appealing policy to reap the private benefits of 
markets while protecting ecosystems. The current water management approach in Spain, 
based on stakeholders‟ cooperation, achieves almost the same economic outcomes and 
better environmental outcomes compared to a pure water market. These findings call for 
a reconsideration of the current management in arid and semiarid basins around the 
world. The paper illustrates the potential of hydro-economic modeling for integrating 
the multiple dimensions of water resources, becoming a valuable tool in the 
advancement of sustainable water management policies. 
 
Keywords: hydro-economic modeling, droughts, climate change, stakeholders‟ 
cooperation, water markets, environmental benefits 
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2.1 Introduction  
The pressure on water resources has been mounting worldwide with water scarcity 
becoming a widespread problem in most arid and semiarid regions around the world. 
Global water extractions have increased more than six-fold in the last century, which is 
more than twice the rate of human population growth. The huge exploitation of water 
resources has resulted in 35 percent of the world population living in regions with 
severe water scarcity. Furthermore, about 65 percent of global river flows and aquatic 
ecosystems are under moderate to high threats of degradation (Alcamo et al., 2000; 
Vörösmarty et al., 2010). 
Projected future climate change impacts would further exacerbate the current 
situation of water scarcity in arid and semiarid regions. These regions would likely 
experience more severe and frequent droughts, making future water management even 
more difficult (IPCC, 2007). The impacts of droughts in arid and semiarid regions can 
be substantial because they add on to the existing water scarcity situation. This is the 
case of recent droughts in Australia, the western United States, southern Europe, and 
Africa. 
Severe droughts could have large impacts on agriculture, domestic and industrial 
users, tourism, and on ecosystems. Costs of drought damages seem to be considerable, 
and have been estimated to range from $2 to $6 billion per year in the United States 
(FEMA, 1995; NOAA, 2008), and around 3 billion € per year in the European Union 
(EC, 2007). These costs represent between 0.05 and 0.1 percent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP), although the costs of drought could be exceptionally higher some years. 
Losses in the Murray-Darling basin (Australia) during 2009 were 20 percent of the 
value of irrigated agriculture, representing about 1 percent of GDP (Kirby et al., 2014).  
The scale and costs of the global growing overdraft of water resources indicates 
that water mismanagement is quite common, and that sustainable management of basins 
is a complex and difficult task. These difficulties call for the development of 
methodologies that allow a better understanding of water management issues within the 
contexts of scarcity, drought, and climate change. Integrated hydro-economic modeling 
is a potential methodology for implementing comprehensive river basin scale analysis to 
support the design of sustainable water management policies. 
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This methodology to model river basin interactions has been previously used in 
several studies, such as Booker and Young (1995), McKinney et al. (1999), Cai et al. 
(2003), Booker et al. (2005), Pulido-Velazquez et al. (2008), Molinos et al. (2014), and 
Ward (2014). The present paper suggests a prototype river basin hydro-economic model 
that links a reduced form hydrological component, with a regional economic 
optimization component and an environmental component. The reduced form 
hydrological component is calibrated to observed water allocations in normal and 
drought years using a regression approach. This new simple approach calibrates 
adequately the hydrological component and captures the basin response flexibility to 
various water availability levels, when detailed hydrological information is not available 
(which is the case in many basins worldwide). The regional economic component 
includes a detailed farm-level optimization model and an urban social surplus model. 
The environmental component estimates the benefits that environmental amenities 
provide to society in a way that makes them comparable with the benefits derived from 
other uses. 
The integrated model simulates demand nodes‟ behavior under different drought 
scenarios (mild, severe, and very severe drought) and policy intervention alternatives 
(baseline or institutional, agriculture-urban water market, and environmental water 
market policies). The linkage between model components allows a rigorous evaluation 
of drought impacts under the different policy settings: allocation among sectors, spatial 
distribution, land use decisions, and private and social benefits and costs of water 
utilization. The hydro-economic model is empirically tested in an arid and semiarid 
basin in Southeastern Spain, the Jucar River Basin. The empirical application provides a 
valuable illustration of the development procedure of hydro-economic modeling, data 
requirements and calibration processes, as well as its use for comprehensive river basin 
climate and policy impact assessment. 
The contributions of this paper relative to prior literature are both methodological 
and empirical ones, and the insights could be generalized for addressing the current 
mismanagement pervading the main basins in arid and semiarid regions around the 
world. The methodology combines three key elements partially tackled in previous 
hydro-economic modeling: a simplified hydrology circumventing full hydrological 
knowledge, a regional model including all economic sectors, and an explicit benefit 
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function of basin ecosystems. This approach could be easily applied to most basins 
around the world.   
Empirically, the results show the advantages of stakeholders‟ cooperation for water 
management. This is the institutional approach being implemented in Spain to address 
water scarcity, where stakeholders themselves participate in the design of management 
rules and implementation of enforcement mechanisms. The results show that this 
institutional approach achieves almost the same economic outcomes and better 
environmental outcomes compared to a pure water market policy (Pareto-efficient 
solution). These findings call for a reconsideration of the current water institutions and 
policies in many arid and semiarid basins, based on command and control instruments 
or else on pure economic instruments, such as water markets or water pricing. These 
instruments, that disregard stakeholders‟ role, have failed in reducing water scarcity and 
protecting ecosystems because they lack both legitimacy among stakeholders, and 
knowledge of local conditions (Cornish et al., 2004; Varela et al., 2011; Connor and 
Kaczan, 2013). This empirical finding is an important policy issue for basins around the 
world, suggesting that collective action seems to be a key ingredient to move towards a 
more sustainable water management.  
2.2 Modeling framework  
The hydro-economic river basin model integrates hydrologic, economic, institutional, 
and environmental variables, and involves the main users in the basin, including 
irrigation districts, urban centers, and aquatic ecosystem requirements. The model is 
used to simulate various drought scenarios, and to assess the scope of possibilities to 
improve the environmental and economic outcomes of the basin under those drought 
scenarios.   
Hydro-economic modeling is a powerful tool to analyze water scarcity, drought, 
and climate change issues. These models represent all major spatially distributed 
hydrologic and engineering parts of the studied river basin. Moreover, hydro-economic 
models allow capturing the effects of the interactions between the hydrologic and the 
economic systems, ensuring that the optimal economic results take into account the 
spatial distribution of water resources. The spatial location of water users, such as 
irrigation districts and households with respect to the river stream determines largely the 
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magnitude of the impacts of any allocation decision and policy intervention to cope with 
water scarcity (Harou et al., 2009; Maneta et al., 2009).  
However, developing the hydrologic part of the model is a time-consuming and 
complex task that involves detailed hydrologic knowledge and highly-disaggregated 
biophysical information that may not be available, requiring advanced modeling 
abilities that could represent the complex hydrological relationships. Moreover, 
hydrologic and economic models usually have different resolution techniques, and 
spatial and temporal scales, which further complicate their linkage (Harou et al., 2009). 
An alternative approach is to use aggregated historical data provided by water 
authorities, together with simulated data and network topology from existing hydrologic 
models. This method is a quick and credible way to build a reduced form hydrological 
model of the studied river basin (Cai et al., 2003).  
The reduced form hydrological model is a node-link network, in which nodes 
represent physical units impacting the stream system, and links represent the connection 
between these units. The nodes that could be included in the network are classified into 
two types: supply nodes, such as rivers, reservoirs, and aquifers; and demand nodes, 
such as irrigation districts, households, and aquatic ecosystems. The links could be 
rivers or canals (See below the representation of the Jucar model in figure 2.3).  
The flows of water are routed between nodes using basic hydrologic concepts, such 
as mass balance and river flow continuity equations. The mass balance principle could 
be applied for surface flow, reservoir, and aquifer levels. The model is initially 
constrained by a known volume of water availability into the basin, and this volume can 
be varied depending on climate scenarios. Boundary conditions in the form of lower and 
upper bound constraints, such as minimum volume of water stored in reservoirs and 
maximum reservoirs and aquifers depletion, could be incorporated anywhere in the 
network. Institutional constraints could be added to the network to characterize the 
basin‟s allocation rules. River basin authorities worldwide have developed numerous 
institutional rules to allocate water among uses for political, legal, or environmental 
reasons. Examples include water rights, water sharing arrangements, and minimum 
environmental flows of river reaches. These constraints typically limit the choice of the 
hydro-economic model to optimally allocate water among uses (Ward, 2014).   
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The development of the reduced form hydrological model requires accurate 
information on the geographical location of both supply and demand nodes, and the 
links and interactions between them (such as surface water diversion, groundwater 
extractions, return flows, wastewater discharge, reuse), and physical characterization of 
the nodes. Additionally, the model development needs information on water inflows 
(available runoff) time series measured at the considered headwater stream gauges, time 
series data on water use of demand nodes, streamflow time series data measured or 
estimated at selected river gauges, and infrastructure features at each node, including 
facility capacities, losses, and evaporation.   
The reduced form hydrological model allows controlling the flows of water in each 
node and estimating the distribution of the available water among users under each 
climate condition. The model is calibrated so that predicted allocations to users in both 
normal and drought periods match historical water allocations in those periods. The 
calibration process involves defining time series data on streamflows at the considered 
stream diversion gauges, and the diversion of water for the demand nodes from those 
gauges during normal flow and drought years. In this paper, a regression approach 
modeling the relationship between water availability and diversion at each node has 
been used to calibrate the reduced form hydrological model. The calibration of the 
model may pose difficulties derived from the unobserved variables involved in the 
water allocation decisions, and the uncertainty linked to water use data. Letcher et al. 
(2007) suggest that integrated models should not be developed for prediction purposes, 
but to support the understanding of basin responses to changes, such as climate or 
policy changes.   
The reduced form hydrological model, once calibrated, is incorporated into an 
economic framework. The linkage between the hydrologic and economic components 
requires adding several relationships that allow transferring information and feedback 
from one model component to the other. The economic benefits from water use in the 
irrigation sector are jointly determined using calibrated mathematical programming 
models that search for the optimal behavior of irrigation demand nodes subject to a set 
of technical and resource constraints. Alternatively, empirically estimated benefit 
functions, using econometric models that rely on the observed behavior of irrigation 
demand nodes could be used. Generally, calibrated mathematical programming models 
are computationally intensive, while econometric models are data intensive. The 
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Figure 2.1. Modeling framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
required data for econometric models is usually not available at a scale suitable for 
regional analysis, and they are less suitable for changing economic and biophysical 
conditions (Young and Loomis, 2014).  
The economic benefits from urban water use are often found by measuring the 
social surplus derived from inverse water demand functions estimated using 
econometric techniques. Demand functions relate water use to the price of water and 
other explanatory variables such as income, climate, and household structure (Young 
and Loomis, 2014). Environmental benefits provided by aquatic ecosystems could be 
modeled by developing ecological response models of those ecosystems and using 
existing economic valuation studies (Keeler et al., 2012). Otherwise, environmental 
water uses may be represented with minimum-flow constraints if environmental 
valuation studies and ecosystem health indicators are unavailable.  
The integrated hydro-economic model could then be used to simulate the effects of 
various drought scenarios on water uses in the studied river basin under the current 
institutional and policy setting predefined by the modeler. The procedure is as follows: 
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(1) the calibrated reduced form hydrological model predicts water flows in each node 
and endogenously provides water availability constraints (supply) to the economic and 
environmental models, and (2) the economic and environmental models simultaneously 
determine water demand in each node to maximize nodes‟ economic benefits from 
water use. Different policy constraints could be added to the underlying framework or 
some existing constraints could be relaxed to investigate alternative allocation rules, 
institutional arrangements and policy interventions.   
The modeling framework described in this section is summarized in figure 2.1 and 
it is applied to the drought management problem in an arid and semiarid basin in 
Southeastern Spain, the Jucar River Basin. The next section provides background 
information on the basin, and the following sections present the design and calibration 
of the reduced form hydrological model and that of the economic models to the 
conditions in the Jucar River Basin.  
2.3 The Jucar River Basin: Background information     
Recently, signs have been mounting on successful water management approach in Spain 
(Schwabe et al. 2013). This approach is institutional and relies on the river basin 
authorities. There is a strong tradition of cooperation among water stakeholders within 
basin authorities in Spain dating back centuries. The rationale behind that approach is 
the different types of goods and services provided by water, which can be classified as 
private goods, common pool resources, or public goods. Treated drinkable water in 
urban networks is close to a private good, irrigation water from surface watercourses 
and aquifers is close to a common pool resource, while water sustaining ecosystems 
comes close to a public good (Booker et al., 2012). The common pool and public good 
characteristics of water is a good reason for the institutional approach based on basin 
authorities achieving the collective action of stakeholders.   
The basin authorities in Spain are responsible for water management, water 
allocation and water public domain, planning and waterworks. The special characteristic 
of this institutional approach is the key role played by stakeholders in basin authorities. 
Stakeholders are inside basin authorities taking decisions in the basin governing bodies 
and in local watershed boards, and they are involved at all levels of decision making: 
planning, financing, waterworks, measures design, enforcement, and water 
management. The management of water is decentralized, with the basin authorities in  
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Figure 2.2. Map of the Jucar River Basin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
charge of water allocation, and water user associations in charge of secondary 
infrastructure, water usage, operation and maintenance, investments, and cost recovery. 
The main advantage of this institutional setting is that stakeholders cooperate in the 
design and enforcement of decisions, rules and regulations, and therefore the 
implementation and enforcement processes are carried on smoothly. 
The Jucar River Basin (henceforth JRB) is located in the regions of Valencia and 
Castilla La Mancha in Southeastern Spain (Figure 2.2). It extends over 22,300 Km
2
 and 
covers the area drained by the Jucar River and its tributaries, mainly the Magro and the 
Cabriel Rivers. The basin has an irregular Mediterranean hydrology, characterized by 
recurrent drought spells and normal years with dry summers.  
The basin includes 13 reservoirs, the most important of which are the Alarcon, 
Contreras and Tous dams. There are two major water distribution canals: the Acequia 
Real canal, which conveys water from the Tous dam to the traditional irrigation districts 
in the lower Jucar, and the Jucar-Turia canal, which transfers water from the Tous dam 
to irrigation districts located in the bordering Turia River Basin.  
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At present, renewable water resources in the JRB are nearly 1,700 Mm
3
, of which 
930 are surface water and 770 are groundwater resources. Water extractions are 1,680 
Mm
3
, very close to renewable resources, making the JRB an almost closed water 
system. Extractions for irrigated agriculture are nearly 1,400 Mm
3
. Urban and industrial 
extractions total 270 Mm
3
, which supply households, industries, and services of more 
than one million inhabitants, located mostly in the cities of Valencia, Sagunto and 
Albacete.  
The irrigated area extends over 190,000 ha, and the main crops grown are rice, 
wheat, barley, garlic, grapes, and citrus. There are three major irrigation areas, the 
Eastern La Mancha irrigation area (henceforth EM) is located in the upper Jucar, the 
traditional irrigation districts of Acequia Real del Jucar (henceforth ARJ), Escalona y 
Carcagente (henceforth ESC), and Ribera Baja (henceforth RB) are in the lower Jucar, 
and the irrigation area of the Canal Jucar-Turia (henceforth CJT) is located in the 
bordering Turia River Basin. 
The expansion of water extractions and the severe drought spells in recent decades 
have triggered considerable negative environmental and economic impacts in the basin 
(CHJ, 2009). The growth of water extractions has been driven especially by 
groundwater irrigation from the EM aquifer. The aquifer water table has dropped about 
80 m in some areas, resulting in large storage depletion, fluctuating around 2,500 Mm
3
. 
The aquifer is linked to the Jucar River stream, and it fed the Jucar River with about 150 
Mm
3
/year in the 1980s. Due to the depletion, the aquifer is at present draining the water 
flow of the upper Jucar rather than feeding it, at an average of 70 Mm
3
/year during 
2001–2005 (Sanz et al., 2011). 
Environmental flows are dwindling in many parts of the basin, resulting in serious 
damages to water-dependent ecosystems. The environmental flow in the final tract of 
the Jucar River is below 1 m
3
/s, which is very low compared with the other two major 
rivers in the region, the Ebro and Segura Rivers. In addition, there have been negative 
impacts on the downstream water users. For instance, the water available to the ARJ 
district has been reduced from 700 to 200 Mm
3
 in the last 40 years. Consequently, the 
dwindling return flows from the irrigation districts have caused serious environmental 
problems to the Albufera wetland, the main aquatic ecosystem in the JRB, which is 
mostly fed by these return flows (Garcia-Molla et al., 2013).  
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Figure 2.3. Jucar River Basin network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Albufera wetland is a freshwater lagoon with an area covering 2,430 ha, 
supporting very rich aquatic ecosystems. Since 1989, the Albufera was catalogued in 
the RAMSAR list, and was declared a special protected area for birds. The Albufera 
receives water from the return flows of the irrigation districts in the lower Jucar, mainly 
from the ARJ and the RB districts. Other flows originate from the Turia River Basin, 
and from the discharge of untreated and treated urban and industrial wastewaters in the 
adjacent municipalities. At present, the Albufera wetland suffers from the reduction of 
inflows originating from the Jucar River and the degradation of water quality. The Jucar 
River flows play an important role in improving the quality of urban and industrial 
wastewater discharges to the wetland and in meeting its water requirements. Water 
inflows reduction and quality degradation has caused severe damages to the Albufera 
wetland, triggering the decline of fish populations and recreation services (Sanchis, 
2011). 
2.4 Model components and scenarios  
The hydro-economic model includes three components: (1) a reduced form hydrological 
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model, (2) a regional economic model, and (3) an environmental benefit model. The 
features of each model and the estimation procedure used for its coefficients are 
described below. 
2.4.1 Reduced form hydrological model  
The model is applied, using data from the Jucar basin authority (CHJ, 2009). The model 
is calibrated to water allocations in both normal and drought periods, taking into 
account the response of the basin authority to three consecutive years in the last drought 
period from 2006 to 2008. Figure 2.3 presents the hydrological network of the basin, 
including the most important infrastructures, and water supply and demand nodes. 
The reduced form hydrological model estimates the volume of water availability 
that can be used for economic activities after considering the environmental restrictions. 
The mathematical formulation of the reduced form model is as follows: 
                      
       
                                                             (2.1) 
               
        
      
         
                                        (2.2) 
        
                                                                                                              (2.3) 
The mass balance equation (2.1) determines the water outflow      from a river 
reach d, which is equal to water inflow      minus the loss of water        
(including evaporation, seepage to aquifers and any other loss) and the diversions for 
irrigation     
  , and urban and industrial uses     
   . The continuity equation (2.2) 
guarantees the continuity of river flow, where the water inflow to the next river reach 
       is the sum of outflow from upstream river reach     , the return flows from 
previous irrigation districts [  
        
   ], the return flows from the cities [  
    
     
    ], and runoff entering that river reach from tributaries,      . Equation (2.3) 
states that the water outflow      from a river reach d must be greater than or equal 
to the minimum environmental flow   
    in that river reach.  
Water diversions for irrigation districts     
   and for urban and industrial uses 
    
   , and minimum environmental flows   
   , are governed by a set of allocation 
rules defined in the JRB‟s regulations, which are implemented by the basin authority in 
response to climate conditions and reservoir storage. The hydrological plan of the JRB 
defines surface water allocations in the basin following the historical water rights and 
the access to groundwater resources. The Alarcon agreement of 2001 transferred the 
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ownership of the Alarcon dam from farmers in the lower Jucar with seniority rights to 
the public administration, in exchange for guarantees on water rights and water use 
priority to these traditional districts. The agreement establishes that during drought 
situations, selected users could continue extracting surface water but they have to pay 
compensation to the traditional irrigation districts that are reducing surface extractions. 
Additionally, these traditional districts get a special authorization to substitute surface 
water for groundwater during drought, and the compensation covers the costs of 
groundwater pumping.  
The JRB drought plan, approved in 2007, includes an integrated system of 
hydrological indicators that are used to declare the state of alert or full drought. Drought 
events trigger progressively stronger measures as the drought situation worsens. The 
drought plan allocates water following the priority rules that guarantee the provision of 
urban, industrial and environmental demand, while giving low priority to irrigation 
(CHJ, 2007). The draft of the upcoming hydrological plan of the JRB proposes 
minimum environmental flows for the different reaches of the Jucar River, based on 
technical studies that evaluate ecosystem needs for each reach (CHJ, 2009).  
Water diversions for the different uses under the current institutional setting have 
been approximated by regression equations. These equations model the relationship 
between water diversion for each demand node (    
   or     
   ,
 
as dependent 
variables) and the net water inflow to the corresponding river reach (    , as an 
explanatory variable). These relationships have been calculated using data on water 
diversions and water inflows in each diversion node for a normal flow year and for each 
year in the last drought period (2006, 2007, and 2008). The advantage of using the 
regression approach instead of fixed allocation coefficients is that it captures implicitly 
the flexibility of the basin authority‟s response to drought including water allocation 
rules and reservoir operation regimes. The distinctive feature of the current management 
(baseline policy) in the JRB is the institutional approach to water management, based on 
river basin authorities that organize the collective action of stakeholders. This approach 
is based on negotiated arrangements and stakeholders‟ cooperation. The water 
allocations in the baseline policy are the result of this collective action process. These 
allocations are captured in the model through the use of the regression equations. When 
water market scenarios are simulated, the coefficients from the regression equations are 
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removed from the model, and market-based (equi-marginal principle) water allocations 
are driven by the optimization of economic benefits.  
Information on groundwater extractions by demand node has been incorporated 
exogenously into the reduced form hydrological model to cover the demand of each 
node (CHJ, 2009). It is assumed that groundwater use in the EM irrigation district 
decreases as drought severity intensifies, based on the observed cooperative behavior of 
farmers in the last two decades. This behavior is driven by the pressures of the basin 
authority with the political influence of the downstream stakeholders, calling for the 
control of extractions and threatening farmers by not issuing water rights (Sanz et al., 
2011; Esteban and Albiac, 2012). Increases in groundwater extractions in certain 
irrigation districts are allowed by the basin authority during drought periods within the 
framework of the Alarcon agreement. These additional extractions are restricted in the 
model based on past maximum pumping levels (IGME, 2009). In this paper, 
groundwater dynamics and pumping costs are held constant because of the short run 
nature of the model. Furthermore, the major groundwater extractions in the JRB are 
those of the EM aquifer, which is the largest aquifer system in Spain. Any changes in its 
water table level require a very long period of time. 
The interaction between the Jucar River and EM aquifer has been approximated by 
a linear regression equation covering the period 1984 to 2004. The dependent variable is 
the discharge   from aquifer to river, and the explanatory variable is groundwater 
pumping    . This approximation follows the results by Sanz et al. (2011) indicating 
that there is a linear relationship between the Jucar River depletion and groundwater 
extraction in the EM aquifer. Sanz et al. (2011) find that although groundwater 
extractions increased considerably from 1980s, the depletion of the aquifer has been 
lower than expected because of the aquifer recharge coming from the Jucar River. Only 
a contemporary (one period) river-aquifer interaction is included in the reduced form 
hydrological model, given the short run or static nature of the analysis.  
2.4.2 Regional economic model  
The regional economic model accounts for the decision processes made by irrigation 
users in the five major irrigation districts (EM, CJT, ARJ, ESC, and RB) and by urban 
users in the three main cities (Valencia, Albacete, and Sagunto).  
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A farm-level model has been developed for each irrigation district, which 
maximizes farmers‟ private benefits of the chosen crop mix subject to technical and 
resource constraints. A Leontief production function technology is assumed with fixed 
input and output prices, in which farmers are price takers. The optimization problem is 
given by the following formulation: 
      
        
                                                                                                   (2.4)  
subject to 
                                                                                              (2.5) 
                                                                                                               (2.6) 
                                                                                                                 (2.7) 
                                                                                                (2.8) 
                                                                                                                             (2.9) 
where   
   is private benefit in irrigation district   and     
  is net income per hectare of 
crop i using irrigation technology j. The decision variable in the optimization problem is 
    , the area of crop   under irrigation technology  . Crops are aggregated into three 
representative groups: cereals, vegetables, and fruit trees. Irrigation technologies are 
flood, sprinkler, and drip. Cereals can be irrigated using flood and sprinkler systems, 
and vegetables and fruit trees can be irrigated using flood and drip systems.  
The land constraint (2.5) represents the irrigation area equipped with technology   
in district  ,        . The water constraint (2.6) represents the water available in 
district  ,        , which is the sum of surface water and groundwater extractions. 
Parameter     is gross water requirements per hectare of crop   with technology  . The 
water constraint level is the connecting variable between the economic optimization 
model of irrigation districts and the reduced form hydrological model. The labor 
constraint (2.7) represents labor availability in district  ,        . Parameter      is 
labor requirements per hectare of crop   using technology  .  
The aggregation constraint (2.8) forces crop production activities      to fall within 
a convex combination of historically observed crop mixes      , where the index   
indicates the number of the observed crop mixes. The aggregate supply response 
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solution determines endogenously the weight variables    during the optimization 
process, because the optimal solution is the weighted sum of the corresponding crops 
mixes (Önal and McCarl, 1991). Mathematical programming models have to account 
for the aggregation problem when performing an analysis at regional level, because 
farms are heterogeneous. The convex combination approach solves the aggregation 
problem using theoretical results from linear programming. Other procedures such as 
the representative farm approach and the positive mathematical programming make 
quite strong assumptions on farm responses.  
Detailed information on the technical coefficients and parameters have been 
collected from field surveys, expert consultation, statistical reports, and reviewing the 
literature. This information covers crop yields and prices, subsidies, crop water and 
labor requirements, irrigation efficiencies, water and production costs, land and labor 
availability, and groundwater extractions (GV, 2009; GCLM, 2009; INE, 2009; 
MARM, 2010). The district models are calibrated for the year 2009 (a normal flow 
year), with observed crop area, water use, and net income of each irrigation district by 
crop group (Table 2.1).  
For urban water uses, an economic surplus model has been developed for each city 
in the basin. The model maximizes social surplus given by the consumer and producer 
surplus from water use in each city, subject to several physical and institutional 
constraints. The optimization problem is:  
      
             
 
 
        
          
 
 
        
                         (2.10) 
subject to 
                                                                                                                    (2.11) 
                                                                                                                       (2.12) 
where   
    is the consumer and producer surplus of city u. Variables Qdu and Qsu are 
water demand and supply by/to the city u, respectively. Parameters adu and bdu are the 
intercept and slope of the inverse demand function, while parameters asu and bsu are the 
intercept and slope of the water supply function. Equation (2.11) states that supply must 
be greater than or equal to demand. The quantity supplied, Qsu, is the connecting 
variable between urban use optimization models and the reduced form hydrological 
model. This paper adapts the empirical water demand findings for Valencia, Albacete, 
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and Sagunto from the study by Collazos (2004). Urban water use decisions are 
simulated through the price mechanism, in which information on changed supplies is 
transmitted through price changes. Information on urban water prices and costs are 
taken from the Jucar basin authority reports (CHJ, 2009) (Table 2.1).   
2.4.3 Environmental benefit model  
The river basin model accounts for environmental benefits generated by the main 
aquatic ecosystem in the JRB, the Albufera wetland. Wetlands provide a wide range of 
services to society, including food production, groundwater recharge, nutrient cycling, 
carbon sequestration, habitat for valuable species, and recreational opportunities 
(Woodward and Wui, 2001). Estimating wetland benefits in a way that makes them 
comparable with the benefits derived from other uses is helpful for the design of 
sustainable water management policies. 
The environmental benefit model developed here considers only water inflows to 
the Albufera wetland originating from irrigation return flows of the ARJ and RB 
irrigation districts. Inflows and benefits of the Albufera wetland are given by the 
following expressions: 
                
          
         
         
                                                     (2.13) 
           
                                                                     
                                                   
                                                   
                         (2.14) 
 
where equation (2.13) determines the quantity of water flowing to the Albufera wetland 
from irrigation return flows,          . Parameters α and β represent the shares of return 
flows that feed the wetland from the ARJ and RB irrigation districts, respectively. The 
products [    
          
   ] and [   
         
  )] are return flows from the ARJ and RB 
irrigation districts, respectively. Equation (2.14) represents economic environmental 
benefits,          , from the services that the Albufera wetland provides to society. The 
economic environmental benefit function is assumed to be a piecewise linear function of 
water inflows,          , to the wetland. This function expresses shifts in the ecosystem 
status when critical thresholds of environmental conditions (water inflows in this case) 
E1 and E2 are reached, while E3 is the maximum observed inflow. This functional form 
is adapted from the study by Scheffer et al. (2001), indicating that ecosystems do not  
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Table 2.1. Parameters of the JRB model. 
Parameters Value Unit 
Total irrigated area 157,000 ha 
   Cereals area 70,650 ha 
   Vegetables area 21,980 ha 
   Fruit trees area 64,370 ha 
   Flood irrigation area 28,260 ha 
   Sprinkler irrigation area 58,090 ha 
   Drip irrigation area 70,650 ha 
Average irrigation water price  0.05 €/m3 
Average urban water price 0.71 €/m3  
Inverse water demand functions for cities 
  
   Intercept (adu)   
       Valencia 6 € 
       Albacete 6 € 
       Sagunto 6 € 
   Slope (bdu)   
        Valencia -0.06  €/Mm3 
        Albacete -0.3  €/Mm3 
        Sagunto -0.5  €/Mm3  
Benefit function of the Albufera from water inflows 
  
      Intercept (    33 10
6 € 
   First threshold of inflows to the Albufera (    51 Mm
3
 
      Intercept (    -214 10
6 € 
      Slope (    4.8 €/m
3
 
   Second threshold of inflows to the Albufera (    78 Mm
3
 
      Intercept (    43 10
6 €  
      Slope (    1.8 €/m
3 
 
   Third threshold of inflows to the Albufera (    138 Mm
3
 
Economic value of the Albufera wetland 13,600 €/ha 
 
always respond smoothly to changes in environmental conditions, but they may switch 
abruptly to a contrasting alternative state when these conditions approach certain critical 
levels.           is the connecting variable between the environmental benefit model, 
the economic regional model, and the reduced form hydrological model. 
The empirical benefit function of the Albufera wetland has been developed in two 
steps. First, time series data of various ecosystem health indicators of the wetland have 
been collected, including the quantity of water inflows, the number of water 
replenishments, chlorophyll a and phosphorus concentrations, and salinity levels. These 
indicators are used to calculate a unique health index of the wetland for each year of 
available data, following the methodology developed by Jorgensen et al. (2010). The 
health index ranges between 0 (bad ecological status) and 1 (good ecological status). 
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Once the health index for each year is calculated, then thresholds E1 and E2 under which 
the ecosystem status changes significantly are determined. 
Second, the information on the economic value of the wetland is only available for 
one year. The value of this particular year is extrapolated to the other years as a linear 
function of the health index of each year. This linear extrapolation assumes that the 
environmental benefits of the wetland are a function of its ecosystem health. Once the 
economic values are calculated for each year, the relationships between the 
environmental benefits and water inflows to the wetland are estimated.  
The economic value of the Albufera wetland, used to estimate the environmental 
benefit function, is approximated using the results from Del Saz and Perez (1999) on the 
recreation value of the Albufera wetland in 1995, and other studies from the literature 
that estimate non-recreation values of wetlands (Woodward and Wui, 2001; Brander et 
al., 2006). The economic value of the Albufera and the parameter estimates of the 
benefit function are presented in Table 2.1.  
2.4.4 JRB optimization model 
The JRB optimization model integrates the three components presented earlier. The 
model maximizes total basin benefits subject to the hydrological constraints and the 
constraints of the individual economic sector optimization models. The optimization 
problem for the whole river basin takes the following form: 
                                                                                                      (2.15) 
subject to the constraints in equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.5), (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9), 
(2.11), (2.12), (2.13), and a set of constraints that defines the allocation of water among 
users depending on the policy intervention alternative that will be presented in section 
4.5:                                        
    
                                                                                                             (2.16) 
     
 
                                                                                                               (2.17) 
where    is the benefits of each demand node   and           is the environmental 
benefits provided by the Albufera wetland to society. Equations (2.16) and (2.17) are 
used to allocate water among users under the baseline policy (institutional approach). 
Equation (2.16) ensures that water diversion,     
 , for each demand node   located in a 
river reach   is a function,     , of net water inflow to the corresponding river reach, 
                                                                                      Modeling water scarcity and droughts 
 
32 
 
    . This equation incorporates the institutional intervention in water allocations. 
Equation (2.17) ensures that the sum of water diversions to all users,     
 , does not 
exceed water available for the whole basin,  . Under the water market scenarios, the 
allocations to users are determined fully by maximizing the entire basin‟s benefits 
(equation 2.15), subject to the total basin water availability (equation 2.17). The 
regression equations (equation 2.16) are removed from the model. Therefore, water is 
allocated to the higher-value uses (efficient allocation) without any institutional 
intervention in allocations. The labor constraint (2.7) is relaxed to allow labor transfers 
among irrigation districts. The market price of water is determined endogenously in the 
model based on the shadow value of water.  
2.4.5 Model application and scenarios   
The modeling framework is used to analyze the impacts of climate change-induced 
drought on water uses in the JRB. Given the uncertainty associated with future climate 
change, three alternate drought scenarios are developed to reflect a range of possible 
future water availability in the basin. Drought scenarios expressed as a percentage 
reduction of normal year water inflows are the following: mild (-22 percent), severe (-
44 percent), and very severe (-66 percent). The characterization of drought scenarios 
severity is based on historical water inflows following the classification procedure of 
drought severity by the Jucar basin authority. 
Estimations of climate change impacts in the Jucar basin indicate a reduction of 
water availability by 19 percent in the short-term (2010-2040), and 40 to 50 percent in 
the long-term (2070-2100) (Ferrer et al., 2012). A study by CEDEX (2010) forecasts 
water availability reductions between 5 and 12 percent for 2011-2040, between 13 and 
18 percent for 2041-2070, and between 24 and 32 percent for 2071-2100. The drought 
scenarios considered in this paper cover the range of these estimations.  
The model is used to assess the economic and environmental effects of alternative 
drought management policies under the drought scenarios described above. Three 
policy intervention alternatives are considered: 
Baseline policy: Represents the current water management approach implemented in 
the JRB to cope with water scarcity and drought. This approach allows flexible adaptive 
changes in water allocations, based in the negotiation and cooperation between users.  
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Figure 2.4. Surface water inflows to the main reservoirs and river reaches (top) and 
diversions for the demand nodes (down) in the Jucar River Basin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The special characteristic of this approach is that all water stakeholders are involved in 
the decision making process, and environmental concerns are considered.  
Ag-Urban water market: There are increasing calls from international water 
institutions, water experts, and the Spanish government for market-based allocation of 
water during droughts. Water markets would allow water transfers between willing 
buyers and sellers, leading to welfare gains. This policy intervention highlights the 
question of whether these gains predicted by economic theory are quantitatively 
significant in practice. Under this policy, water trading is allowed among irrigation 
districts and with urban users in the JRB.  
Environmental water market: In recent decades, the water market policy to acquire 
water for the environment has been gaining ground in some parts of the world, such as 
in Australia and the United States. This policy consists of having the basin authority 
participating in the water market to acquire water for the Albufera wetland. As such, the 
wetland is competing for water with other users and does not depend passively on 
remaining return flows.  
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Table 2.2. Relationships between water diversions and inflows. 
Demand nodes  Regression equations
*
 
Albacete
**
                                                                    (0.98) 
EM irrigation district
**
                                                                    (0.98) 
Jucar River-EM aquifer interaction
**
                                                                           (0.50) 
Valencia
†
                                                                    (0.86) 
Sagunto
***
                                                                      (0.93) 
CJT irrigation district
††
                                            
           (0.99) 
ARJ irrigation district
† 
                                                                       (0.76) 
ESC irrigation district
†† 
                                                                        (0.57) 
RB irrigation district
***
                                      
            (0.91) 
Note:          = Water inflows to Alarcon dam;       = Water inflows to Tous dam;      = Water 
inflows from small rivers 1;          = Irrigation return flows from previous irrigation districts;    = 
Groundwater pumping. 
* 
R
2 
are
 
in parenthesis; 
** 
Regression coefficients significant at p<0.01; 
*** 
Regression coefficients significant at p<0.05; 
† 
Regression coefficients significant at p<0.1; 
†† 
Regression 
coefficients significant at p<0.2. 
 
The reason for having two separate policies for water trading (Ag-Urban, and 
Environment) is mainly because of the nature of agents involved. While in the Ag 
Urban water market the traders are private decision makers, the water for environmental 
purposes has the public agency as a steward for the environment, which sometimes 
creates conflicts with the other sectors. The GAMS package has been used for model 
development and scenario simulation. The model has been solved using a mixed integer 
nonlinear programming algorithm.    
2.5 Data sources and hydrological relationships   
Information about water inflows to the main reservoirs and river reaches has been taken 
from the reports and modeling efforts of the Jucar basin authority. The annual reports 
provide historical data on gauged inflows in the basin, while the hydrological model of 
the JRB “AQUATOOL” provides additional information on the circulating flows in the 
basin (Andreu et al. 1996; CHJ, 2002, 2012; Collazos, 2004) (Figure 2.4). 
Water diversions for irrigation have been calculated using detailed information on 
crop areas and water requirements, and irrigation technologies and efficiencies in each 
irrigation district (INE, 2009; GV, 2009; GCLM, 2009). Water diversions for cities and 
industries have been taken from the Jucar basin authority (CHJ, 2002, 2009), where the 
water diversion to the nuclear power plant of Cofrentes (henceforth NCC) is always 
maintained at a fixed level (Figure 2.4).  
Return flows have been calculated as the fraction of diverted water not used in crop 
evapotranspiration [  
        
   ] and urban consumption [  
         
    ]. Most  
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Table 2.3. Comparison between simulated (Sim) and observed (Ob) water diversions 
(Mm
3
). 
Demand nodes 
Normal flow 
year 
2006 2007 2008 Statistical measures 
Sim  Ob  Sim  Ob  Sim  Ob  Sim  Ob  R
2
 NSE  
Albacete 17 17 8 8 11 11 9 10 0.99 0.98 
EM 13 13 0 0.2 4 5 1 0 0.99 0.98 
NCC 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 - 1 
Valencia 94 95 41 42 59 47 56 66 0.86 0.86 
Sagunto 8 8 3 4 5 5 5 4 0.84 0.81 
CJT  64 70 6 7 9 14 7 5 0.99 0.98 
ARJ  200 213 92 120 129 100 123 110 0.76 0.76 
ESC  33 38 10 20 18 10 17 10 0.55 0.54 
RB  243 254 87 110 136 110 126 120 0.91 0.91 
Albufera 51 55 21 27 30 24 29 26 0.85 0.85 
Total 738 777 282 352 415 340 387 365 0.91 0.91 
 
return flows originate from irrigation, with overall irrigation efficiency estimated at 60 
percent, given the efficiency of farm plots and primary and secondary conveyance 
networks. Information about the distribution of return flows is taken from the reports of 
the basin authority (CHJ, 2009). 
A good ecological status of the Albufera wetland is directly linked to the return 
flows from the ARJ and RB districts in the lower Jucar. Studies by the Jucar basin 
authority provide information on the amount and sources of water flows feeding the 
Albufera wetland during recent years (CHJ, 2009). Following these studies, the 
Albufera receives 28 and 23 percent of the return flows from the ARJ and RB districts, 
respectively. These return flows distribution coefficients are held constant for all 
drought scenarios.  
Table 2.2 presents the relationships between water diversions for demand nodes 
and water inflows to the diversion nodes, and also the Jucar River-EM aquifer 
relationship. For simplicity, all estimated relationships have been assumed linear, except 
in the case of the CJT irrigation district for which a quadratic specification seems more 
suitable. These equations are used to reproduce the observed water allocations to users 
under normal flow and drought years. After validation, they are used to simulate the 
allocation of water under the baseline policy for the hypothetical future drought 
scenarios.       
The reduced form hydrological model is validated by comparing the simulated and 
observed values of water diversions in the demand nodes for normal flow and drought 
years. The robustness of the model results are tested using the coefficient of 
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determination (R
2
) and the Nash-Sutcliffe efficiency coefficient (NSE, ranges from 1 to 
-∞) (Krause et al., 2005). The validation results verify the robustness of the reduced 
form hydrological model, because the values of R
2
 range between 0.55 and 0.99, and 
the values of NSE range between 0.54 and 1. The outcomes are broadly consistent, 
indicating that the model reproduces adequately the hydrologic conditions (Table 2.3).  
2.6 Results and discussion  
The economic and environmental outcomes from the three policy alternatives and 
drought scenarios are depicted in tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6.  
2.6.1 Baseline policy  
Social welfare, which is the sum of private and environmental benefits, in the JRB 
under the Baseline policy and normal flow conditions amounts to 548 million € (Table 
2.4). Water use is 1,149 Mm
3
, of which 672 is surface water and 477 is groundwater 
resources (Table 2.5). Irrigation activities generate 190 million € from using 1,030 
Mm
3
. The social surplus of urban centers is 283 million € and they use 119 Mm3. About 
60 Mm
3
 of return flows from the ARJ and RB irrigation districts feed the Albufera 
wetland, which support the good ecological status of the wetland. Environmental 
benefits provided by the Albufera wetland are 75 million €.  
Results from drought scenarios indicate that drought events may reduce social 
welfare in the JRB up to 138 million €. Water use patterns show a reduction in 
extractions of surface water (up to 52%) and groundwater (up to 9%). The share of 
groundwater expands when drought increases in severity, from 42 percent in normal 
years up to 57 percent in very severe drought years. Irrigation activities face the main 
adjustment to water scarcity, with almost 90 percent of restrictions allocated to 
irrigation and the remainder allocated to urban uses.   
The irrigation sector reduces surface water extractions up to 296 Mm
3
 and 
groundwater extractions up to 52 Mm
3
. Increased pumping is allowed in the lower 
Jucar, while the curtailment of groundwater extractions is achieved in the EM irrigation 
district where farmers have been cooperating to control extractions during the last two 
decades. The reasons explaining this cooperation are the rising pumping costs from the 
very large aquifer depletion, and the significant pressures from downstream users losing 
water, and from the basin authority. 
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Table 2.4. Benefits and irrigation labor use under the policy and drought scenarios. 
Aggregate results Normal flow 
Mild 
drought 
Severe 
drought 
Very severe 
drought 
Baseline policy 
Private benefits (10
6
 €)         
  Irrigation sector 190.3 170.9 152.7 135.4 
  Urban sector 282.6 276.3 266.4 240.9 
  Total 472.9 447.2 419.1 376.3 
Environmental benefits (10
6
 €) 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Social welfare (10
6
 €)  547.6 484.4 452.1 409.3 
Irrigation labor use (Jobs)
*
 15,100 13,815 12,500 11,230 
Ag-Urban water market 
Private benefits (10
6
 €)          
  Irrigation sector 190.5 174.9 161.2 147.5 
  Urban sector 282.6 276.3 266.4 240.9 
  Total 473.1 451.2 427.6 388.4 
Environmental benefits (10
6
 €)  74.7 33.0 33.0 33.0 
Social welfare (10
6
 €)  547.8 484.2 460.6 421.4 
Irrigation labor use (Jobs) 15,110 14,350 13,620 12,830 
Environmental water market 
Private benefits (10
6
 €)           
  Irrigation sector 195.4 180.2 165.2 160.1 
  Urban sector 282.6 276.3 266.4 240.9 
  Total 478.0 456.5 431.6 401.0 
Environmental benefits (10
6
 €) 277.6 275.9 272.6 255.7 
Social welfare (10
6
 €)   755.6 732.4 704.2 656.7 
Irrigation labor use (Jobs) 14,610 13,720 12,440 10,560 
* 
1 job unit= 1,920 hours/year. 
 
The benefit losses to the irrigation sector in the Baseline policy range between 19 
and 55 million € under mild and very severe drought conditions, and the irrigated area is 
reduced by 14,200 and 39,000 ha, respectively. Generally, irrigation districts reduce the 
irrigated area of cereals and fruit trees, while maintaining the area of vegetables. By 
irrigation technology, the share of flood irrigation decreases while the share of sprinkler 
and drip irrigation increases (Table 2.6). These changes in land use and irrigation 
technology distribution result in declining water application rates as drought severity 
intensifies. 
Irrigation benefits in all five irrigation districts are reduced in drought years, but 
the impacts are distributed quite differently varying over space and severity of drought. 
Benefit losses in the traditional districts (ARJ, ESC, and RB) are larger than in the EM 
and CJT districts. Water use patterns show that the proportional cutback of surface 
water diversion during drought spells is lower in the traditional irrigation districts (ARJ, 
ESC, and RB), although with larger economic losses because they cannot totally 
substitute surface water with groundwater. The EM and CJT districts are based mostly 
on groundwater, which reduce their vulnerability to drought. 
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Table 2.5. Water use and return flows under the policy and drought scenarios (Mm
3
). 
Aggregate results 
Normal 
flow 
Mild 
drought 
Severe 
drought 
Very severe 
drought 
Baseline policy 
Water use          
  Irrigation sector 1,030 908 793 683 
  Urban sector
*
 119 105 90 74 
  Total 1,149 1,013 883 757 
Irrigation return flows          
  Return flows to river and aquifers 267 231 195 158 
  Return flows to Albufera 60 52 43 34 
  Total 327 283 238 192 
Ag-Urban water market 
Water use          
  Irrigation sector 1,030 908 793 683 
  Urban sector 119 105 90 74 
  Total 1,149 1,013 883 757 
Traded water  1 41 87 119 
Irrigation return flows          
  Return flows to river and aquifers 267 224 183 144 
  Return flows to Albufera 60 50 40 29 
  Total 327 274 223 173 
Environmental water market 
Water use          
  Irrigation sector 936 801 672 546 
  Urban sector 119 105 90 74 
  Total 1,055 906 762 620 
Traded water  95 148 169 201 
Irrigation return flows          
  Return flows to river and aquifers 232 184 135 88 
  Return flows to Albufera 49 38 23 7 
  Total 281 222 158 95 
Inflows to Albufera from trade  89 100 115 131 
* 
The quantity of urban water use shown in the table represents only the part of supply from the JRB. 
During droughts, the urban sector uses additional quantity of water from the Turia River to cover the 
demand of Valencia and Sagunto. 
 
The cropping pattern and irrigation technology distribution results show the water 
and land management options for adapting to water scarcity, which are changes of crop 
mix, land fallowing, and improving irrigation efficiency. However, the adaptive 
responses vary among the districts. Several factors may explain the varying adaptive 
responses of irrigation districts to increasing water scarcity. These are cropping patterns 
and crop diversification, the degree of irrigation modernization of the district, and the 
access to alternative water resources.    
The reduction in irrigation water extractions has negative impacts on the Albufera 
wetland, which is mostly fed by irrigation return flows. Total irrigation return flows 
decrease up to 135 Mm
3
, depending on the drought severity. Consequently, water 
inflows to the Albufera wetland dwindle – falling up to 26 Mm3. Under severe drought 
conditions, water inflows to the Albufera wetland are less than the critical threshold E1  
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Table 2.6. Land use under the policy and drought scenarios. 
Aggregate results Normal flow 
Mild 
drought 
Severe 
drought 
Very severe 
drought 
Baseline policy 
Irrigated area (ha) 156,830 142,615 130,530 117,780 
Cropping pattern (ha)         
  Cereals 70,430 63,460 58,060 52,055 
  Vegetables 22,540 20,090 18,390 16,720 
  Fruit trees 63,860 59,065 54,080 49,005 
Irrigation system share (%)         
  Flood 18 17 15 14 
  Sprinkler 37 37 38 38 
  Drip 45 46 47 48 
Ag-Urban water market 
Irrigated area (ha)   156,900 144,520 134,490 124,040 
Cropping pattern (ha)         
Cereals 70,420 62,760 56,590 50,400 
Vegetables 22,550 20,340 18,890 17,430 
Fruit trees 63,930 61,420 59,010 56,210 
Irrigation system share (%)         
Flood 18 16 14 12 
Sprinkler 37 37 38 38 
Drip 45 47 48 50 
Environmental water market 
Irrigated area (ha)  151,680 138,460 126,380 112,380 
Cropping pattern (ha)         
  Cereals 66,910 58,850 53,030 48,130 
  Vegetables 22,210 20,060 18,470 16,730 
  Fruit trees 52,560 59,550 54,880 47,520 
Irrigation system share (%)         
  Flood 17 14 11 8 
  Sprinkler 38 39 40 42 
  Drip 45 47 49 50 
 
equal to 51 Mm
3
, causing a regime shift in the ecosystem. Damages to the Albufera 
wetland under drought conditions are substantial and may exceed 50 percent of normal 
years benefit level.   
The current water regulation in the JRB guarantees the priority of urban water for 
the human population. During severe drought spells the urban demand must be fully 
satisfied first because of such priority rules. The simulated drought scenarios show a 
reduced supply to the main cities in the JRB. However, the full demand of Valencia and 
Sagunto is always met with additional water from the bordering Turia River Basin. 
During extreme drought periods, the provision of water to these cities is supplied 
equally from the Jucar and Turia Rivers. In the city of Albacete, the supply of water 
during dry periods is amended by pumping groundwater from the Eastern La Mancha 
aquifer (CHJ, 2009). The simulation results for the urban sector indicate that the 
provision of surface water for urban use from the Jucar River falls by almost half, while 
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groundwater extractions increase up to 8 Mm
3
. The losses of benefits during droughts in 
the urban sector are nearly 15 percent in the worst-case scenario, because water 
provision is maintained with additional extractions from the Turia River and the Eastern 
La Mancha aquifer, but at higher costs. Several rationing measures were also 
implemented in the JRB to reduce water demand such as the installation of advanced 
water meters and the promotion of the use of water-saving devices (CHJ, 2009). 
However, their effectiveness was quite limited, and they were not considered in our 
model. 
2.6.2 Ag-Urban water market 
Results for the Ag-Urban water market policy indicate that introducing water trading in 
the JRB increases private benefits up to 3 percent compared to the Baseline policy. 
Irrigation benefits increase under water markets up to 9 percent, and urban benefits 
remain unchanged. The reason is that water trading occurs only among irrigation 
districts, and there is no water transfer to the urban sector. Irrigation water shadow 
prices in the market are greater than the cost of alternative water resources available to 
the urban sector in the JRB. Long run policy analysis may reorder these results because 
of possible changes in relative shadow prices of irrigation and urban water use.  
Water trading becomes more pronounced as drought severity intensifies, with 
trades increasing from 1 Mm
3
 (under a normal flow scenario) up to 119 Mm
3 
(under 
very severe drought scenario). These results indicate that the benefits from 
implementing water markets are higher in drought situations compared to normal years. 
In normal years, the gains from the Ag-Urban water market policy are modest 
compared to the Baseline policy, which means that the current institutional approach 
used in the JRB to allocate water among users is almost efficient. During drought 
periods, Pareto improvements could be achieved by allowing water trading among 
irrigation districts. Hence, introducing water markets in the JRB could mitigate drought 
damages for irrigation activities. Moreover, drought damages become more evenly 
distributed among irrigation districts in the Ag-Urban water market policy compared to 
the Baseline policy.   
The water available under each drought scenario is the same for the Baseline and 
Ag-Urban water market policies. However, water markets increase consumption 
through crop evapotranspiration with additional reductions in return flows of up to 19 
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Mm
3
 (10%) compared to the Baseline policy. These 19 Mm
3
 of additional reductions 
are divided between 14 Mm
3
 of return losses to the Jucar River and aquifers, and 5 Mm
3
 
of return losses to the Albufera wetland. Under the Ag-Urban water market policy, 
farmers maximize their benefits from water use by increasing crop evapotranspiration, 
either by increasing crop area, crop switching, or changing irrigation technology. 
Under mild drought conditions, water inflows to the Albufera wetland are less than 
the critical threshold E1 equal to 51 Mm
3
, causing a shift in the ecosystem regime. The 
ecosystem regime shift takes place faster under the Ag-Urban water market policy 
compared to the Baseline policy. The reason is that the Albufera wetland is linked to the 
ARJ and RB irrigation districts that display a lower value of water than other districts. 
Under the drought scenarios, the ARJ and RB districts gain by selling water to other 
districts. As a consequence, return flows to the wetland under the Ag-Urban water 
market policy decline compared to the Baseline policy, leading to further desiccation 
and ecosystems degradation.  
Social welfare in the JRB under mild drought conditions decrease with the Ag-
Urban water market policy compared to the Baseline policy. Under severe and very 
severe droughts, the Albufera receives fewer inflows from the Ag-Urban water market 
policy than from the Baseline policy, but environmental benefits remain unchanged 
because they have already reached their lowest value. These results indicate that Ag-
Urban water market reduces water availability to environmental uses, despite the fact 
that the small legally-required environmental flows are included in the hydro-economic 
model. However, the Albufera wetland does not have at present minimum binding 
inflows, and therefore receives less water under the Ag-Urban water market policy.    
2.6.3 Environmental water market   
Under the Environmental water market policy, the basin authority operates in the water 
markets to purchase water for the Albufera wetland in order to maximize social welfare. 
Results indicate that basin‟s irrigation benefits may increase (up to 18%) compared to 
the Baseline policy. By introducing the Environmental water market policy, drought 
damages become more evenly distributed among irrigation districts, and the traditional 
irrigation districts (ARJ, ESC, and RB) become much less vulnerable to droughts 
compared to the Baseline policy.     
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Irrigation water use decreases up to 20 percent compared to the Baseline policy. 
Irrigation water is more efficiently used under the Environmental water market policy 
compared to the Baseline and Ag-Urban water market policies. However, return flows 
fall significantly up to 51 percent reducing the Jucar River streamflows, aquifer 
recharge and return flows to the Albufera. The traded volume of water increases as 
drought severity intensifies from 95 Mm
3
 under normal flow scenario to 201 Mm
3 
under 
very severe drought. Further, the traded volume of water increases in the Environmental 
water market policy compared to the Ag-Urban water market policy to meet growing 
environmental and irrigation demand. 
Water allocated to the Albufera wetland coming from irrigation in the market is 
between 89 and 131 Mm
3
, securing always a fixed amount of water (138 Mm
3
) flowing 
to the wetland. This amount is well above the minimum environmental requirements of 
the Albufera wetland set by the basin authority (60 Mm
3
), and thus ensures its good 
ecological status. Environmental benefits provided by the Albufera wetland to society 
increase considerably, and so does the social welfare of the JRB. Water reallocated from 
crops with low to high marginal value of water is between 6 and 70 Mm
3
.    
Under the Environmental water market policy, the irrigated area falls in all drought 
scenarios (up to 5%) compared to the Baseline policy. The areas of cereals and fruit 
trees are reduced, while the area of vegetables remains broadly unchanged. For 
irrigation technology, the share of flood irrigation falls significantly, while the share of 
sprinkler and drip irrigation increases. As a consequence of the fall of land under 
production, irrigation labor use declines compared to the Baseline policy.  
The results of the Environmental water market policy depend on the economic 
valuation of the Albufera wetland assumed in the empirical application. A sensitivity 
analysis has been conducted in order to assess the results from the Environmental water 
market policy, and their robustness to different economic valuation estimates of the 
wetland (Table 2.7). Results do not change until the economic valuation estimate is 
changed by a factor of 25, from 13,600 €/ha estimate to 340,000 €/ha (high) and 544 
€/ha (low).  
The Albufera wetland already receives the optimal inflow (the maximum allowed 
in the model) for the 13,600 €/ha estimate, and for higher valuation estimates there is no 
need to purchase more water from the irrigation districts. This implies that the baseline  
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Table 2.7. Sensitivity analysis with different ecosystem values. 
 
Normal 
flow 
Mild 
drought 
Severe 
drought 
Very severe 
drought 
Base case ecosystem value (13,600  €/ha) 
Irrigation private benefits (10
6
 €) 195.4 180.2 165.2 160.1 
Environmental benefits (10
6
 €)  277.6 275.9 272.6 255.7 
Inflows to Albufera from trade (Mm
3
) 89 100 115 131 
High ecosystem value (340,000 €/ha) 
Irrigation private benefits (10
6
 €) 195.4 180.2 165.2 160.1 
Environmental benefits (10
6
 €) 7281.9 7280.2 7276.8 7260.0 
Inflows to Albufera from trade (Mm
3
) 89 100 115 131 
Low ecosystem value (544 €/ha) 
Irrigation private benefits (10
6
 €) 191.6 176.3 163.1 147.5 
Environmental benefits (10
6
 €) 3.2 1.6 0.0 1.3 
Inflows to Albufera from trade (Mm
3
) 21 33 45 0 
 
ecosystem value is high enough to convince society to prioritize ecosystem health rather 
than damaging it. However, a lower ecosystem value modifies the outcome from the 
Environmental water market policy. Water inflows to the Albufera wetland fall for the 
low valuation estimate, and less water is purchased from the irrigation districts upsetting 
consequently the farmers‟ private benefits from selling water. These results call for an 
accurate valuation of the ecosystem services provided to society by the wetland, in order 
to avoid misleading decisions with respect to ecosystem protection. 
2.7 Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper presents the development and application of a policy-relevant integrated 
hydro-economic model. The contribution of this paper to previous hydro-economic 
modeling efforts stems from the development of a reduced form hydrological 
component, including theoretical concepts, data requirements, calibration, and use for 
climate and policy analysis. The idea is basically that when a detailed hydrological 
component is not available, a calibrated reduced form can be used to predict water 
flows, becoming a component of hydro-economic modeling. Furthermore, the hydro-
economic model includes a detailed regional economic component, and it accounts for 
ecosystem benefits in a way that makes them comparable with the benefits derived from 
other water uses. This modeling approach could be easily applied to most basins around 
the world.   
The model has been used for empirical water policy analysis in an arid and 
semiarid basin in Southeastern Spain, the Jucar River Basin, which is a good case for 
studying policies dealing with water scarcity and drought impacts from the impending 
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climate change. The Jucar River is under severe stress, with acute water scarcity 
problems and escalating degradation of ecosystems. This is a common situation in many 
arid and semiarid basins around the world, and the empirical findings provide valuable 
insights to policy-makers not only in Spain but also in these arid and semiarid basins.  
The implementation of a pure water market policy in the Jucar River Basin show 
modest gains compared to the current institutional setting. Yet, the water market 
achieves a more even distribution of drought losses among irrigation districts. The 
reason could be that the current institutions involve asymmetric negotiation power 
among users in the basin authority. However, the water market entails a reduction of the 
water available to the environment, causing faster ecosystem regime shifts compared to 
what may happen under the current institutional setting. The reason is that water is 
mostly a common pool resource with environmental externalities, and markets disregard 
these externalities leading to excessive water extractions and damages to ecosystems. 
 Having the basin authority operating in the water market to acquire water for the 
Albufera wetland seems to be an appealing policy to keep up with the basin‟s increasing 
demand for water and to correct the pure market failure. The main effects of such a 
policy are improved social and private benefits of the basin, reduced vulnerability of 
irrigation districts to droughts, and a secure, fixed amount of water flowing to the 
Albufera wetland that ensures its good ecological status. Some negative effects include 
substantial decreases of the Jucar River streamflows and aquifer recharge, and the fall of 
employment in irrigation.   
The empirical results highlight the advantages of negotiation and stakeholders‟ 
cooperation, which is the current institutional approach to water management in Spain. 
Indeed, compared to a pure water market policy (Pareto-efficient solution), this 
institutional approach achieves almost the same economic outcomes and better 
environmental outcomes. The policy implications of these findings highlight the 
importance of stakeholders‟ cooperation, and call for a reconsideration of water 
policies. Water management arrangements and policies in arid and semiarid basins 
around the world are mostly based on command and control instruments or pure 
economic instruments, disregarding the potential of stakeholders‟ cooperation. These 
instruments fail because they lack legitimacy and knowledge of local conditions.  
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The findings in the Jucar River Basin seem to indicate the importance of collective 
action in achieving a more sustainable water management. But these results do not 
imply that one type of policy instrument is superior to others for advancing sustainable 
water management under all circumstances. Some authors warn against the use of a 
single type of policy instrument (panacea) for solving water management problems 
(Ostrom et al. 2007). Water markets and collective action are alternative approaches to 
achieve welfare gains in the form of private and social benefits. Both approaches are 
intertwined though, because the water trading experiences worldwide indicate that pure 
markets tend to disregard third party effects, including environmental impacts. Well 
functioning water markets would require a great deal of regulation or cooperation by 
stakeholders within a strong institutional setting. Conversely, the institutional approach 
in countries such as Spain would work better by using carefully-designed economic 
instruments. These incentives would introduce more flexibility into the institutional 
process of decision making and implementation. 
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Chapter 3  
 
Cooperative water management and ecosystem protection under 
scarcity and drought in arid and semiarid regions 
 
 
Abstract  
Climate change impacts and the growing concern on environmental water demand are 
further increasing competition for scarce water resources in many arid and semiarid 
regions worldwide. Under these circumstances, new water allocation mechanisms based 
on the involvement of stakeholders are needed, for an efficient and fair allocation of 
water and income among uses. This paper develops a cooperative game theory 
framework in order to analyze water management policies that could address scarcity 
and drought in a typical arid and semiarid basin in Southeastern Spain. The results 
provide clear evidence that achieving cooperation reduces drought damage costs. 
However, cooperation may have to be regulated by public agencies, such as a basin 
authority, when scarcity is very high, in order to protect ecosystems and maintain 
economic benefits. The cooperative game theory solutions and stability indexes 
examined in this paper demonstrate the importance of incorporating the strategic 
behavior of water stakeholders for the design of acceptable and stable basin-wide 
drought mitigation policies. 
 
Keywords Cooperative solutions, Game theory, River basin modeling, Water 
economics, Water scarcity 
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3.1 Introduction 
Global water resources are under increasing pressures that create growing water scarcity 
and quality problems, giving rise to complex social conflicts and environmental 
degradation. Water extractions across the world have increased more than six fold in the 
last century, much above the rate of population growth (UNDP, 2006). It is estimated 
that about 35 percent of the world population suffers from severe water stress and about 
65 percent of global river flows and aquatic ecosystems are under moderate to high 
threats of degradation (Alcamo et al., 2000; Vörösmarty et al., 2010).  
Water scarcity has become widespread in most arid and semiarid regions, including 
river basins such as the Yellow, Jordan, Murray-Darling, Colorado, and Rio Grande 
(UNDP, 2006; Schwabe et al., 2013). Projected future climate change impacts would 
further exacerbate the current situation of water scarcity in arid and semiarid regions. 
These regions would likely suffer a decrease in water resources availability and 
experience longer, more severe, and frequent droughts (IPCC, 2014).   
Emerging social demands for environmental protection in the form of secured 
minimum flows for water-dependent ecosystems further increase competition for 
already scarce water in arid and semiarid regions, especially during dry years. Water-
dependent ecosystems, such as wetlands, provide a diverse range of goods and services 
to society, including habitat for valuable species, flood control, groundwater 
replenishment, water quality improvement, waste disposal, and recreational 
opportunities (Woodward and Wui, 2001). However, water-dependent ecosystem 
services are external to markets, and their social values are overlooked in water 
allocation decisions. For instance, an estimated 50 percent of world wetlands have 
disappeared over the last century (Finlayson et al., 1999).    
Several policy responses have been suggested to cope with water scarcity and to 
mitigate the negative impacts of droughts for the different water use sectors. These 
policies include reducing water allocations, water transfers, conjunctive use of ground 
and surface waters, groundwater banking, recycling and reuse of wastewater, seawater 
desalination, improving water use efficiency, adopting water conserving-technologies, 
changing crop mix, setting minimum environmental flows, and implementing economic 
instruments such as water pricing and water trade including water purchases for 
environmental purposes.   
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These policy alternatives have been previously analyzed in several studies such as 
Booker et al. (2005); Howitt et al. (2014); Kirby et al. (2014); and Zilberman et al. 
(1998). However, the existing literature, while assessing solutions to drought situations 
using engineering, economic and institutional approaches, usually overlooks one 
important aspect, which is the strategic behavior of individual stakeholders. The 
analysis of the strategic behavior of stakeholders is essential to test the acceptability and 
stability of policy solutions aimed at basin-wide drought mitigation.  
This gap is addressed in this paper by developing a cooperative game theory (CGT) 
framework in order to analyze water management policies to deal with scarcity and 
drought at basin scale. The paper contributes to the literature on water policy through 
the inclusion of the strategic behavior of various stakeholders, and ecosystem benefits in 
the river water management problem. Several CGT solution concepts and stability 
indexes are used in order to find efficient and fair allocations of water and income 
among river users under various climate scenarios. In addition, the analysis considers 
the likelihood for ecosystem protection success. 
The CGT deals with games in which stakeholders (players) choose to cooperate by 
forming coalitions and sharing fairly the benefits from those coalitions. In particular, 
CGT favors agreements that include all possible players (grand coalition) and it 
provides several benefit sharing mechanisms (solution concepts) based on different 
notions of fairness. The purpose is finding the incentives for cooperation among 
stakeholders in order to achieve the economic efficient outcomes for the coalitions. The 
advantage of using CGT compared to conventional optimization models is its ability to 
address both efficiency and equity principles, which would promote acceptable and 
stable cooperative outcomes (Dinar et al., 2008). 
The CGT has been applied to different water management problems in the 
literature (Parrachino et al., 2006; Madani, 2010). Some examples are the allocation of 
the costs of a multipurpose water resources development project in the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (Straffin and Heaney, 1981), the allocation of environmental control 
costs among polluters in the San Joaquin Valley of California (Dinar and Howitt, 1997), 
the equitable distribution of benefits among competing water uses at basin scale in 
Canada (Wang et al., 2008), the efficient sharing of a hypothetical river among 
countries (Ambec and Ehlers, 2008), the allocation of the benefits of cooperative 
groundwater management among pumpers in the Eastern La Mancha aquifer in Spain 
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(Esteban and Dinar, 2013), and the development of optimal operation policies for a 
hypothetical multi-operator reservoir systems (Madani and Hooshyar, 2014).     
The CGT framework is applied to the Jucar River Basin (JRB) of Spain, which is a 
good case for studying the strategic behavior of stakeholders and policies to confront 
water scarcity and drought impacts from the impending climate change. The JRB region 
is semiarid and the river is under severe stress with acute water scarcity problems and 
escalating degradation of ecosystems. Another interesting aspect of the JRB is that there 
have been already successful policies leading to stakeholders‟ cooperation. In particular, 
the curtailment of water extractions in the Eastern La Mancha aquifer that were 
threatening the activities of downstream stakeholders (Esteban and Albiac, 2012).    
3.2 Cooperative game theory framework 
This section presents the CGT framework used to analyze water management policies 
addressing scarcity and drought at basin scale. Assume that a basin includes n˃1 users 
(players in the game). The users consider a cooperative management of the basin by 
agreeing to share water resources. Initially, the users have predetermined administrative 
water allocations depending on the climate condition. Under the cooperative water 
sharing agreement, the agency responsible for water allocation reallocates water among 
uses so that the whole basin benefits are maximized. When additional benefits are 
obtained through this cooperative agreement compared to non-cooperation (status quo), 
the water agency needs to distribute these benefits among the cooperating users in a fair 
way that would sustain cooperation.  
Let N be the set of all players in the game, S is the set of all feasible coalitions, and 
s (s  S) is one feasible coalition. The singleton coalitions are {l}, l=1,2,..., n, and the 
grand coalition is {N}. Assume that the objective of the water agency is to maximize the 
benefits,   , of any feasible coalition in the basin, s, by efficiently allocating water 
among the players in that coalition. Let      be the characteristic function of coalition s, 
which is the best value that such coalition can obtain. The cooperative water sharing 
agreement takes the following form: 
                                                                                                             (3.1) 
subject to 
                                                                                                                     (3.2) 
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where Bl is the private net benefits from water use of player l in coalition s. The water 
constraint (3.2) states that the sum over players, l, in coalition, s, of water use by each 
player,   , must be less than or equal to water available for that coalition,   .  
When additional benefits are obtained through this cooperative agreement 
compared to non-cooperation, the water agency overseeing the agreement needs to 
allocate these benefits among the cooperating players in a fair way in order to secure the 
acceptability and stability of the agreement. These allocations could be determined 
using the CGT solution concepts. A necessary condition for cooperation in the basin is 
that the benefits obtained by each cooperating player under full cooperation (grand 
coalition) are greater than what each player can obtain under non-cooperation (singleton 
coalition), or by participating in partial cooperative arrangements (partial coalitions).    
Let   
 
 be the allocated cooperative benefit (payoff) to player l using the CGT 
solution concept,  . A feasible cooperative allocation should satisfy the following three 
requirements: 
  
                                                                                                                   (3.3) 
   
 
                                                                                                             (3.4) 
   
 
                                                                                                                   (3.5) 
 
Equation (3.3) fulfills the condition for individual rationality, which means that the 
allocated benefits from full cooperation to player l,   
 
, must be greater than or equal to 
its benefits from non-cooperation,       . Equation (3.4) fulfills the group rationality 
condition, which means that the sum of full cooperative benefit allocations to any group 
of players,    
 
   , must be greater than or equal to the total obtainable benefits under 
any coalition s that includes the same players,     . Equation (3.5) fulfills the efficiency 
condition, which means that the total obtainable benefits under the grand coalition, 
    , must be allocated to the members of that coalition,    
 
   .   
An allocation that satisfies these three requirements is in the Core of the 
cooperative game (Gillies, 1959). The Core is a set of game allocation gains that is not 
dominated by any other allocation set. The Core provides information about the range 
of acceptable solutions for each player and allows for ranking the players‟ preferences 
over the possible cooperative solutions. Satisfying the Core conditions for a cooperative 
solution is a necessary condition for its acceptability by the players. Therefore, solutions 
not included in the Core are not acceptable and not stable (Shapley, 1971).  
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Three CGT solution concepts based on different notions of fairness are used in this 
paper to allocate the gains from cooperation among the players: the Shapley value, the 
Nash-Harsanyi, and the Nucleolus.  
The Shapley value allocates   
  
 to each player based on the weighted average of 
their contributions to all possible coalitions. The Shapley value is based on the intuition 
that the allocation that each player receives should be proportional to his contribution. 
Players who add nothing, should receive nothing and players who are indispensable 
should be allocated a lot (Shapley, 1953). The Shapley solution takes the following 
form: 
  
    
                
  
   
   
                                                                   (3.6) 
where n is the total number of players in the game,     is the number of players 
participating in coalition s, and          is the value of coalition s without member l.   
The Nash–Harsanyi solution (Harsanyi, 1959) to an n-person bargaining game is a 
modification to the two-player Nash solution (Nash, 1953). This solution provides an 
allocation to each player,   
  
, by maximizing the product of the incremental gain of 
the players from cooperation. The Nash-Harsanyi solution takes the following form: 
        
  
                                                                                                      (3.7)  
subject to the Core conditions (equations (3.3) to (3.5)). The Nash-Harsanyi solution is 
unique and it is in the Core (if it is not empty).  
The Core of a cooperative game in the characteristic function form may be empty 
because certain partial coalitions provide greater payoff than the grand coalition. 
Conversely, conditions may arise where the Core does exist but is too large and leaves 
the allocation problem open for further bargaining. The Nucleolus solves this problem 
by minimizing the worst inequity or dissatisfaction of the most dissatisfied coalition 
(Schmeidler, 1969). The Nucleolus of the benefit allocation game can be determined by 
finding   through the following optimization model: 
                                                                                                                                (3.8) 
subject to 
     
  
                                                                                                     (3.9) 
   
  
                                                                                                              (3.10) 
                                                                                                                             (3.11) 
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where   is the maximum tax imposed on or subsidy provided to all coalitions to keep 
them in the Core. The Nucleolus allocation,   
  , is a single solution that is always in 
the Core, if the Core is not empty.   
The fulfillment of the Core requirements for a CGT allocation solution is a 
necessary condition for its acceptability by the players. However, being in the Core does 
not guarantee the stability for a solution, as some players may find it relatively unfair 
compared to other solutions. The consequence is that some players might threaten to 
leave the grand coalition and form partial coalitions because of their critical position in 
the grand coalition (Dinar and Howitt, 1997). The stability of any solution is important 
given the existence of considerable fixed investments and transaction costs, so that a 
more stable solution might be preferred even if it is harder to implement.  
Some methods are suggested in the literature to evaluate the stability of the CGT 
allocation solutions (Dinar and Howitt, 1997). For instance, Loehman et al. (1979) used 
an ex-post approach to measure power in a cooperative game. This approach is similar 
to the one suggested by Shapley and Shubik (1954) for measuring power in voting 
games. The Loehman power index (  
 ) compares the gains to a player with the gains to 
the coalition. The power index is the following:  
  
  
  
        
    
            
         
                                                               (3.12) 
where   
  is the allocation solution for player   using the CGT solution concept  . The 
power index of each player is used as an indicator of the stability of the allocation 
solution. The higher the power index of a player, the higher that player‟s propensity for 
cooperating and staying in the grand coalition. If the power is distributed more or less 
equally among the players, then the coalition is more likely to be stable. The coefficient 
of variation of the power indexes of the different players for an allocation solution is 
defined as the stability index of the grand coalition      . The greater the value of       the 
larger the instability of the allocation solution.  
The theoretical CGT framework proposed in this section is applied to the water 
management problem in the JRB. The next section describes the empirical river basin 
model of the JRB that is used to calculate the value of the characteristic function of 
various coalitional arrangements.   
 
                                                        Cooperative water management and ecosystem protection 
 
56 
 
3.3 Empirical river basin model  
The empirical river basin model includes the main users in the JRB: irrigation activities, 
urban uses, and aquatic ecosystems needs. A specific model for optimizing each and all 
water use sectors has been built, and these models are linked, using a reduced form 
hydrological model developed and calibrated to the JRB conditions in chapter 2 of this 
thesis. 
3.3.1 Study area 
The JRB is located in the regions of Valencia and Castilla La Mancha in Southeastern 
Spain and it extends over 22,400 km
2
. Renewable water resources in the JRB are nearly 
1,700 Mm
3
. Water extractions are 1,680 Mm
3
, very close to renewable resources, 
making the JRB an almost closed water system (CHJ, 2009).  
Extractions for irrigated agriculture are about 1,400 Mm
3 
per year, which represent 
84 percent of total water extractions, to irrigate 190,000 ha. The major irrigation 
districts are: the Eastern La Mancha aquifer district (EM) in the upper Jucar, the 
traditional districts of Acequia Real del Jucar (ARJ), Escalona y Carcagente (ESC) and 
Ribera Baja (RB) in the lower Jucar, and the the Canal Jucar-Turia district (CJT) 
situated in the adjacent Turia River Basin. Urban and industrial extractions are about 
270 Mm
3
, serving more than one million inhabitants located mostly in the cities of 
Valencia, Sagunto and Albacete (CHJ, 2009).  
Expansions of water extractions in the basin and the severe drought spells in recent 
decades have triggered considerable negative environmental and economic impacts. 
Environmental flows are dwindling in many parts of the basin, resulting in serious 
damages to water-dependent ecosystems. The environmental flow in the final tract of 
the Jucar River is below 1 m
3
/s, which is very low compared with the other two major 
rivers in the region, the Ebro and Segura Rivers. There have been also negative impacts 
on downstream water users, where water availability has been reduced substantially in 
the last forty years. Consequently, the dwindling irrigation return flows in the lower 
Jucar have caused serious environmental problems to the Albufera wetland, the main 
aquatic ecosystem in the JRB, which is mainly fed by these return flows (Garcia-Molla, 
2013).  
The Albufera wetland is a freshwater lagoon with an area covering 2,430 ha, 
supporting very rich aquatic ecosystems. Since 1989, the Albufera was included in the 
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list of wetlands of international importance, and was declared a special protected area 
for birds. The Albufera receives water from the return flows of irrigation in the lower 
Jucar, mainly from the ARJ and the RB districts. Other flows originate from the Turia 
River Basin, and from discharge of untreated and treated urban and industrial 
wastewaters. Currently, the Albufera wetland suffers from reduction of inflows and the 
degradation of their quality. These problems are driven by the reduced flows originating 
from the Jucar River, and by deficiencies in the sewage disposal and treatment systems 
from adjacent municipalities, causing severe damages to the Albufera wetland, such as 
the loss of biodiversity, the decrease in recreation services, and the decline of fishing 
activities (Sanchis, 2011).  
3.3.2 The model  
The hydro-economic model of the JRB integrates hydrologic, economic, environmental, 
and institutional variables within a single framework. The model accounts for decision 
processes made by irrigators in the five major districts (EM, CJT, ARJ, ESC, and RB) 
and by urban users in the three major cities (Valencia, Albacete, and Sagunto) in the 
basin. In addition, the model includes environmental benefits provided by the Albufera 
wetland to society. Numerous small demand units in the basin are not included in the 
model. The model runs on an annual basis, and its main focus is on the allocation and 
utilization of surface water. Groundwater use and management are not taken into 
account in this paper.   
In order to link the different components of the river basin model and to simulate 
the spatial impact of drought in the JRB, a reduced form of the hydrological model of 
the basin is used (CHJ, 2009). The reduced form hydrological model is a node-link 
network that controls the flows of water in each node and estimates the distribution of 
available surface water among users in each climate condition, calibrating it to observed 
water allocations in both normal and drought years. This approach to model river basin 
hydrology has been used in several studies such as Cai et al. (2003); and Ward and 
Pulido-Velazquez (2009).     
The reduced form hydrological model is based on the principles of water mass 
balance and continuity of river flow, which determine the volume of water availability 
in each river reach that can be used for economic activities taking into account 
environmental restrictions. The mathematical formulation of the model is as follows: 
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                                                                        (3.13) 
            
      
      
       
                                                             (3.14) 
      
                                                                                                                 (3.15)  
The mass balance equation (3.13) determines the volume of water outflow     
from a river reach d, which is equal to the net (of evaporation loss   ) water inflow 
           to d minus diversion for irrigation   
   and for urban and industrial uses 
  
   . The continuity equation (3.14) guarantees the continuity of river flow in the 
basin, where the volume of water inflow to the next river reach       is the sum of 
outflow from the previous river reach    , the return flows from previous irrigation 
districts   
      
    and, the return flows from the cities   
       
    . Equation (3.15) 
states that the volume of water outflow     from a river reach d must be greater than 
or equal to the minimum environmental flow   
    established for that river reach, 
which is determined by the basin‟s regulations.         
We incorporate the reduced form hydrological model into a regional economic 
optimization model. For irrigation activities, a farm-level optimization model has been 
developed for each irrigation district. Irrigation districts maximize farmers‟ private 
benefits, subject to technical and resource constraints. The optimization problem for 
each irrigation district takes the following form: 
      
        
 
                                                                                                 (3.16) 
subject to  
                                                                                                                   (3.17) 
                                                                                                                           (3.18) 
 
where   
   is farmers‟ private benefits in irrigation district k.     
  is a vector of 
coefficients of net income per hectare of crop i cultivated under irrigation technology j. 
Aijk is a matrix of production coefficients and Rk is a vector of constraint levels including 
land, water and labor in each irrigation district k. Xijk corresponds to the area of crop i 
cultivated under irrigation technology j in irrigation district k and it is the decision 
variable in the irrigation district optimization problem.  
For urban water uses, an economic surplus model has been developed for each city. 
The model maximizes the social (consumer and producer) surplus from water use for 
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each city, subject to several physical and institutional constraints. The optimization 
problem for each urban center takes the following form:   
      
             
 
 
        
          
 
 
        
                         (3.19) 
subject to 
                                                                                                                    (3.20) 
                                                                                                                       (3.21) 
 
where   
    is the social surplus of city u from water use. Qdu and Qsu are the quantity of 
water demanded and supplied by/to the city u, respectively. adu and bdu are the intercept 
and the slope of the inverse demand function of city u, respectively. asu and bsu are the 
intercept and the slope of the water supply function for city u, respectively. Equation 
(3.20) states that the quantity of water supplied must be greater than or equal to the 
quantity demanded.  
The river basin optimization model accounts also for the environmental benefits 
provided by the main aquatic ecosystem in the JRB, the Albufera wetland. The model 
considers only water inflows to the Albufera wetland originating from irrigation return 
flows of the ARJ and RB irrigation districts. Inflows and benefits of the Albufera 
wetland are given by the following expressions: 
                
        
         
       
                                                            (3.22) 
           
                                                                     
                                                   
                                                   
                         (3.23) 
 
where equation (3.22) determines the quantity of water flowing to the Albufera wetland, 
         . Parameters α and β represent the shares of return flows that feed the wetland 
from the ARJ and RB irrigation districts, respectively. The products     
        
    and 
   
       
  ) are return flows from the ARJ and RB irrigation districts, respectively. 
Equation (3.23) represents environmental benefits,          , that the Albufera wetland 
provides to society. The environmental benefit function is assumed to be a piecewise 
linear function of the water inflows,          , to the wetland. This function expresses 
shifts in the ecosystem status when critical thresholds of environmental conditions are 
reached (water inflows E1, E2 and E3). This functional form is adapted from the study by 
Scheffer et al. (2001), indicating that ecosystems do not always respond smoothly to 
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changes in environmental conditions, but they may switch abruptly to a contrasting 
alternative state when these conditions approach certain critical levels. This function has 
been built following the methodology developed by Jorgensen et al. (2010) using time 
series data of various ecosystem health indicators of the wetland from the JRB authority 
reports, and economic valuation estimates of wetland services from the literature. Figure 
A1 in the appendix shows the environmental benefit function of the Albufera wetland.    
The river basin optimization model maximizes total basin benefits subject to the 
hydrological constraints and the constraints of the individual economic sector 
optimization models. The optimization problem for the whole river basin takes the 
following form: 
        
  
     
   
                                                                                 (3.24) 
subject to the constraints in equations (3.13), (3.14), (3.15), (3.17), (3.18), (3.20), (3.21) 
and (3.22). 
The river basin optimization model allows calculating basin benefits under current 
institutional setting or baseline scenario (the non-cooperative solution) and it is the basis 
for calculation of benefits accrued to users under various cooperative arrangements for 
different drought scenarios.  
Detailed biophysical and economic data has been collected from several sources 
including water inflows and diversions, crop area and water requirements, irrigation 
efficiency, crop costs and revenues, and water costs and prices by sector. Selected 
hydrologic and economic parameters of the JRB model are shown in Table 3.1. The 
river basin model and the CGT application have been run using the GAMS package.  
3.3.3 Scenario simulation 
The main water users in the JRB (described in section 3.1) are classified into four 
players that have similar characteristics regarding water use and their relation with the 
Albufera wetland. Players in the JRB game are: irrigation districts linked to the 
Albufera including the ARJ and RB irrigation districts (IE); irrigation districts not 
linked to the Albufera including the EM, CJT, and ESC irrigation districts (INE); the 
cities including Valencia, Sagunto and Albacete (C); and the Albufera wetland (E). This 
classification will allow us to capture all important strategic relationship between 
players in various locations of the basin and their opposed interests, and at the same  
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Table 3.1. Parameters of the JRB model. 
Parameters Value Unit 
Total irrigated area 157,000 ha 
   Cereals area 70,650 ha 
   Vegetables area 21,980 ha 
   Fruit trees area 64,370 ha 
   Flood irrigation area 28,260 ha 
   Sprinkler irrigation area 58,090 ha 
   Drip irrigation area 70,650 ha 
Average irrigation water price  0.05 €/m3 
Average urban water price 0.71 €/m3  
Share of return flows feeding the Albufera  
  
  ARJ     28 % 
  RB (   23 % 
Benefit function of the Albufera from water inflows 
  
      Intercept (    33 10
6 € 
   First threshold of inflows to the Albufera (    51 Mm
3
 
      Intercept (    -214 10
6 € 
      Slope (    4.8 €/m
3
 
   Second threshold of inflows to the Albufera (    78 Mm
3
 
      Intercept (    43 10
6 €  
      Slope (    1.8 €/m
3 
 
   Third threshold of inflows to the Albufera (    138 Mm
3
 
Economic value of the Albufera wetland 13,600 €/ha 
 
time to keep the computational burden at a reasonable level.    
The cooperative water sharing agreement described in section 2 (equations (3.1) 
and (3.2)) is applied for two different scenarios of water management. The purpose is to 
find efficient and fair allocations of water and income among the players, and to explore 
the likelihood for ecosystem protection success. The scenarios are the following:  
Scenario 1: This scenario maximizes the private benefits of the basin under all possible 
coalitional arrangements. The private benefits are the sum of the benefits of players IE, 
INE and C, disregarding the environmental benefits provided to society by player E (the 
Albufera wetland). The wetland receives water from return flows generated by player 
IE, similar to what happens in the current situation. The wetland is a weak player in the 
game because it does not compete for water.  
Scenario 2: This scenario maximizes the social benefits of the basin under all possible 
coalitional arrangements. The social benefits are the sum of the benefits of all the 
players in the game, including the environmental benefits provided to society by player 
E (the Albufera wetland). In this case, the wetland is competing for water with other  
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Table 3.2. Benefits under the baseline situation for different climate conditions (10
6
 €). 
Users Normal flow Mild drought Severe drought 
Very severe 
drought 
EM 79.8 71.9  66.4  60.7  
CJT 44.9 40.6  37.2  35.7  
ARJ 34.1 31.0  27.0  22.9  
ESC 7.3 6.8  5.7 4.2 
RB 24.2 20.7 16.5 12.1 
Irrigation sector  190.3 170.9 152.8 135.6 
Valencia 216.3 214.0 206.6 186.9 
Sagunto 26.1 24.1 22.2 16.8 
Albacete 40.2 38.9 38.8 38.6 
Urban sector 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
Albufera wetland 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total JRB 547.7 485.1 453.4 410.9 
 
users, and does not depend passively on remaining return flows.  
These two scenarios are simulated under normal flow and various drought 
conditions using two sets of coalitional arrangements. Drought is classified into three 
levels, depending on the severity of the drought event: mild, severe, and very severe, 
based on historical data about water inflows in the JRB. The two sets of coalitional 
arrangements are: (a) partial cooperation in which the two scenarios are run with 
different combination of players; and (b) full cooperation, in which the two scenarios 
are run with all the players. 
3.4 Results and discussion  
The baseline situation (non-cooperation) represents the current conditions of water 
allocations in the JRB. Each player is maximizing its private benefits from its 
administrative water allocation, and there is no cooperation in the form of water sharing 
among the players. The results of the baseline situation are presented in Tables 3.2 and 
3.3. Benefits in the JRB under the baseline situation for normal flow conditions amount 
to 548 million € from using 1,149 Mm3. Irrigation activities generate 190 million € from 
using 1,030 Mm
3. The social surplus of the cities is 283 million € and they use 119 
Mm
3. Environmental benefits provided by the Albufera wetland are 75 million €. The 
Albufera wetland receives 60 Mm
3
 from the return flows of the ARJ and RB irrigation 
districts, which support the good ecological status of the wetland.  
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Table 3.3. Water use under the baseline situation for different climate conditions (Mm
3
). 
Users Normal flow Mild drought Severe drought 
Very severe 
drought 
EM 399 359 332 304 
CJT 155 132 115 107 
ARJ 200 180 155 130 
ESC 33 30 25 18 
RB 243 207 167 123 
Irrigation 
sector  
1,030 908 794 682 
Valencia 94 81 67 53 
Sagunto 8 7 6 4 
Albacete 17 17 17 17 
Urban sector 119 105 90 74 
Albufera 
wetland 
60 52 43 34 
Total JRB 1,149 1,013 884 756 
Note: Total water use in the JRB is the sum of water use in the irrigation and urban sectors, and does not 
include water return flowing to the Albufera wetland.  
The quantity of urban water use shown in the table represents only the part of supply from the JRB. 
During droughts, the urban sector uses additional quantity of water from the Turia River to cover the 
demand of Valencia and Sagunto. The full demand of Valencia (94 Mm
3
) and Sagunto (8 Mm
3
) is always 
covered.  
 
Results of the drought scenarios indicate that drought events reduce the benefits of 
the JRB between 11 and 25%. Water use patterns show a reduction in extractions 
between 12 and 34%. Irrigation activities reduce water extractions between 12 and 34%. 
Irrigation benefit losses range between 10 to 30% of benefits in normal year. The 
reduction in irrigation water extractions has large negative impacts on the Albufera 
wetland that is mostly fed by irrigation return flows. Water inflows to the Albufera 
wetland decrease between 13 and 43%, depending on drought severity. As a 
consequence, drought damages for the Albufera wetland under drought conditions 
exceed 50% of benefits in normal years.   
The current water resources regulation in the JRB guarantees the availability of 
urban water to human population. During severe drought spells, the urban demand must 
be first fully covered because of such priority rules. The three simulated drought 
scenarios show a reduced supply from the Jucar River to the main cities in the JRB. 
However, the full demand of Valencia and Sagunto is always covered with additional 
water from the neighboring Turia River Basin. During extreme drought periods, the 
provision of water to these cities is shared equally between the Jucar and the Turia 
Rivers. In the city of Albacete, the supply of water during dry periods is amended by  
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Table 3.4. Results of the characteristic functions under non-cooperation and full 
cooperation for the scenarios of water management (10
6
 €). 
Water 
management 
scenarios 
Coalitional arrangements Normal 
Mild 
drought 
Severe 
drought 
Very severe 
drought 
Scenario 1 
Non-
cooperation 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{E} 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.7 485.1 453.4 410,9 
Full 
cooperation 
{INE,IE,C,E} 582.4 (6%) 517.8 (7%) 474.5 (5%) 427.3 (4%) 
Scenario 2 
Non-
cooperation 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{E} 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.7 485.1 453.4 410.9 
Full 
cooperation 
{INE,IE,C,E} 742.3 (36%) 735.0 (52%) 710.1 (57%) 659.6 (61%) 
Note: The percentage gain in benefits between full cooperation and non-cooperation is given in 
parenthesis. 
 
pumping groundwater from the Eastern La Mancha aquifer (CHJ, 2009). The simulation 
results for the urban sector indicate that the provision of surface water from the Jucar 
River falls between 14 and 45%, while groundwater extractions increase up to 8 Mm
3
. 
The benefit losses during droughts in the urban sector are below 14% in the worst-case 
scenario, because water provision is maintained with additional extractions from the 
Turia River and the Eastern La Mancha aquifer, but at higher costs.  
3.4.1 Cooperative water management  
Table 3.4 presents the values of the characteristic function under non-cooperation 
(baseline) and full cooperation for different drought conditions in the two scenarios of 
water management. Detailed results of the characteristic function of all coalitional 
arrangements under drought conditions for the two scenarios are presented in Tables A1 
and A2 in the appendix.  
The results suggest that full cooperative management of water in the JRB achieves 
the highest aggregate level of benefits for the two scenarios and all drought conditions. 
For Scenario 1, full cooperation among users improves benefits between 16 and 34 
million € (4 to 7%) compared to non-cooperation. When a policy to protect the Albufera 
wetland is introduced in Scenario 2, full cooperation improves significantly benefits 
between 195 and 285 million € (36 to 61%) compared to non-cooperation.  
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Figure 3.1. Water inflows to the Albufera wetland under different coalitional 
arrangements and drought conditions for scenarios 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Thr= Threshold, NC= Non-cooperation, FC (Sc 1)= Full cooperation in Scenario 1, FC (Sc 2)= Full 
cooperation in Scenario 2. The threshold considered is 60 Mm
3
 and it is calculated based on the minimum 
water requirements of the Albufera wetland and the percentage contribution of irrigation activities to 
water flowing to the wetland. 
 
These improvements in benefits of full cooperation under both scenarios occur mainly 
because player IE transfers part of its water to players INE and E. Benefits under partial 
cooperation are always higher than under non-cooperation, but lower than under full 
cooperation.  
The values of the characteristic functions of the JRB game under the different 
cooperative arrangements for the water management and climate scenarios show 
superadditivity compared to non-cooperation. This property is important because it 
indicates that the players have an incentive to cooperate. This incentive increases 
considerably when the environmental benefits provided by the Albufera wetland to 
society are accounted for in Scenario 2. Furthermore, it seems that partial cooperation 
between players IE, INE, and E is sufficient to maximize the benefits of the JRB and 
protect the Albufera wetland, and player C could be excluded from the game due to its 
minute contribution.
3
 However, these results do not guarantee the acceptability of the 
cooperative agreement by the players nor its stability, and the likelihood of failure of 
cooperation remains. Therefore, to assure that the players remain cooperative, the 
                                                 
3
 Player C is called a dummy player, using the Game Theory Jargon.  
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reallocation of benefits among the players should be performed using the CGT solution 
concepts. These allocations are calculated in section 4.2.   
Figure 3.1 presents the quantity of water flowing to the Albufera wetland under 
different cooperative arrangements and drought conditions for scenarios 1 and 2. 
Results indicate clearly that policy intervention to protect the Albufera wetland 
(Scenario 2) is better than non-intervention, securing always a fixed amount of water 
(138 Mm
3
) flowing to the wetland. This amount is well above the minimum technical 
requirement of the Albufera wetland (60 Mm
3
) set by the basin authority, and thus 
ensures a good ecological status. Moreover, cooperation without public intervention 
fails to provide the wetland with a minimum water threshold that could maintain its 
good ecological status (Scenario 1). Water inflows to the Albufera wetland in Scenario 
1 for severe and very severe droughts are far below the minimum requirement. 
We find that achieving cooperation without policy intervention to regulate the 
Albufera wetland degrades the wetland. The reason is that most services provided by the 
Albufera wetland are public goods, and the private decision-makers in the river game 
have little incentive to conserve water and enhance the provision of such services. The 
Albufera wetland is linked to the IE player (ARJ and RB) which displays a lower value 
of water than the INE player (EM, CJT, and ESC). This is a common situation for 
environmental assets worldwide which are usually linked to subsidiary or low-value 
activities. In Scenario 1, benefit gains are achieved by reallocating water from player IE 
to player INE. Consequently, return flows to the wetland decline as drought severity 
intensifies producing the desiccation and degradation of ecosystems. Hence, both policy 
intervention and cooperation (Scenario 2) are needed for the full protection of the 
Albufera wetland under drought. 
The comparison between the two scenarios indicates that public intervention to 
protect the Albufera through its inclusion in the cooperative agreement (Scenario 2), 
provides high incentives for cooperation. The result is a more sustainable use of water 
and substantial gains in basin benefits. A major policy implication from the analysis is 
that cooperation may have to be regulated by public agencies (the basin authority in this 
case) when scarcity is very high, in order to protect ecosystems and increase regional 
economic benefits.   
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Table 3.5. Benefits by CGT solutions and non-cooperation in Scenario 1. 
Climate 
scenarios 
Players Non-cooperation 
Full cooperation 
Shapley Nash-Harsanyi Nucleolus 
Normal 
INE 132.0 143.5 140.7 132.2 
IE 58.3 70.0 67.0 58.5 
C 282.6 282.7 291.3 282.6 
E 74.7 86.3 83.4 109.1 
Mild drought 
INE 119.2 130.8 127.4 121.4 
IE 51.7 64.5 59.9 82.2 
C 277.0 277.3 285.2 277.0 
E 37.2 45.2 45.4 37.2 
Severe 
drought 
INE 109.3 118.7 114.6 127.3 
IE 43.5 53.1 48.8 43.6 
C 267.6 269.5 272.9 270.6 
E 33.0 33.2 38.3 33.0 
Very severe 
drought 
INE 100.5 107.1 104.6 112.1 
IE 35.0 43.2 39.1 38.1 
C 242.3 243.8 246.4 244.1 
E 33.0 33.1 37.1 33.0 
 
3.4.2 Allocations of the cooperative benefits 
The results of the different cooperative arrangements suggest that cooperative water 
management in the JRB yields higher benefits compared to non-cooperation. The 
challenge here is to allocate the benefits from cooperation among the players in a fair 
manner. The allocation of benefits is calculated using the different CGT allocation 
solutions. Then, the acceptability and stability of the benefit allocations are tested using 
the Core conditions (equations (3.3) to (3.5)), the power index (  
 ), and the stability 
index (     ). Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the allocated benefits to each player, based on the 
different CGT solutions.  
Results of benefit allocations highlight that the preferred CGT solutions for the 
players vary, depending on the scenario of water management and the drought 
condition. The reason for these results lies in the properties of the CGT solutions. Player 
C does not contribute to any coalition in all management and climate scenarios but 
gains an equal share of benefit with Nash-Harsanyi. This is because Nash-Harsanyi 
allocates an equal incremental gain to each player based on its original benefit under 
non-cooperation, irrespective of its contribution to the coalition. Player E does not 
contribute either under Scenario 1, but gets an equal share with Nash-Harsanyi. Player 
E prefers mostly Shapley under Scenario 2, because it makes a contribution that is  
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Table 3.6. Benefits by CGT solutions and non-cooperation in Scenario 2. 
Climate 
scenarios 
Players Non-cooperation 
Full cooperation 
Shapley Nash-Harsanyi Nucleolus 
Normal 
INE 132.0 216.1 180.7 132.2 
IE 58.3 67.8 107.0 58.5 
C 282.6 282.8 331.3 282.6 
E 74.7 175.7 123.4 269.0 
Mild drought 
INE 119.2 209.6 181.7 291.4 
IE 51.7 84.1 114.2 93.9 
C 277.0 283.8 339.5 281.3 
E 37.2 157.5 99.7 68.6 
Severe 
drought 
INE 109.3 185.6 173.5 231.9 
IE 43.5 95.0 107.7 88.2 
C 267.6 303.9 331.8 312.3 
E 33.0 125.6 97.2 77.7 
Very severe 
drought 
INE 100.5 155.8 162.7 162.7 
IE 35.0 113.5 97.2 97.2 
C 242.3 283.8 304.5 304.5 
E 33.0 106.5 95.2 95.2 
 
rewarded in the Shapley solution. Player INE prefers mostly the Nucleolus because this 
solution discourages the formation of partial coalitions that do not benefit him. These 
empirical findings on the preferred cooperative solutions for the players indicate the 
different interests of the players, and the difficulties to achieve a sustainable cooperative 
agreement at basin scale in the Jucar basin.   
The analysis of the acceptability of the CGT allocations using the Core 
requirements indicates that the benefit allocations based on the Shapley and Nash-
Harsanyi solutions for Scenario 1 under different drought conditions satisfy only 
individual rationality (equation 3.3) and the efficiency condition (equation 3.5), but not 
group rationality (equation 3.4). These allocations are not in the Core of the game, and 
they are not acceptable by the players. Therefore, the Shapley and Nash-Harsanyi 
solutions are not stable, and players may consider defection from the grand coalition to 
create partial coalitions. However, the Core requirements are satisfied for benefit 
allocations based on the Nucleolus solution, and they are acceptable to players in 
Scenario 1. For these reasons, the most stable cooperative solution in Scenario 1 is the 
Nucleolus for all drought scenarios.   
 Under Scenario 2, the benefit allocations based on the three cooperative solutions 
satisfy the Core requirements, and since these allocations are in the Core they are 
acceptable to all players. So, theoretically there are no incentives for the players to leave  
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Table 3.7. Power and stability indexes in Scenario 2. 
Cooperative solution 
Power indexes of players (  
 ) Stability index 
       INE IE C E 
Normal Flow   
Shapley 0.43 0.05 0.00 0.52 1.05 
Nash-Harsanyi 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 
Nucleolus 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.99 
Mild drought 
Shapley 0.36 0.13 0.03 0.48 0.83 
Nash-Harsanyi 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 
Nucleolus 0.69 0.17 0.02 0.13 1.20 
Severe drought 
Shapley 0.30 0.20 0.14 0.36 0.39 
Nash-Harsanyi 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 
Nucleolus 0.48 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.61 
Very severe drought 
Shapley 0.22 0.32 0.17 0.30 0.27 
Nash-Harsanyi 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 
Nucleolus 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 
 
the grand coalition in order to act individually or to participate in partial coalitions. 
However, players have different preferences over the various allocation solutions. 
Therefore, there is a need to evaluate the stability of these solutions to find the best one 
in this scenario. Table 3.7 presents the power and the stability indexes for each 
cooperative solution in Scenario 2.  
The stability indexes show that the most stable cooperative solution is the Nash-
Harsanyi for all drought scenarios, although for a very severe drought scenario the 
Nucleolus achieves the same degree of stability as the Nash-Harsanyi. The least stable 
cooperative solution is the Nucleolus under normal flow, and mild and severe droughts, 
and the Shapley is the least stable under very severe drought conditions. Scrutiny of the 
stability indexes indicates that the stability of the grand coalition increases as drought 
severity intensifies. This means that the severity of drought is an incentive to act 
cooperatively.   
The power indexes of players under the Shapley solution indicate that player E (the 
Albufera wetland) has the highest propensity to cooperate and stay in the grand 
coalition under all drought conditions, while player C (the cities) has the lowest 
propensity to cooperate and may disrupt the grand coalition unless improving its 
allocation. Under the Nash-Harsanyi solution, the power is distributed equally among  
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Figure 3.2. Sensitivity analysis of the ecosystem value of the Albufera wetland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: N=Normal flow year, MD=Mild drought, SD=Severe drought, VSD=Very severe drought. 
TP=Tipping point. 
 
the players, which means that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable. The 
Nucleolus solution shows that players E, IE, and INE display a high propensity to 
cooperate. 
The results of the analysis of the acceptability and stability of the cooperative 
solutions suggest that the internalization of environmental damages in Scenario 2 
provides more stability to cooperation compared to Scenario 1. However, stability of 
cooperation under Scenario 2 would likely be affected by the economic value of the 
ecosystem. A sensitivity analysis has been conducted in order to assess the results under 
Scenario 2, and their robustness to different economic valuation estimates of the 
Albufera wetland (Figure 3.2). Results indicate that ecosystem value and drought 
condition affect the policy decision concerning the protection of the wetland. The 
tipping points in figure 3.2 show critical ecosystem values below which the Albufera 
wetland is excluded from the water sharing agreement, and the game stability is 
reduced. The tipping point moves to higher values of the Albufera as drought severity 
intensifies because of the increase in the economic value of water (shadow price) to 
users.    
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3.5 Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper develops a cooperative game theory framework in order to analyze the 
possibilities of cooperation over sharing water resources, and the options for protecting 
ecosystems in arid and semiarid basins under scarcity and drought. The framework was 
empirically tested in the Jucar River Basin (Spain), a typical highly stressed river basin 
in a semiarid region with acute water scarcity problems that are damaging valuable 
ecosystems. 
Results indicate that drought damage costs in the Jucar River Basin are 
considerable. However, the cooperation of stakeholders through the right institutional 
setting reduces drought damage costs between 4 and 7%. When environmental damages 
are internalized through the inclusion of the wetland in the cooperative agreement, the 
cooperative results are more appealing, reducing drought damage costs by 52 to 61%.  
Cooperative water management may be challenging in practice because of the 
strategic behavior of stakeholders and the high transaction costs of organizing collective 
action. Water agencies can promote cooperative management by creating different 
incentives for cooperation, such as taxes and subsidies, diversion thresholds, monitoring 
mechanisms, and technical advice. The role of these agencies is especially important in 
protecting ecosystems. Our empirical results indicate that cooperative management 
improves the economic benefits of water users but it may have little effect on 
ecosystems protection without additional incentives or regulations. 
The cooperative game theory solutions and stability indexes examined in this paper 
provide information about the possibility for cooperation in the Jucar River Basin. This 
information could be helpful to reach an agreement to share water resources that could 
enhance private and social benefits. The empirical results suggest that cooperation is a 
feasible option, but the basis for cooperation is weak hindering the acceptability and 
stability of the cooperative agreement. However, the internalization of environmental 
damages provides more stability to the agreement, although it depends on the value of 
ecosystem.   
The results highlight the fact that various cooperative solutions have different 
outcomes in terms of their acceptability by the players and their stability. This finding 
has important policy implication because it demonstrates the difficulties in selecting a 
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mix of policy instruments that could address scarcity, and mitigate the negative impacts 
of droughts, and the risk of policy failure.  
While the empirical analysis was performed using the Jucar Basin situation, our 
analytical framework is capable of providing meaningful results to any of the mounting 
cases of climate change-related water scarcity issues in any of the basins in arid and 
semiarid regions, including the ones mentioned in this paper. The inclusion of the 
strategic behavior of the parties involved in the drought mitigation policies is new to the 
policy analysis and would add an important aspect to the analysis of policy feasibility 
under scarce water situations.   
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3.7 Appendix  
 
Figure A1. Environmental benefits function of the Albufera wetland. 
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Table A1. Results of the characteristic functions under different coalitional 
arrangements and drought conditions in Scenario 1 (10
6
 €). 
Coalitional 
arrangements 
Players 
Normal 
flow 
Mild 
drought 
Severe 
drought 
Very severe 
drought 
Non-
cooperation 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{E} 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.7 485.1 453.4 410.9 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,IE} 190.6 181.9 170.3 150.2 
{C} 282.7 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{E} 74.5 33.0 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.8 491.9 470.9 425.5 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,C}  414.8 398.4 379.0 344.1 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{E} 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.8 487.3 455.5 412.1 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,E}  206.8 158.6 144.4 134.8 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
Total 547.7 487.3 455.5 412.1 
Partial 
cooperation 
{IE,C} 341.1 330.0 314.2 282.2 
{INE} 149.1 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{E} 74.8 40.8 33.0 33.0 
Total 565.0 490.0 456.5 415.7 
Partial 
cooperation 
{IE,E} 133.5 94.0 76.6 68.1 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
Total 548.1 490.2 453.5 410.9 
Partial 
cooperation 
{C,E} 357.4 314.2 300.6 275.3 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
Total 547.7 485.1 453.4 410.8 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,IE,C} 473.3 459.5 441.5 394.3 
{E} 74.5 33.0 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.8 492.5 474.5 427.3 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,IE,E} 299.8 240.8 203.3 183.2 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
Total 582.4 517.8 470.9 425.5 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,C,E} 489.5 435.6 412.0 377.1 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
Total 547.8 487.3 455.5 412.1 
Partial 
cooperation 
{E,C,IE} 416.1 370.9 347.2 315.2 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
Total 548.1 490.1 456.5 415.7 
Full 
cooperation 
{INE,IE,C,E} 582.4 (6%) 517.8 (7%) 474.5 (5%) 427.3 (4%) 
Note: The percentage gain in benefits between full cooperation and non-cooperation is given in 
parenthesis. 
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Table A2. Results of the characteristic functions under different coalitional 
arrangements and drought conditions in Scenario 2 (10
6
 €). 
Coalitional 
arrangements 
Players Normal 
Mild 
drought 
Severe 
drought 
Very severe 
drought 
Non-
cooperation 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{E} 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.7 485.1 453.4 410.9 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,IE} 190.6 181.9 170.3 150.2 
{C} 282.7 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{E} 74.5 33.0 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.8 491.9 470.9 425.5 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,C}  414.8 398.4 379.0 344.1 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{E} 74.7 37.2 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.8 487.3 455.5 412.1 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,E}  389.6 312.3 190.0 134.8 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
Total 730.5 641.0 501.1 412.1 
Partial 
cooperation 
{IE,C} 341.1 330.0 314.2 282.2 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{E} 74.8 40.8 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.9 490.0 456.5 415.7 
Partial 
cooperation 
{IE,E} 166.7 157.5 79.1 68.1 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
Total 581.3 553.7 456.0 410.9 
Partial 
cooperation 
{C,E} 358.6 314.2 300.6 275.3 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
Total 548.9 485.1 453.4 410.8 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,IE,C} 473.3 459.5 441.5 394.3 
{E} 74.5 33.0 33.0 33.0 
Total 547.8 492.5 474.5 427.3 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,IE,E} 459.7 449.5 353.1 283.4 
{C} 282.6 277.0 267.6 242.3 
Total 742.3 726.5 620.7 525.7 
Partial 
cooperation 
{INE,C,E} 672.3 636.9 540.7 386.5 
{IE} 58.3 51.7 43.5 35.0 
Total 730.6 688.6 584.2 421.5 
Partial 
cooperation 
{E,C,IE} 449.3 439.4 422.6 389.5 
{INE} 132.0 119.2 109.3 100.5 
Total 581.3 558.6 531.9 490.0 
Full 
cooperation 
{INE,IE,C,E} 742.3 (36%) 735.0 (52%) 710.1 (57%) 659.6 (61%) 
Note: See note to table A1 
. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Efficient water management policies for irrigation adaptation to 
climate change in Southern Europe 
 
 
Abstract    
This paper evaluates economic and environmental effects of two incentive-based water 
management policies to address climate change impacts on irrigated agriculture: water 
markets and irrigation subsidies. A Southern European case study assesses farmers‟ 
long and short-run adaptation responses under climate change and policy interventions 
with a discrete stochastic programming model. Results indicate that climate change will 
likely have negative impacts on irrigation activities and water-dependent ecosystems in 
Southern Europe. However, the severity of impacts depends on government policy 
settings and farmers‟ adaptation responses. The comparison between water market and 
irrigation subsidy policies shows the advantages of water markets over irrigation 
subsidies in terms of both private and social benefits. These findings could contribute to 
the design of efficient climate change adaptation policies in the irrigated agriculture of 
Southern Europe.  
    
Keywords: Climate change, Irrigation, Adaptation, Southern Europe, Stochastic 
programming, Water policies 
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4.1 Introduction   
Climate change is a major challenge for sustainable agricultural production in the 
coming decades in arid and semiarid regions worldwide. In those regions, climate 
change will likely increase temperature and evapotranspiration, reduce precipitation and 
snowmelt, and modify precipitation patterns, impacting negatively on water resources, 
irrigated and dryland agriculture, and water-dependent ecosystems (IPCC, 2014). This 
challenge will be difficult to manage in a context of rising world food demand and 
growing competition between consumptive and environmental water uses (Elliot et al., 
2014).  
The South of Europe is one of the arid and semiarid regions where the vulnerability 
of irrigated agriculture to climate change is expected to be especially strong (IPCC, 
2014). Climate change projections for this region suggest significant reductions in 
freshwater supplies from surface and groundwater resources, and increases of the 
frequency and longevity of extreme drought events (Lehner et al., 2006). The reductions 
of water availability and reliability in Southern Europe will be combined with increases 
of irrigation demand (Jimenez et al., 2014), leading mostly to reduced crop yields and 
shifts of some cultivation activities northward (EEA, 2012).       
Irrigation adaptation to climate change in Southern Europe has become one of the 
main objectives of the European water and agricultural regulations, such as the Water 
Framework Directive and the 2014-2020 Rural Development policy (EC, 2009 and 
2013). The evaluation of the effectiveness of existing adaptation policies and whether 
additional adaptation policies are needed is of particular interest for policymakers and 
stakeholders in the region. The response to these issues requires the development of 
studies that provide a better understanding of the economic and environmental impacts 
of climate change on irrigation, the adaptation policy alternatives, and the cost 
implications.  
Many studies in the literature have addressed the issue of irrigated agriculture 
adaptation to the foreseeable climate change impacts. A wide variety of adaptation 
options has been proposed. Farm-level adaptation options such as improving irrigation 
scheduling, crop mix change, use of new crop varieties, and improving irrigation 
efficiency seem to contribute significantly to adaptation (Howden et al., 2007; Reidsma 
et al., 2010; Leclere et al., 2013). However, a string of the literature calls for a 
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reconsideration of water institutions and policies used at present, and the 
implementation of incentive-based policies for more effective uptake of adaptation 
(Zilberman et al., 2002; Booker et al., 2005). Two popular incentive-based policies to 
address climate change irrigation adaptation which are widely considered in the 
literature are water markets and public subsidies for investments in efficient irrigation 
systems.  
Water markets seem to be a good option to smooth the economic impacts of 
climate change (Calatrava and Garrido, 2005; Gomez-Limon and Martinez, 2006; 
Gohar and Ward, 2010). Estimations of water market benefits during the last drought in 
the Murray-Darling basin of Australia, which is at present the most active water market 
in the world, are close to 1 billion US dollars per year (Connor and Kaczan, 2013).
4
 A 
challenge to water markets is the third party effects such as the environmental impacts. 
Water markets reduce streamflows because previously unused water allocations are 
traded, and also because gains in irrigation efficiency at parcel level reduce return flows 
to the environment (Howe et al., 1986; Qureshi et al., 2010). Another worrying effect is 
the large surge in groundwater extractions, as shown in the last drought in the Murray-
Darling basin.
5
 These environmental impacts reduce the benefits of trading and increase 
adaptation costs. For instance, water authorities in Australia are implementing very 
expensive public programs on infrastructure upgrading investments and environmental 
water buyback, in order to recover water for the environment in the Murray-Darling 
basin (Wheeler et al., 2014).   
Public policies that provide subsidies for investments in efficient irrigation systems 
(irrigation modernization) are considered also important options for climate change 
adaptation (Cazcarro et al., 2011, Graveline et al., 2014; Varela et al., 2014). The reason 
is that modernization reduces land abandonment, facilitates the adoption of diversified 
and high-value cropping patterns, and improves crop yields, leading to an increase in 
the value of agricultural production (Perry et al., 2014). In addition, modernization 
supports rural development and improves water quality (Playan et al., 2013). However, 
contrary to widespread expectations, modernization increases water depletion through 
enhanced crop evapotranspiration and reduction of return flows. These flows contribute 
                                                 
4
 Potential water market benefits in California during drought have been also estimated at 1 billion US 
dollars per year (Medellin et al., 2013).  
5
 Blewett (2012) indicates that extractions between 2002 and 2007 were seven times above the allowed 
limits placed on groundwater users. 
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to in-stream flows and groundwater replenishment that could be essential for 
downstream consumptive and environmental uses (Huffaker, 2008; Perry et al., 2014). 
The above-mentioned studies analyze the advantages and limitations of water 
markets and irrigation subsidies in detail. However, there are no studies in the European 
context that provide a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of these two incentive-
based policies for irrigation adaptation to climate change, and the extent to which 
farmers could realize potential adaptation opportunities. To address this gap in the 
literature, this paper presents a stochastic modeling framework to analyze the 
contribution of these two incentive-based policies to adaptation, and the economic and 
environmental tradeoffs between these policies.  
The results obtained could guide policymakers on the design of efficient water 
institutions and policies to address climate change in the irrigated agriculture of 
Southern Europe. The lower Jucar basin in Spain is chosen as a representative basin for 
Southern Europe. This basin is a good experimental field for studying irrigation 
adaptation possibilities to the impending climate change. The Jucar River is under 
severe stress with acute water scarcity and near zero mouth outflows, and severe 
ecosystem degradation. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, the lower Jucar basin is described in 
section 2, followed by the explanation of the modeling framework in section 3. Climate 
change and adaptation scenarios are presented in section 4, and the simulation results in 
section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes with the summary and policy implications. 
4.2 Case study area: the lower Jucar basin  
The lower part of the Jucar basin is located in the region of Valencia in Spain (Figure 
4.1). This basin has an irregular Mediterranean hydrology, characterized by recurrent 
drought spells and normal years with dry summers. Irrigated area in the lower Jucar 
basin expands over 102,000 ha, representing half of the irrigated area in the basin.     
The main crops grown are rice, corn, tomato, watermelon, peach, and citrus. Extractions 
for irrigation are about 980 Mm
3 
per year, of which 770 are surface water and 210 are 
groundwater resources (CHJ, 2014). The analysis undertaken in this paper focuses on 
the irrigation activities in the four major irrigation districts in the lower Jucar basin: 
Acequia Real del Jucar (ARJ), Escalona-Carcagente (ESC), Ribera Baja (RB), and 
Canal Jucar-Turia (CJT).  
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Figure 4.1. Map of the lower Jucar basin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These districts use almost 80 percent of total extractions in the lower Jucar basin.   
The lower Jucar basin includes the Albufera wetland, which is one of the most 
important aquatic ecosystems in Southern Europe. The Albufera is catalogued in the 
RAMSAR list, and declared a special protected area for birds. It receives water mainly 
from the return flows of the ARJ and RB districts. Other flows originate from the 
neighboring Turia basin, and from the discharge of untreated and treated urban and 
industrial wastewaters in the adjacent municipalities.  
The growth of water extractions in the upper Jucar and the severe drought spells in 
recent decades have triggered considerable negative environmental and economic 
impacts in the basin. For instance, water available to the ARJ district has been reduced 
from 700 to 200 Mm
3
 in the last 40 years. Consequently, the dwindling irrigation return 
flows have caused serious environmental problems to the Albufera wetland. In addition, 
the outflows of the Jucar River to the Mediterranean Sea are below 1 m
3
/s, which is 
very low compared with the other two major rivers in the region, the Ebro and Segura 
Rivers (Garcia-Molla et al., 2013).  
One key issue for water management in the lower Jucar basin is adaptation of 
irrigation to the upcoming effects of climate change, which would exacerbate water 
                                                                                       Efficient water management policies 
 
84 
 
scarcity and the intensity and frequency of droughts. Estimations of climate change 
impacts in the Jucar basin for a range of climate and socioeconomic scenarios for 2100 
indicate a reduction of rainfall by up to 25 percent, an increase of temperature by up to 5 
ºC, an increase of evapotranspiration by up to 22 percent, and a reduction of runoff by 
up to 45 percent (CEDEX, 2010).  
4.3 Modeling framework  
There is a growing body of economic literature that analyses climate change impacts 
and adaptation possibilities in irrigation. Two major approaches are widely used. One 
approach is mathematical programming models (both partial and general equilibrium 
models) that link biophysical (hydrologic, agronomic, and environmental) and 
economic components to simulate farmers‟ choices of crop mix, technologies, and 
resources for different climate scenarios, allocation rules, institutional arrangements, 
and policy interventions (Hurd et al., 2004; Connor et al., 2012; Medellin et al., 2013; 
Calzadilla et al., 2014). The alternative approach is econometric models that represent 
observed responses of farmers to past climate conditions under existing policies and 
institutions. These models are then used to estimate the effects of changes in climatic 
and policy variables (Zilberman et al., 2002; Mendelsohn and Dinar, 2003; Wheeler et 
al., 2013; Connor et al., 2014). Generally, mathematical programming models are 
computationally intensive, while econometric models are data intensive.  
The modeling approach used in this paper is discrete stochastic programming 
(DSP). The advantage of using DSP models compared to other modeling techniques is 
their ability to capture sources of risk that influence the objective function and the 
constraint set, and also allowing for a multi-stage decision process in which the decision 
makers‟ knowledge about random events changes through time as economic choices are 
made (Rae, 1971). DSP has been previously used in many studies in the literature to 
analyze different water management problems. Some examples are the measurement of 
forgone irrigation benefits derived from rural to urban water transfers under uncertain 
water supplies (Taylor and Young, 1995), the impacts of reducing pumping in the 
Edwards aquifer in Texas (McCarl et al., 1999), and the assessment of water market 
outcomes under uncertain water supply in Spain (Calatrava and Garrido, 2005). DSP 
models seem to be a suitable approach to investigate irrigation adaptation to climate 
change because they can incorporate the production decisions in agriculture and the 
uncertainty linked to climate change impacts (Connor et al., 2012).     
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This paper develops a two-stage DSP framework. The first stage represents 
farmers‟ choice of long-run capital investment in cropping and irrigation systems. This 
investment is the response to the expected climate change scenario made prior to the 
knowledge on annual water inflows, which is a stochastic variable. The long-run 
horizon is given by the economic life of the capital investment which is in the range of 
20 to 30 years. The second stage represents the short-run (annual) choice of variable 
input levels, including irrigated and fallowed areas, and irrigation water applied to crops 
which are determined after stochastic annual water inflows are known. This short-run 
choice is conditional on the fixed capital investment level chosen in the first stage. 
The objective of the model is to maximize farmers‟ profits in each irrigation district 
subject to technical and resource constraints, which is given by the following 
formulation:    
                                                                                               (4.1a) 
                                                                                                         (4.1b) 
                                                                                                         (4.1c) 
                                                                                                                (4.1d) 
                                                                                                          (4.1e) 
where variables are presented by capital letters.    is farmers‟ profits in irrigation 
district  ;         is the area of crop   equipped with irrigation system   in district   in 
the first stage;           is the irrigated area of crop   equipped with irrigation system   in 
district   and state of nature   in the second stage.          is yield of crop   equipped 
with irrigation system   in district   and state of nature  , which depends on the water 
applied to the crop,         .           is gross irrigation requirement of crop   equipped 
with irrigation system   in district   and state of nature  .           is the fallowed area 
of perennial crop,     (      , in district   and state of nature  .  
Parameters are represented by lower case letters, where        is fixed crop 
establishment costs;          is fixed irrigation equipment costs;    is crop prices;     is 
water cost;       is variable cost other than water;         is perennial land fallowing 
penalty; and     is the probability of each state of nature  .  
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The crops   which are included in the model are the main crops cultivated in the 
study area: rice, cereals, vegetables, citrus, and other fruit trees. The irrigation systems   
are flood, sprinkler and drip. Surface water inflows to the basin in the period 1990-2011 
are classified into four states of nature    . The states are low, moderately low, 
moderately high, and high inflow levels, with probabilities of 10%, 40%, 40%, and 
10%, respectively.  
Expression (4.1a) represents long-run (first-stage) capital investment costs in 
cropping and irrigation systems. Expression (4.1b), (4.1c), and (4.1d) represent short-
run (second-stage) crop revenues, water costs, and variable costs, respectively. 
Expression (4.1e) represents a perennial land fallowing penalty, indicating possible 
future yield losses if farmers decide to fallow perennial crop lands.  
The yields,         , are determined using crop-water production functions. These 
functions represent crop yield as an increasing function of water available for the crop 
up to a point beyond which additional water reduces yield. These quadratic production 
functions take the following form:  
                                                              
                                          (4.2) 
where the parameters a, b, and c are the intercept, linear and quadratic coefficients, 
respectively. These functions are estimated following the procedure developed by 
Warrick and Yates (1987) that relates crop yield to maximum and minimum crop water 
requirements and application uniformity. The production functions are calibrated based 
on local yield, water requirement, and economic data from chapter 1 of this thesis.  
The variable applied water,        , is defined as the quantity of water available for 
each crop   equipped with irrigation system   in district   and state of nature  , which is 
the sum of net irrigation water and effective rainfall. This relationship is defined as 
follows: 
                                                                                                               (4.3) 
where       is the efficiency of each irrigation system   in district  , and         is 
effective rainfall for each crop   in district   and state of nature  .  
Crop-water production functions allow for the modeling of deficit irrigation or 
applying less than full crop water requirement and accepting less than the maximum 
possible yield, subject to a minimum water requirement threshold. 
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The objective function (1a-e) is maximized subject to the following constraints:       
                                                                                                                (4.4) 
                                                                                                                     (4.5) 
                                                                                                              (4.6) 
                                                                                                        (4.7) 
                                                                                                  (4.8a) 
                                                                                                        (4.8b) 
                                                                                                          (4.9) 
Expression (4.4) represents land available in each irrigation district,           , 
for capital investments in cropping and irrigation systems (first-stage decision). 
Expressions (4.5) and (4.6) represent the possibility that a share of area with capital 
investments,        , can be irrigated,          , or fallowed,          , in each state of 
nature (second-stage decision). Expression (4.7) states that the water used in an 
irrigation district under each state of nature does not exceed the water allocated to that 
district,              . Expression (4.8a-b) calculates irrigation water left for 
environmental flows in each irrigation district and state of nature,     , which is the 
sum of unused irrigation water (4.8a), and irrigation return flows (4.8b). Irrigation 
return flows are calculated as a function of water use and efficiency. Expression (4.9) 
determines the quantity of water flowing to the Albufera wetland, the most important 
aquatic ecosystem in the Jucar basin, from environmental flows in each state of nature, 
  . Parameters α and β represent the shares of environmental flows that feed the 
wetland from the ARJ and RB irrigation districts, respectively.      and    are proxy 
variables for environmental impacts of climate change. 
The environmental damage costs to the Albufera wetland from climate change are 
estimated indirectly. Given the limited knowledge and information available on 
ecosystem damages from the reduction of inflows to the wetland, a damage cost 
avoided method is used. This method does not provide a strict measure of ecosystem 
damages, but a lower-bound estimate of these damages (De Groot et al., 2002). 
The hydrological plan of the Jucar basin indicates that the loss of inflows to the 
Albufera wetland under climate change would be replaced using available treated  
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Figure 4.2. Observed and simulated area and water use by crop and irrigation district. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
wastewater. Therefore, the wastewater treatment cost is considered here as the damage 
avoidance cost for the Albufera wetland, which is estimated at 0.7 € per cubic meter of 
wetland inflow reduction relative to the current situation (CHJ, 2014).       
Detailed information on the technical coefficients and parameters of the model 
have been collected from field surveys, expert consultation, statistical reports, and 
reviewing the literature. This information covers crop yields and prices, water and 
production costs, crop water requirements, irrigation efficiencies, and land availability 
(GV, 2009; INE, 2009; MARM, 2010).  
The use of mathematical programming models to analyze agricultural production at 
regional level faces the problem of aggregation and overspecialization because farms in 
a region are different in terms of resources endowment, technologies, and management 
skills. Ideally, a regional model should include a component for every individual farm, 
but this is unfeasible because of the complexity of such a model (Hazell and Norton, 
1986). Many approaches have been developed to solve this problem and to calibrate 
regional models to observed conditions such as the representative farm approach (Day, 
1963), the convex combination approach (Önal and McCarl, 1991), and the positive  
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Table 4.1. Water allocation to irrigation districts by climate scenario and state of nature. 
Climate scenario State of nature 
P value 
(%) 
Water allocations (Mm
3
) 
ARJ ESC RB CJT 
Baseline 
Low 10 61 12 119 17 
Moderately low 40 111 22 217 34 
Moderately high 40 168 38 274 54 
High 10 222 66 336 80 
Climate change 
Low 10 49 9 91 8 
Moderately low 40 89 16 166 16 
Moderately high 40 134 28 210 25 
High 10 178 49 257 37 
 
mathematical programming (PMP) approach (Howitt, 1995; Röhm and Dabbert, 2003). 
Our model is calibrated for the year 2009 (a moderately high state of nature year), 
with observed crop area, and water use by crop and irrigation district using the PMP 
approach. The Röhm and Dabbert‟s procedure is applied, in which there is a larger 
elasticity of substitution among crop variants than among completely different crops. 
Crop variants include the same crop grown under different irrigation systems. The 
outcomes of the model are broadly consistent, indicating that the model reproduces 
reliably the observed situation (Figure 4.2). 
4.4 Climate change and adaptation scenarios 
The modeling framework is used to analyze climate change impacts and adaptation 
possibilities in the Jucar basin. The impacts of an average climate change scenario are 
evaluated with a 32% reduction of water inflows to the basin, and a 15% increase of 
crop irrigation requirements compared to the baseline scenario (current climate 
conditions). These estimates of inflows and water requirements are taken from climate 
change projections of the Jucar basin by CEDEX (2010), which downscales to basin 
level the results of various global circulation models and emission scenarios. 
Table 4.1 shows water allocations to irrigation districts under each climate scenario 
and state of nature. The allocations are estimated using the reduced form hydrological 
model of the Jucar basin developed in chapter 1 of this thesis. This model includes 
several demand nodes from upstream to downstream river reaches, and allocates water 
to those nodes subject to various hydrologic, institutional and environmental 
constraints.  
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Table 4.2. Climate change adaptation scenarios. 
Adaptation possibilities 
No- 
policy  
(NP) 
Irrigation 
subsidy  
(IS) 
Water  
market  
(WM) 
Full  
adaptation  
(FA) 
On-farm adaptation         
Crop mix change Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Irrigation system change Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Land fallowing Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deficit irrigation Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institutional adaptation         
Irrigation subsidy  No Yes No Yes 
Water trading No No Yes Yes 
 
Four adaptation scenarios of several on-farm and institutional adaptation measures 
are analyzed. Adaptation measures at farm-level are crop mix and irrigation system 
change, land fallowing, and deficit irrigation. Adaptation measures at institutional-level 
are public subsidies for investments in efficient irrigation systems on-farm (sprinkler 
and drip systems), and introduction of water trading.  
Table 4.2 shows the four adaptation scenarios, representing the different 
combinations of on-farm and institutional adaptation measures. Adaptation scenarios 
show the contribution of each measure to overall adaptation, and the tradeoff between 
the different possibilities. The objective function (4.1a-e) and the water availability 
constraint (4.7) are modified according to the adaptation scenario.   
Farmers in scenarios are assumed to optimize the water application rate (deficit 
irrigation), which requires advanced technical skills for farmers, and available 
meteorological data and information on crop water requirements. A sensitivity analysis 
of this assumption is conducted by modeling the alternative assumption that farmers 
maintain fixed the water application rates.    
4.5 Results and discussion    
Results of the climate and adaptation scenarios are presented in terms of economic 
impacts, land use and irrigation system changes, and water use and environmental 
flows. Table 4.3 presents the economic outcomes of the various climate and adaptation 
scenarios, and figure 4.3 displays crop production costs, revenues, and profits per unit 
of land for each scenario.  
 
 
                                                                                                                            Chapter 4 
91 
 
Table 4.3. Economic outcomes of the climate and adaptation scenarios (10
6 €). 
Economic indicators Baseline 
Climate change 
NP IS WM FA 
Long-run fixed costs 120.1 87.9 96.9 100.7 108.7 
Short-run variable costs
*
 93.2 65.8 73.3 82.9 87.8 
Fallow penalty 1.6 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Crop revenues 278.2 197.7 219.6 238.4 256.8 
Public subsidy 0.0 0.0 4.6 0.0 4.9 
Farmers' profits 63.3 43.4 48.8 54.8 60.2 
Environmental costs - 8.0 10.7 11.5 12.5 
*
 Short-run variable costs include water and non-water costs.
  
 
 
Results indicate that climate change will likely have negative effects on irrigation 
activities in the Jucar basin for all scenarios considered. However, the severity of those 
effects is different depending on the scenarios. Farmers‟ profits are reduced by 31% 
under the most restrictive scenario (NP), and only by 5% under the most flexible 
scenario (FA) compared to baseline scenario. Introducing water trading (scenario WM) 
is the best individual adaptation option, improving farmers‟ profits by 26% (or 11 
million €/year) compared to the most restrictive scenario. Subsidizing irrigation 
modernization (scenario IS) improves farmers‟ profits by 12% (or 5 million €/year). 
However, improved farmers‟ profits from irrigation subsidy barely cover the public 
subsidy cost. These results suggest that the extent of climate change impacts on 
irrigation will depend on government policy settings and farmers‟ adaptation responses.  
Crop revenues and production costs (long and short-run) decrease under climate 
change for all scenarios compared to the baseline. However, they increase progressively 
as more adaptation possibilities are included. Production costs, revenues and profits per 
unit of land increase under all climate change and adaptation scenarios compared to the 
baseline scenario. The reason is that more water scarcity results in higher shadow values 
of water, inducing farmers to invest in efficient irrigation systems and high-value crops, 
and move-away from water-intensive and low-value crops.  
The perennial land fallowing penalty arises from not meeting a minimum irrigation 
threshold for fruit trees that ensures productivity in future years. This penalty decreases 
under climate change compared to the baseline scenario, and vanishes under the water 
market scenarios (WM, FA). The environmental costs required to replace the water 
inflows losses to the Albufera wetland increase considerably under climate change for  
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Figure 4.3. Crop costs, revenues and profits by climate and adaptation scenarios (€/ha). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
all scenarios considered, reaching almost 13 million €/year for the most flexible 
scenario.   
The economic outcomes described above are explained by farmers‟ long-run choice 
of capital investment in cropping and irrigation systems (Table 4.4), and short-run 
choice of irrigated and fallowed areas (Table 4.5). Long-run choice of capital 
investment indicates that under climate change farmers reduce irrigated land between 15 
and 35% compared to the baseline scenario. Irrigation subsidy and water market 
policies result in almost the same rate of irrigation abandonment (24%) compared to the 
baseline scenario.  
The crop mix changes considerably, with a decline in the water-intensive and low-
value crops, mainly rice, and the maintenance of high-value crops such as vegetables 
and fruit trees. Irrigated area falls by up to 65% for rice, 34% for cereals, and 39% for 
citrus, while the area of vegetables and other fruit trees remains almost unchanged. The 
reason for the large reduction in the area of citrus under climate change in some 
scenarios (NP, IS) is the lack of enough water in dry years (low water state of nature) to 
meet citrus minimum water requirements. Thus, the efficient response in the presence of 
substantial cultivated area of citrus is to reduce long-run capital investment to minimize 
both current and future yield losses. However, in the water market scenarios (WM, FA) 
more area of citrus is maintained because of the possibility of purchasing water in dry 
years to avoid future yield losses. 
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Table 4.4. Long-run choices by climate and adaptation scenario (ha). 
Land use indicators Baseline 
Climate change 
NP IS WM FA 
Irrigated land 56710 36660 43030 43035 48430 
Land abandonment 0 20050 13680 13675 8280 
Crop mix 
Rice 14740 6890 10085 5090 8260 
Cereals 600 440 485 400 580 
Vegetables 2310 2270 2290 2275 2265 
Citrus 30170 18510 22170 26900 28260 
Other fruit trees 8890 8550 8000 8370 9065 
Irrigation system 
Flood 31980 24110 16975 32245 22770 
Sprinkler  150 115 145 65 210 
Drip 24580 12435 25910 10725 25450 
 
Long-run choice of capital investment in irrigation systems suggests that farmers 
choose to move away from less-efficient flood system towards more-efficient sprinkler 
and drip systems in some scenarios (IS, FA). In these scenarios, the irrigation subsidy 
provides a good incentive to farmers for such a change. However contrary to 
expectations, farmers reduce the area under sprinkler and drip systems in the other 
scenarios (NP, WM). The main reason for that is the possibility of strategically adopting 
deficit irrigation and/or purchasing water in the market as contingencies in dry years, 
instead of investing in efficient irrigation systems with high sunk costs that may be 
needed only in dry years and not in wet years (high water state of nature with low water 
requirements and abundant water availability). These findings are consistent with the 
results from other studies dealing with irrigation technology adoption under uncertainty 
(Carey and Zilberman, 2002; Cai and Rosegrant, 2004).   
Results of short-run choice of irrigated and fallowed areas suggest that farmers‟ 
response to risk (stochastic inflows) is similar in the various climate and adaptation 
scenarios. Famers mostly choose to irrigate areas which have strong capital investments 
in high-value crops (vegetables and fruit trees) and high-efficient irrigation technologies 
(sprinkler and drip), and to fallow areas with small capital investments in low-value 
crops (rice and cereals) and less-efficient irrigation technologies (flood). This behavior 
is especially pronounced in the water market scenarios (WM, FA) because of the 
possibility of water reallocation from crops with low to high marginal value of water. 
  
                                                                                       Efficient water management policies 
 
94 
 
Table 4.5. Short-run choices by climate and adaptation scenario (ha)
*
. 
Land use indicators Baseline 
Climate change 
NP IS WM FA 
Irrigated area 52720 35475 40220 41210 45230 
Fallowed area 3990 1185 2810 1825 3200 
Crop mix 
Rice 11185 5945 7520 3380 5125 
Cereals 510 400 440 360 520 
Vegetables 2180 2145 2160 2200 2260 
Citrus 30025 18505 22165 26900 28260 
Other fruit trees 8820 8480 7935 8370 9065 
Irrigation system 
Flood 28110 23045 14290 30490 19595 
Sprinkler  140 110 135 60 185 
Drip 24470 12320 25795 10660 25450 
* 
Results on short-run choice are average values across probability weighted states of nature.  
 
 
However, the proportion of irrigated and fallowed areas is different for each 
scenario. The reason is the tradeoff between maximizing the expected profit and 
minimizing the risk of profit loss in dry years in each scenario. In the most restrictive 
scenario (NP), farmers seek to limit their risk exposure by reducing long-run 
investments and thus minimizing short-run losses of fallowing the cultivation area. But 
in the other scenarios (IS, WM, FA) farmers increase long-run investments, even if they 
have to fallow greater cultivation area because they can compensate dry years losses 
with higher gains in wet years, and also because they can purchase water in the market 
to offset the effects of drought.  
Table 4.6 presents the water outcomes of the various climate and adaptation 
scenarios. The allocated water to irrigation is divided between water used by crops and 
unused water left in-stream. Water use under climate change decreases by up to 23% 
compared to the baseline scenario, although water use increases progressively as more 
adaptation options are included. Water use expands by 7% under the most flexible 
scenario (FA) compared to the most restrictive scenario (NP). Water use increases by 
6% with the irrigation subsidy, and by 3% with water trading. Both the irrigation 
subsidy and water trading seem to provide significant incentives for farmers to use the 
water allocations that are left in-stream in wet years under the most restrictive scenario. 
These water allocations become activated by expanding the irrigated area of flexible 
annual crops in wet years. The in-stream unused water is reduced by up to 33% 
compared to the most restrictive scenario. 
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Table 4.6. Water outcomes by climate and adaptation scenarios (Mm
3
)
*
. 
Water indicators Baseline 
 Climate change 
NP IS WM FA 
Water use  449 347 367 358 373 
Unused water 94 78 58 67 53 
Environmental flows 217 174 146 164 136 
Inflows to Albufera 45 33 29 28 27 
* 
Results of the water indicators are average values across probability weighted states of nature. 
  
 
The decrease of both the volume of water left in-stream and the irrigation return 
flows leads to a reduction of environmental flows by up to 37% compared to the 
baseline scenario. The consequence is a fall of the inflows to the Albufera wetland by 
up to 40% compared to the baseline scenario. The irrigation subsidy contributes more to 
the reduction of environmental flows, followed by water trading. However, water 
trading contributes somewhat more to the reduction of inflows to the Albufera wetland 
than irrigation subsidy. The reason is the market spatial reallocation of water and the 
fact that the Albufera is fed by the return flows of the ARJ and RB irrigation districts 
which are net water sellers in the market (low-value uses).    
Table 4.7 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis of the deficit irrigation 
assumption in terms of farmers‟ profits, environmental costs, long-run choices, and 
water outcomes. Results show that without deficit irrigation farmers‟ profits for the 
various climate and adaptation scenarios are further reduced compared to baseline 
scenario as a result of less capacity to maintain irrigated area by reducing water 
application rates on low-value crops. The long-run choice of capital investment in 
cropping and irrigation systems decreases by up to 16%, and land abandonment 
increases by up to 94% compared to the same scenarios with the possibility of deficit 
irrigation. These results highlight the extent to which farmers are able to perform 
potential adaptation opportunities at farm level.  
Water use decreases under all adaptation scenarios compared to the baseline 
scenario and to adaptation scenarios with the possibility of deficit irrigation. The 
elimination of the deficit irrigation possibility leads to the fall of water use and an 
increase of the inflows to the Albufera. The irrigation subsidy remains the largest 
contributor to environmental degradation. Environmental costs are reduced compared to 
adaptation scenarios with the possibility of deficit irrigation. 
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Table 4.7. Results of the sensitivity analysis. 
  NP IS WM FA 
Farmers' profits (10
6 €) 39.5 43.5 47.7 51.8 
Environmental costs (10
6 €)  7.2 9.5 8.3 9.4 
Long-run irrigated land (ha)  33592 38523 38901 40679 
Long-run land abandonment (ha) 23114 18183 17805 16027 
Water use (Mm
3
) 324 353 351 359 
Environmental flows (Mm
3
) 172 152 157 148 
Inflows to Albufera (Mm
3
) 34 31 33 31 
 
4.6 Conclusions and policy implications  
This paper presents a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of two popular 
incentive-based water management policies to address climate change impacts on 
irrigated agriculture in Southern Europe: water markets and irrigation subsidies. The 
analysis is undertaken in a representative basin of Southern Europe, the lower Jucar 
basin of Spain, using a modeling framework that links hydrologic, agronomic, and 
economic variables within a discrete stochastic programming model. This model 
estimates farmers‟ responses to climate change and policy interventions in terms of 
long-run choices of capital investment in cropping and irrigation systems and short-run 
decision to irrigate or fallow land.  
Results indicate that climate change will likely substantially reduce farmers‟ profits 
in the absence of any policy intervention. These losses can be reduced through the 
implementation of water markets and irrigation subsidy policies. These policies provide 
incentives to farmers for investing in cropping and irrigation systems, reducing land 
abandonment, shifting towards high-value cultivation activities, and increasing water 
use, although farmers‟ behavior is different under each policy. In addition, a deficit 
irrigation strategy proves to be an important response to climate change, reducing 
significantly farmers‟ losses. However, environmental flows will be reduced under 
climate change for all scenarios considered, generating considerable environmental 
costs for society. Water market and irrigation subsidy policies further reduce 
environmental flows compared to a climate change scenario without any policy 
intervention, with larger flow reductions from irrigation subsidies than water markets. 
These empirical results suggest that the benefits of the irrigation subsidy policy are 
very small, especially when public subsidies and social costs of replacing lost 
environmental flows are accounted for. In contrast, the benefits of introducing water 
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markets seem to be quite large, even though well-functioning water markets involve 
sizeable monitoring and transaction costs that are not considered in this study but 
require evaluation. 
As a final remark, the findings in the lower Jucar basin highlight that climate 
change will likely have negative impacts on the irrigated agriculture and the linked 
water-dependent ecosystems of Southern Europe. However, the severity of these 
impacts will depend on the degree of adaptation at farm level, farmers‟ investment 
decisions, and the policy choices, which are interrelated. Therefore, the main thrust of 
the European water and agricultural regulations should be placed on enhancing the 
adaptive capacity at farm level, improving farmers‟ knowledge of climate change 
impacts for better long-run investment decisions, and fostering the adoption of 
adaptation policies that minimize both private and social benefit losses such as water 
markets.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Hydro-economic modeling with aquifer-river interactions for 
sustainable basin management 
 
 
Abstract 
Water demands for irrigation, urban and environmental uses in many arid and semiarid 
regions continue to grow, while freshwater supplies from surface and groundwater 
resources are becoming scarce and are expected to decline because of climate change. 
Policymakers in these regions are faced with hard choices on water management and 
policies. Hydro-economic modeling is the state-of-the arts tool to assist policymakers in 
the design and implementation of sustainable water management policies in basins. The 
strength of hydro-economic modeling lies in its capacity to integrate key biophysical 
and socio-economic components within a coherent framework. A major gap in 
developments of hydro-economic models to date has been the difficulty of integrating 
surface and groundwater flows based on the theoretically correct Darcy equations used 
by the hydrogeological community. The hydro-economic model presented here specifies 
a spatially-explicit groundwater flow element. The methodological contribution to 
previous modeling efforts is the explicit specification of the aquifer-river interactions, 
which are important when aquifer systems make a sizable contribution to basin 
resources. This advanced framework is applied to the Jucar basin (Spain) for the 
assessment of different climate change scenarios and policy choices, specially the 
hydrologic, land use and economic outcomes. The response to scenarios integrates the 
multiple dimensions of water resources, allowing results to provide valuable 
information on the basin scale climate change adaptation paths to guide alternative 
policy choices using sound science.  
 
Keywords. Hydro-economic modeling, aquifer-river interactions, climate change, water 
policies   
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5.1 Introduction 
Water resources are key critical assets to support human societies and natural 
ecosystems. Despite their paramount importance, many freshwater systems are 
threatened because of the affordable expansion in water extractions, coupled with large 
pollution loads that impair water quality. The rate of growth of water extractions has 
almost doubled population growth during the last century. This expanded human access 
to water has been driven by urbanization, industrialization and land use changes, with a 
large deployment of engineering waterworks such as dams, irrigation schemes, inter-
basin transfers, and extensive well drilling. 
Costs to ensuing damages to ecosystems and biodiversity in river basins are 
undervalued by private markets when there are public good characteristics of these 
natural assets. The environmental benefits and services provided to society are “market 
externalities” and the market failure that are corrected with water policies and 
regulations can produce a more economically efficient allocation of water resources 
(Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). 
The situation in river basins located in arid and semiarid regions is even worse 
because in these regions human activities already maximize the extraction of water from 
the natural environment. The water scarcity problem could become quite serious, 
threatening both human activities and natural ecosystems. The forthcoming impacts 
from climate change would further exacerbate the current water scarcity situation in arid 
and semiarid regions having sizable impacts on irrigated agricultural production, as 
indicated by global model results (Schewe et al., 2014; Elliot et al., 2014).   
The current drought in California and much of the southwestern United States and 
the recent millennium drought in the Murray-Darling basin of Australia illustrate 
vividly the severity of water scarcity problems. Another indicator is the finding that a 
third of the world biggest groundwater systems are in distress, especially in arid and 
semiarid basins (Richey et al., 2015). The long-term sustainability of groundwater 
systems requires new aquifer management models in order to address the current 
groundwater management challenge (Gorelick and Zheng, 2015). 
This widespread mismanagement of water resources in basins demonstrate the need 
for better analytical tools that could support more sustainable water management and 
policies. An important emerging tool for the analysis of sustainable management 
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options in basins is hydro-economic modeling. Hydro-economic models (HEM) 
integrate the spatially distributed water systems, water storage and conveying 
infrastructures, water-based economic activities, and water-dependent ecosystems into a 
coherent model (Harou et al., 2009). The advantage of this approach is the inclusion of 
interrelationships between the hydrologic, economic, institutional and environmental 
components for an accurate assessment of sustainable management and policy options 
(Cai et al., 2003).  Booker et al. (2012) analyze the evolution in concepts, methods and 
application of hydro-economic modeling, stressing its capability for addressing system 
wide impacts. They indicate that hydro-economic modeling requires further advances in 
the dynamic and stochastic model dimensions, and also in the accurate understanding of 
interdependencies between the hydrologic, economic, institutional and environmental 
components. Despite these achievements, an important gap not yet closed in the 
development of most hydro-economic models is the theoretically weak connection of 
the linkages between groundwater and surface water activities. While the Darcy 
equation approach is the widely-recognized and correct approach to modeling 
groundwater flows, few if any hydro-economic modeling applications in the water 
resources literature properly account for the Darcy equation approach for groundwater, 
mass balance for surface water, and economic principles properly applied for a 
complete optimization framework.  
This paper‟s unique contribution is to present the development and application of a 
hydro-economic modeling framework that addresses the gap described above. The issue 
addressed in this paper is the improvement of the river basin dynamics in modeling, by 
including the linkage between aquifer systems and river flows. This linkage is important 
when aquifer systems are closely related to river flows making a sizable inflow or 
outflow contribution to the basin resources. Overall, the aquifer dynamics and stream-
aquifer interactions have been simplified in hydro-economic models, given the level of 
complexity already involved in modeling whole river basins. First, aquifers are 
represented as simple single-tank units. Second, the linkage of aquifers and river flows, 
either inflows or outflows, is usually represented with linear estimates relating the 
stream-aquifer flow, with variables such as aquifer recharge, water pumping, or water 
table levels. 
For example, Cai et al. (2003) assume a linear relationship between aquifer 
discharges and water table levels. McCarl et al. (1999) use regression-based forecasts of 
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aquifer discharges that respond to recharge, pumping and water table heights. Ward and 
Pulido-Velazquez (2009) estimate discharge using a simple proportion of recharge. The 
study by Schoups et al. (2006) deals with the conjunctive use of surface water and 
groundwater in irrigation, stressing the need to account for interactions between surface 
and groundwater systems. Although the model includes water extractions and returns to 
the aquifer from irrigation, it does not include an explicit aquifer-river interaction. 
The approach to the aquifer-river interaction taken here is much more elaborated, 
avoiding both the single-tank assumption, and overly simple assumptions on the 
aquifer-river linkages. When these linkages are important, these simplifying 
assumptions may result into wrong policy recommendations (Brozovic et al., 2010). 
The groundwater flow formulation used in this paper is similar to the one used in 
MODFLOW groundwater model, which is able to simulate the spatial and temporal 
heterogeneity of real-world aquifers and the linkage between aquifer system and river 
flow (McDonald and Harbaugh, 1984). The model is applied to the Jucar basin in Spain, 
where the river-aquifer linkage is important for the sustainable management of the 
basin.             
5.2 Modeling framework 
This paper presents an integrated basin-scale hydro-economic modeling framework that 
could be used to assess the impacts of future climate change scenarios and to analyze 
the economic and biophysical outcomes of adaptation policies. This framework is a 
comprehensive tool that integrates several components including surface and 
groundwater hydrology, agronomy, land use, institutions, environment, and economic 
activities, covering the main water uses. The mathematical formulation of each 
component is presented below.  
5.2.1 Hydrology  
Basin hydrology is based on the principle of water mass balance, defined for each flow, 
 , and each stock,  . The main flow variables,   , tracked by the model include 
headwater flow, streamflow, surface water diversion, groundwater pumping, water 
applied and consumed, return flow to streams and aquifers, stream-aquifer interaction, 
and reservoir release and evaporation. The stock variables,   , tracked by the model are 
the reservoir and aquifer volume levels.  
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5.2.1.1 Headwater inflows 
Total surface water inflows to the basin are defined as the total annual flows at the 
different headwater gauges. The inflows,     , at each headwater gauge,   (a subset of 
 ), in time t, are equal to total source supplies,          :  
                                                                                                                        (5.1) 
5.2.1.2 Streamflows 
The streamflow,     , at each river gauge,   (a subset of  ), in time t, is equal to the sum 
of flows over any upstream node,  , whose activities impact that streamflow. These 
nodes include headwater inflow, river gauge, diversion, surface return flow, stream-
aquifer interaction, and reservoir release. The streamflow at each river gauge, which is 
required to be nonnegative, is defined as follows: 
                                                                                                                       (5.2)                                                                                                                  
where      is a vector of coefficients that links flow nodes,  , to river gauge nodes,  . 
The coefficients take on values of 0 for non-contributing nodes, +1 for nodes that add 
flow, and -1 for nodes that reduce flow. 
5.2.1.3 Surface water diversions 
Water supply to basin‟s users can be met partially or totally by diversions from a 
stream. However, during drought spells, streamflow can be low or even zero. Therefore, 
a surface water diversion constraint is required in order to avoid that diversion,     , 
exceeds available streamflow at each diversion node,   (a subset of  ), in time t. A 
diversion, which is required to be nonnegative, is defined as follows: 
                                                                                                                      (5.3) 
where      is a vector of coefficients that links flow nodes,  , to diversion nodes,  . The 
right hand side term represents the sum of all contributions to flow at diversion nodes 
from upstream sources. These sources include headwater inflow, river gauge, diversion, 
surface return flow, stream-aquifer interaction, and reservoir release. The   coefficients, 
take on values of 0 for non-contributing nodes, +1 for nodes that add flow, and -1 for 
nodes that reduce flow. 
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5.2.1.4 Water applied 
Water applied,     , at each application node,   (a subset of  ), in time t, can come from 
two sources: stream diversion,     , and groundwater pumping,     . Water applied is 
defined as follows: 
                                                                                                       (5.4) 
where      and      are vectors of coefficients that link application nodes to diversion 
and pumping nodes, respectively. The coefficients take on values of 1 for application 
nodes withdrawing water from available sources, and 0 for not withdrawing water.  
For each agricultural node in the basin, total water applied for irrigation is defined as 
follows: 
    
                                                                                                         (5.5) 
Equation (5.5) states that irrigation water applied to crops from both surface and 
groundwater sources,     
  
, is equal to the sum over crops ( ) and irrigation technologies 
( ) of water application per ha,       , multiplied by irrigated area,         , for each crop 
and irrigation technology.          is multiplied by an identity matrix,     , to conform 
nodes. 
5.2.1.5 Water consumed 
Consumptive use,     , at each use node,   (a subset of  ), in time, t, is an empirically 
determined proportion of water applied,     . For irrigation, consumptive use is the 
amount of water used through crop evapotranspiration (ET). For urban uses, 
consumptive use is the proportion of urban water supply not returned through the 
sewage system. That use, which cannot be negative, is defined as follows:  
                                                                                                                    (5.6) 
where parameters,    , are coefficients indicating the proportion of water applied that 
is consumptively used in each use node. For agricultural use nodes, water consumed is 
measured as: 
    
                                                                                                                  (5.7) 
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Equation (5.7) states that irrigation water consumed,     
  
, is equal to the sum over crops 
( ) and irrigation technologies ( ) of empirically estimated ET per ha,       , multiplied 
by irrigated area,         , for each crop and irrigation technology.  
5.2.1.6 Return flows  
Return flows,     , at each return flow node,   (a subset of  ), in time, t, is a proportion 
of water applied      . These flows return to the river system or contribute to aquifers 
recharge. Return flows are defined as follows: 
                                                                                                                     (5.8) 
where parameters,     , are coefficients indicating the proportion of total water applied 
that is returned to river and aquifers. For agricultural nodes, returns flows are defined as 
follows: 
    
                                                                                                          (5.9) 
Equation (5.9) states that irrigation return flows,     
  
, are equal to the sum over crops 
( )  and irrigation technologies ( ) of empirically estimated return flows per ha,       , 
multiplied by irrigated area,         , for each crop and irrigation technology.          is 
multiplied by an identity matrix,     , to conform nodes. The sum of water consumed 
and returned must be equal to water applied at each demand node.   
5.2.1.7 Reservoir stock and operation 
Water stock,       , at each reservoir,     (a subset of  ), in time t, is defined in the 
following equations:   
                                                                                            (5.10) 
                                                                                                                         (5.11) 
           
                                                                                                                (5.12) 
           
                                                                                                                (5.13) 
where equation (5.10) states that reservoir water stock,       , is equal to its stock in the 
previous time period,         , minus both the net release (outflow minus inflow) from 
the reservoir,     , and reservoir evaporation,     . Evaporation depends on reservoir 
features and climatic factors. Both sets of parameters        and        are identity 
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matrices linking reservoir stock nodes to reservoir release and evaporation nodes, 
respectively. Equation (5.11) defines initial reservoir water stock at    ,       . Upper 
and lower bounds on reservoir water stock are defined in equation (5.12) and (5.13), 
respectively. Parameters     
    and     
    are reservoir maximum capacity and dead 
storage, respectively. Upper bound constraint guarantees that reservoir stock in each 
time period never exceeds its maximum capacity, while lower bound constraint states 
the capacity from which stored water in reservoir cannot be used.     
5.2.1.8 Aquifer stock and stream-aquifer interaction 
The groundwater flow is calculated with a finite-difference groundwater flow equation 
based on the principle of water mass balance and Darcy‟s law. The formulation is 
similar to that used in MODFLOW groundwater model (McDonald and Harbaugh, 
1984). Assume an aquifer system divided into   (1 row and   columns) connected cells 
(sub-aquifers),     (a subset of  ), which are linked to n connected reaches of a river, 
      (a subset of  ). The aquifer head,       , in each sub-aquifer,    , in time,  , is 
defined in the following equation (see the mathematical appendix for further details on 
the groundwater flow equation): 
                                                             
                                                              
                                 ;                                                              (5.14)                            
where parameters     ,     , and        are specific yield, area, and recharge for sub-
aquifer,    , respectively. Parameters            and            represent hydraulic 
conductance between sub-aquifer,    , and adjacent sub-aquifers,       and 
     , respectively. Parameter            is hydraulic conductance of river reach, 
     , linked to sub-aquifer,    . Parameter    is the time step. Parameter        is the 
initial head of sub-aquifer,    , at    . Variable          is the head of sub-aquifer, 
   , in the previous time period. Variables          and          are heads of adjacent 
sub-aquifers,       and      , respectively. Variable            is the head of the 
river reach,      , linked to sub-aquifer,    , and variable        is net groundwater 
pumping from sub-aquifer,    , which are defined in equations (5.15) and (5.16) as 
follows: 
                                                                                                  (5.15) 
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                                                                                                 (5.16) 
where variables      is streamflow at each river gauge node,  ;       is gross 
groundwater pumping at each pumping node,  ; and      is return flows at each return 
flow node,  , in time,  . Parameters             are coefficients defining the 
relationship between river head (or river stage) and streamflow (or discharge) for each 
river reach. This relationship depends on river features such as riverbed form and 
roughness coefficients. Parameter sets             ,        and        are identity 
matrices linking river reaches to river gauge nodes, and sub-aquifers to pumping and 
return flow nodes, respectively.    
The interaction between each sub-aquifer and the corresponding river reach is 
defined in the following equation: 
                                                                                                    (5.17) 
Equation (5.17) states that water flows between river reach,      , and sub-aquifer, 
   ,             , depend on river and sub-aquifer heads and hydraulic conductance of 
river reach, with              being negative if sub-aquifer is discharging water to river 
reach.  
5.2.2 Land use 
For irrigated agriculture, land in production in each agricultural use node, (a subset of 
 ), which derives water demand in that node, is defined in the following equations:  
                                                                                                                   (5.18) 
                                                                                                                      (5.19) 
Equation (5.18) states that the sum over crops ( ) and irrigation technologies ( ) of 
irrigated land in production,         , at each agricultural use node in time,  , cannot 
exceed land availability,        , in that use node and time period. Equation (5.19) 
states that irrigated land in production,           , of perennial crops,     (a subset of  ), 
at each agricultural use node in time,  , cannot exceed perennial irrigated land for that 
use node in the previous time period,    . This constraint reflects the possible future 
loss of long-run capital investments in perennial crops if farmers decide to not irrigate 
those crops in the current time period.  
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5.2.3 Institutions and environment 
Water agencies in arid and semiarid regions worldwide impose several institutional and 
environmental constraints on water use and management such allocations rules, 
minimum supply requirements, and minimum environmental flows. The reasons are the 
need to satisfy human water needs, to secure supply to downstream users, and to protect 
valuable aquatic ecosystems, among others.    
In this paper, several institutional and environmental constraints are included 
depending on the climate and policy scenarios considered. A constraint on urban water 
supply is maintained in all scenarios in order to assure that a minimum amount of water, 
  
   , is delivered to urban application nodes,  , in each time period,  . This constraint 
is defined in the following form:  
    
      
                                                                                                                 (5.20) 
5.2.4 Economics 
Water has an economic value in all its competing uses, which is determined by the total 
willingness to pay of users benefiting from it. For agricultural use, the economic value 
of water is measured by the contribution of water to farmers‟ net benefits. For urban 
use, it is measured by the sum of the consumer and producer surplus. 
Net benefits,      , at each use node,  , in time,  , is defined as follows: 
                                                                                                                (5.21) 
where       and       are the total benefits and costs at each use node,  , in time,  , 
respectively.  
For agricultural use nodes, total benefits,      
  
, and total costs,      
  
, in time,  , are 
defined by the following equations: 
     
                                                                                                          (5.22) 
     
                                                                                                   (5.23) 
where parameters      is crop prices;          is crop yields, and           is non-water 
production costs, and variable          is crop area. Variable           is water costs 
which is defined as follows: 
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                                                                                                                                (5.24)  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
where parameters     is surface water price,      is pumping cost not related to the 
level of the water table (investment, operation and maintenance of the well and pump 
equipment), and      is pumping cost related to the water table level or energy costs of 
lifting water from the water table to land surface. The variable            is the 
pumping depth, or the difference between the water table level (aquifer head) and land 
surface elevation. Variables        and        are the water applied to crops supplied 
with surface water and groundwater, respectively. Parameters     and     are vectors 
of coefficients that conform use nodes to diversion and pumping nodes, respectively. 
For urban use nodes, (a subset of  ), total benefits,      
   , and total costs,      
   , in 
time,  , are defined by the following equations: 
     
                
            
                                                                    (5.25) 
     
           
                                                                                                        (5.26) 
where equation (5.25) is the total benefits function with a quadratic specification, with 
   ,     and     are the parameters for the constant, linear and quadratic terms, 
respectively. For urban use nodes, households utilize water first for high-value uses 
such as indoor uses for drinking, sanitation and cooking, so that urban benefits rise 
quickly for supplies allocated to these uses, starting from a position of no use. These 
high-value uses have few substitution possibilities, and therefore     is expected to be 
large and positive. However, urban marginal benefits fall rapidly for other additional 
low-value uses, such as outdoor uses for garden irrigation and car washing. Then     is 
expected to be large and negative. Equation (5.26) represents total urban supply costs, 
with    being the per unit cost of water supplied.  
5.2.5 Objective function  
The model objective is maximizing the net present value of the economic net benefits 
over a planning horizon, subject to the basin‟s hydrological, land use, institutional, and 
environmental constraints. The model provides information on the optimal water flows 
and stocks, and cropping patterns under different climate and policy scenarios 
predefined by the modeler. The objective function takes the following form: 
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                                                                                             (5.27) 
where     is the net present value,       are the net benefits, and   is the discount 
rate.    
5.3 Model application 
The modeling framework described previously in section 1 is applied to an arid and 
semiarid basin in Southeastern Spain, the Jucar basin. This basin is a good experimental 
field for an integrated basin scale analysis. One reason is that the Jucar is at present 
under severe stress with acute water scarcity and significant ecosystem degradation. 
Another reason is that the foreseeable climate change impacts are expected to 
exacerbate water scarcity problems in the basin. However, the modeling framework is 
designed to be adaptable for any basin elsewhere.  
5.3.1 Study area: the Jucar basin   
The Jucar basin is located in the regions of Valencia and Castilla La Mancha in 
Southeastern Spain. It extends over 22,300 km
2
 and covers the area drained by the Jucar 
River and its tributaries, mainly the Magro and Cabriel Rivers. The basin is a complex 
system including 13 reservoirs and numerous competing uses with different priority 
rights, and with a complex relationship between surface and groundwater resources. The 
Jucar basin presents a ratio of 0.84 between total water demand and average renewable 
water resources. This value highlights the strong pressure on water resources in the 
basin (Momblanch et al., 2014).  
Urban and industrial extractions are 270 Mm
3
 to supply households, industries, and 
services in an area with more than one million inhabitants. This population is located 
mostly in the cities of Valencia, Sagunto and Albacete. Extractions for irrigated 
agriculture are nearly 1,400 Mm
3
 to irrigate 190,000 ha. The main crops are rice, wheat, 
barley, corn, garlic, onion, grapes, and citrus. There are three major irrigation areas, the 
Eastern La Mancha irrigation area (EM) located in the upper Jucar; the traditional 
irrigation districts of Acequia Real del Jucar (ARJ), Escalona y Carcagente (ESC), and 
Ribera Baja (RB) located in the lower Jucar; and the irrigation area of the Canal Jucar-
Turia (CJT) located in the bordering Turia Basin (CHJ, 2014). 
The Jucar basin includes the Albufera wetland, which is one of the most important 
aquatic ecosystems in Europe. The Albufera is catalogued in the RAMSAR list, and it is 
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a natural park and a special protected area for birds. It receives water mainly from the 
return flows of the ARJ and RB irrigation districts. Other flows originate from the 
neighboring Turia basin, and from the discharge of urban and industrial wastewaters in 
the adjacent municipalities (Sanchis, 2011).  
Irrigation development during recent decades in the basin has been quite important 
for the local economy, and irrigated agriculture remains an important source of income 
and labor in the area. The expansion of irrigation has been driven especially by 
groundwater pumping from the EM aquifer, which is the largest aquifer system in Spain 
(Esteban and Albiac, 2012). However, the intensive groundwater pumping has caused a 
significant drop in the water table level reaching 80 m in some areas, and resulting in 
large storage depletion fluctuating around 2,500 Mm
3 
at present. In addition, the EM 
aquifer is linked to the Jucar River stream, and it used to feed the river with about 200 
Mm
3
/year in the 1980s. Due to the depletion, aquifer discharges to the river have 
declined considerably over the past 30 years (Sanz et al., 2011). The consequence is that 
the lower Jucar is undergoing severe problems of low flows and water-quality 
degradation, with the riverbed in the middle Jucar being desiccated during recent 
droughts.  
A major challenge for policymakers in the Jucar basin is the design of sustainable 
adaptation strategies to the upcoming effects of climate change, which is expected to 
reduce the freshwater supplies and increase the demand for water. Climate change 
projections for the end of the twenty-first century in the Jucar basin under a range of 
climatic and emission scenarios indicate a reduction of surface and groundwater 
availability between 11 and 46%, and an increase of evapotranspiration between 12 and 
22% (CEDEX, 2010).  
The hydro-economic modeling framework is applied to the Jucar basin in order to 
address adaptation to climate change. The analysis undertaken in this paper focuses on 
irrigation activities in the major irrigation districts (EM, CJT, ESC, ARJ and RB) and 
urban demand in the major cities (Albacete, Valencia, and Sagunto). Following the 
study by Sanz et al. (2011), the EM irrigation district is divided into three sub-areas of 
the aquifer, Northern Domain (NEM), Central Domain (CEM), and Southern Domain 
(SEM). In addition, the analysis includes the most important aquatic ecosystems in the 
Jucar basin: the Albufera wetland, the ecosystem linked to the Jucar River and its 
tributaries, and the groundwater-dependent ecosystems in the EM aquifer. Three proxy 
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variables are used in order to quantify the environmental impacts of the climate and 
policy scenarios on these ecosystems: the inflows to the Albufera wetland, the outflows 
to the Mediterranean Sea, and the change in the EM aquifer storage. The model of the 
Jucar basin consists of 8 headwater inflow nodes, 21 river gauge nodes, 8 diversion 
nodes, 4 pumping nodes, 11 return flow nodes, 3 stream-aquifer interaction nodes, 1 
environmental demand node, 3 reservoir release nodes, 3 reservoir stock nodes, and 3 
aquifer stock nodes. Figure 5.1 presents the hydrological network of the basin, including 
the sources and uses of water. 
5.3.2 Data sources 
Data on headwater inflows to the basin, gauged water flows, and reservoir inflows, 
releases and evaporation has been obtained from the reports of the Jucar basin authority 
and the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture and Environment (CHJ, 2014; MAGRAMA, 
2014). Information on the parameters of the EM sub-aquifers including area, recharge, 
hydraulic conductance and specific yield has been taken from Sanz et al. (2011). 
Headwater inflows and aquifer recharge are stochastically represented in the model with 
means and variances of historical inflows and recharge, respectively.  
For agricultural uses, detailed information on crop yields and prices, subsidies, 
crop water requirements, irrigation efficiencies, water and production costs, and land 
availability in each irrigation district have been collected from field surveys, expert 
consultation, statistical reports, and published documentation (INE, 2009; GV, 2009; 
GCLM, 2009; MARM, 2010). Irrigation water extractions by source of water in each 
district have been calculated using crop areas, water requirements, and location of 
irrigation technologies and their efficiencies. The crops included in the model are rice, 
wheat, barley, corn, other cereals, garlic, onion, other vegetables, citrus, grapes and 
other fruit trees. Irrigation technologies are flood, sprinkler and drip.  
For urban uses, a linear demand function is specified to characterize the demand 
for water in each urban demand node. The linear demand function results in a quadratic 
benefit function similar to the one specified in equation (5.25). Parameter estimation 
requires three data items: the observed water price and quantity for a specific time 
period, and the price elasticity of water demand (Young, 2005). Information on urban 
water supply by source of water, population growth rate, water prices and costs has been 
obtained from the Jucar basin authority reports (CHJ, 2014). The price elasticity of   
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Figure 5.1. Network of the Jucar basin. 
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demand has been taken from Martinez-Espiñeira (2002) and Arbues and Barberan 
(2004).  
The environmental benefits and damage costs for the most important aquatic 
ecosystems in the Jucar are estimated. For the Albufera wetland, an environmental 
benefit function of the wetland from chapter 1 of this thesis is used. For the Jucar River, 
a benefit function is specified as linear in the amounts of water in the mouth flowing to 
the Mediterranean Sea. We relied on valuation studies from the literature that estimate 
the values of the ecosystem services provided by rivers (Hatton et al., 2011, CSIRO, 
2012, Banerjee et al., 2013). For groundwater-dependent ecosystems in the EM aquifer, 
a damage cost function is specified as linear in the volume of depletion following the 
study by Esteban and Albiac (2012).   
Return flows to the Jucar River and to aquifers have been calculated as the fraction 
the applied water not used in crop evapotranspiration or in urban consumption. The 
information about the contribution of return flows to streamflow and aquifer recharge is 
taken from the reports of the Jucar basin authority (CHJ, 2014). 
5.3.3 Model calibration 
Integrated hydro-economic models typically require a careful calibration procedure 
before they can be used to assess sustainable water management policies. In this paper, 
both the hydrologic and the agricultural economic components of the Jucar model are 
calibrated. The calibration of the hydrologic component involves adjusting model 
parameters in order to reproduce the observed system states such as streamflows and 
aquifer heads under baseline conditions (Sophocleous et al., 2009). The agricultural 
economic component is calibrated using the Positive Mathematical Programming 
(PMP) in order to reproduce observed land and water use under baseline conditions, and 
to address the problem of overspecialization in agricultural production (Howitt, 1995). 
Both components are calibrated for the year 2009, which is a normal flow year.  
The hydrological component is calibrated so that its predicted gauged flows match 
the observed flows at each river gauge, where measurement data are available (8 gauges 
in the Jucar). To achieve this, the model is constrained to reproduce observed gauged 
flows, and to deliver the observed water supply to irrigation districts and cities. The 
calibration procedure involves introducing new variables that represent unmeasured 
sources or uses of water, which allow balancing supply and demand at each node. These  
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Table 5.1. Climate change impacts in the Jucar basin compared to current climate. 
Climate scenario Mild Severe 
Temperature (ºC) +3.8 +4.4 
Rainfall (%) -1 -24 
Potential evapotranspiration (%) +13 +22 
Surface runoff (%) -27 -46 
Groundwater recharge (%) -22 -45 
Note: The mild climate change scenario is the outcome of the downscaled climatic model ECHAM4-FIC 
forced by the B2 emission scenario. The severe climate change scenario is the outcome of the downscaled 
climatic model HadCM3-SDSM forced by the A2 emission scenario. Both scenarios present projections 
for the period 2071-2100 compared to current climate conditions. 
 
variables include all possible sources or uses of water in the basin that are not properly 
measured. Unmeasured sources include upstream headwater inflows, surface return 
flows, and aquifer discharge. Unmeasured uses include upstream demand nodes not 
included in the study, evapotranspiration of natural vegetation, evaporation from open 
water such as rivers and channels, and percolation. Additionally, the calibration 
procedure involves an adjustment of aquifer parameters such as hydraulic conductance, 
specific yield and recharge in order to reproduce the observed aquifer heads and the 
stream-aquifer interaction. The calibration procedure requires a fair amount of 
experimentation since the model have to be calibrated node by node from upstream to 
downstream. Once the model calibration is satisfactory, all unmeasured sources and 
uses have to be held constant. Then any changes brought about by new policy 
intervention scenarios will not change these unmeasured levels.  
The agricultural economic component is calibrated using a variant of PMP 
developed by Dagnino and Ward (2012), in which parameters are estimated for a linear 
crop yield function. This function represents a decreasing crop yield when additional 
land is assigned to crop production, based on the principle of Ricardian rent. For each 
crop and irrigation technology, the first lands brought into production have the highest 
yields, after which yields fall off as less-suitable lands enter production. The parameters 
of the linear yield function for each crop and irrigation technology are given in tables 
B1 and B2 in the appendix.    
5.3.4 Climate change and policy scenarios 
The modeling framework is used to analyze climate change impacts and adaptation 
possibilities under various climate and policy scenarios in the Jucar basin. Two climate 
change scenarios are considered: mild and severe. These scenarios cover climate change 
                                                         Hydro-economic modeling with aquifer-river interactions 
 
118 
 
impacts on potential evapotransipration, surface runoff, and groundwater recharge as 
shown in table 5.1. Impact estimates are taken from climate change projections for the 
Jucar basin by CEDEX (2010), which downscales to basin level the results of various 
global circulation models and emission scenarios.  
The model is used to assess the outcomes of two policy alternatives under the 
climate change scenarios defined above. The two policy alternatives are defined as 
follows: 
Unsustainable management policy: This policy promotes a high use of water which is 
above renewable water availability. The policy is implemented in the model by placing 
no requirements on terminal reservoir or aquifer stocks, or on yearly streamflows. 
Reservoirs and aquifers can be run down as low as desired up to the last time period 
with no regard for future water uses or for environmental damages caused by water 
resources depletion. The cost that groundwater users confront when pumping aquifers 
unsustainably is the increased pumping costs incurred by lowering the aquifer heads. 
Under unsustainable management, competing users ignore the common pool nature of 
groundwater creating the water extraction externality, where extractions by one user 
reduce the water stock available for others. Because every user believes that competitors 
will not conserve water for future use, there is no incentive to protect the water stock. 
Pumping by users takes place as long as the economic value of the marginal product of 
pumped water exceeds the marginal pumping cost. Beyond these marginal costs, there 
are no incentives to conserve water for the future or account for other environmental 
externalities related to groundwater depletion (Esteban and Albiac, 2012).  
In recent decades, aquifer systems have been suffering substantial pressures in arid 
and semi-arid regions, with extraction rates well above recharge (Richey et al. 2015). 
Significant negative impacts are already occurring in many basins worldwide, because 
the degradation of water bodies limits economic activities and endangers ecosystems 
(UNEP 2003; WWAP 2006). In addition, individual agents are unable to capture the 
future value of stock resources. Therefore, both surface water stored in reservoirs and 
groundwater resources in the absence of adequate regulation are misallocated and used 
more intensively than what is socially desirable (Esteban and Albiac, 2012).  
Sustainable management policy: This policy promotes the protection of water 
resources, accounting for long-term and environmental benefits. The sustainable 
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management of water resources requires a reform of the water institutions and policies 
used at present that have failed to align private short-term goals with societal long-term 
goals (Guerry et al., 2015). For the purpose of this paper, sustainable water management 
is defined as the water extractions that do not exceed the natural replenishment rate and 
maintain minimum environmental flow thresholds. This policy is implemented by 
requiring that all aquifers and reservoirs in the basin return to their starting levels by the 
end of the planning period, and that annual streamflows are greater than the minimum 
flow thresholds set for the Jucar River.  
These two policy alternatives do not necessarily replicate the current water 
management approach in the Jucar basin, but they provide a range of the possible future 
climate change impacts under different water management policy choices.  
5.3.5 Solving the model   
The model is formulated as a dynamic nonlinear problem that maximizes the Jucar 
basin‟s net present value for a 20 years‟ time period. The GAMS package has been used 
for model development and scenario simulation (Brooke et al., 1988). The dimensions 
of the model are 391,317 equations, 421,764 variables and 1,039,011 nonzero elements. 
The model is solved using the CONOPT algorithm within GAMS, which is designed to 
solve large-scale nonlinear optimization models.  
5.4 Results and discussion  
The results for the climate change and policy scenarios are compared to those of the 
current situation or baseline in terms of hydrologic, land use and economic outcomes. 
Results are presented by demand node, sector and basin location. The tables show 
average values for the analyzed planning period. 
5.4.1 Baseline scenario  
Table 5.2 shows the outcomes of the baseline scenario. The hydrologic outcomes of this 
scenario indicate that total water demand is 799 Mm
3
 per year, divided between 690 
Mm
3
 for agricultural demand (86%) and 110 Mm
3 
for urban demand (14%).
6
 The 
surface water diversions are 483 Mm
3 
covering the agricultural and urban demand, 
especially in the lower Jucar region of Valencia. These surface water extractions do not 
affect reservoir storage, which increases by 10 Mm
3
 per year. Groundwater extractions  
                                                 
6
 About 260 Mm
3
/year of water extractions by numerous small demand nodes are not included in the 
model. 
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Table 5.2. Hydrologic, land use and economic outcomes of the baseline scenario. 
Region/basin location Castilla La Mancha/Upstream Valencia/Downstream Basin 
Sector Agriculture Urban Agriculture Urban 
Agriculture Urban Environment Total 
Demand nodes NEM CEM SEM Albacete CJT ESC ARJ RB Valencia Sagunto 
Hydrologic outcomes (Mm3/year)                             
     Headwater inflows                            1355.5 
     Aquifer recharge                            323.1 
     Water demand  16.3 185.9 58.4 15.3 112.5 18.8 104.5 193.6 87.9 6.2 689.9 109.5   799.4 
           Surface water diversion  0.0 0.0 0.0 15.3 56.5 18.8 104.5 193.6 87.9 6.2 373.4 109.5   482.9 
           Groundwater pumping  16.3 185.9 58.4 0.0 56.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 316.5 0.0   316.5 
     Storage change (storage depletion if ˂0)                              
           Reservoirs                            9.9 
           Aquifers                          -39.3 -39.3 
     Aquifer-river discharge (river gains if ˃0)                            45.9 
     Outflow to Mediterranean Sea                          416.6 416.6 
     Inflows to Albufera wetland                          88.6 88.6 
Land use outcomes                              
     Irrigated area (1000 ha/year)* 6.8 45.9 17.1   19.2 3.4 15.3 15.3     123.0     123.0 
           Cereals 2.9 27.3 11.1   0.5 0.0 3.1 8.6     53.5     53.5 
           Vegetables 0.5 10.5 3.5   0.7 0.0 0.6 0.2     16.0     16.0 
           Fruit trees 3.4 8.1 2.6   18.0 3.4 11.6 6.4     53.5     53.5 
      Irrigation technology distribution (%)                             
           Flood 1.8 4.0 4.3   23.9 38.7 50.8 69.1     21.9     21.9 
           Sprinkler 42.6 59.5 64.6   0.1 0.0 0.5 0.1     33.7     33.7 
           Drip 55.6 36.4 31.1   76.0 61.3 48.7 30.9     44.4     44.4 
Economic outcomes                              
     Gross benefits (million €/year) 11.1 96.8 32.5 75.1 94.4 16.8 66.8 49.2 430.9 30.6 367.4 536.6 205.6 1109.6 
     Production costs (million €/year) 7.1 60.0 20.3 19.8 71.0 13.4 51.5 38.1 113.4 8.1 261.4 141.3 1.3† 404.0 
     Net benefits (million €/year) 4.0 36.7 12.2 55.3 23.4 3.4 15.3 11.1 317.5 22.5 106.0 395.3 204.3 705.6 
     Marginal value of irrigation water  (€/m3) 0.10 0.11 0.09   0.08 0.03 0.03 0.01     0.06       
     Urban water price  (€/m3)       1.29         1.29 1.29   1.29     
*
 Crops are aggregated into three representative groups: cereals: rice, wheat, barley, corn, other cereals; vegetables: garlic, onion, other vegetables and Fruit trees: citrus, grapes     
and other fruit trees.   
†
 For the environment, production costs are equivalent to damage costs.    
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are 317 Mm
3
 and they are the major water sources for the irrigation districts located in 
the region of Castilla La Mancha in the upper Jucar (NEM, CEM and SEM).  
Results show that under the current policy setting and climate conditions, 
groundwater pumping results in aquifer depletion of about 39 Mm
3
 per year. The 
consequence is that aquifer discharge to the river is no more than 46 Mm
3
 per year, 
which is very low compared to the historical discharges of 250 Mm
3
 before the largest 
pumping extractions took place in the 1999‟s (Sanz et al., 2011). The annual water 
outflow to the Mediterranean Sea is 417 Mm
3
, well above the annual environmental 
flow threshold required to achieve a good ecological status of the Jucar River (63 Mm
3
 
or 2 m
3
/s). The Albufera wetland receives about 89 Mm
3
 per year from irrigation return 
flows, which meets the wetland water requirements in order to achieve a good 
ecological status (CHJ, 2014).   
The land use outcomes show that the irrigated area amounts to 123,000 ha per year, 
of which 53,500 ha are cereals, 16,000 ha are vegetables, and 53,500 ha are fruit trees. 
A considerable irrigated area is grown under high-efficient irrigation technologies (34% 
sprinkler and 44% drip), especially in the upper Jucar. About one fifth of the irrigated 
area is grown under low-efficient flood irrigation technology, especially in the lower 
Jucar.   
  The economic outcomes indicate that the basin net benefits are 706 million €. 
Agriculture, which is the major water user in the basin, produces only 15% of net 
benefits. Environmental uses generate 29% of net benefits. The major share of net 
benefits accrues to urban uses, about 56% of the total. This large share of benefits 
calculated for urban uses occurs because of the low price elasticity of demand for urban 
uses and its associated high consumer surplus. The economic outcomes reflect the 
intense competition for water between agriculture, urban and environmental uses.      
The last two rows in table 5.2 show the economic value of an additional cubic 
meter of water (or shadow price) for farmers and households from water reallocation or 
supply increases. These shadow prices provide important information to policymakers 
on the willingness to pay for water by users, they could guide allocation decision, and 
they could indicate whether investments in developing alternative sources of water such 
as desalination and water conservation are required or not. Results show that the 
shadow price of water is very high for urban use compared to agricultural use. These 
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results justify the fact that agriculture usually faces the main adjustment to water 
scarcity. The marginal values of irrigation water are higher in the upper Jucar, where 
groundwater resources are intensively used, compared to those in the lower Jucar based 
mostly on surface water. 
5.4.2 Mild climate change scenario   
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the outcomes of the mild climate change scenario under the 
two alternative water management policies, unsustainable and sustainable management. 
Under this climate scenario, headwater inflows are reduced by 30%. Aquifer recharge is 
reduced by 21 and 27% under the unsustainable and sustainable management policies, 
respectively. Total water demand is reduced by 5 and 19% under the unsustainable and 
sustainable policies, respectively.  
The economic outcomes of this scenario indicate that the mild climate change 
scenario reduces net benefits between 85 and 91 million € per year (up to 13%) 
compared to the baseline scenario. However, contrary to expectations the sustainable 
policy achieves higher net benefits compared to the unsustainable policy because the 
environmental net benefit gains (+8%) outweigh the agricultural net benefit losses (-
4%) in the sustainable policy. Urban net benefits for both policies remain almost 
unchanged under this climate change scenario compared to the baseline because of the 
very small reduction in urban water supply. Urban water prices rise slightly by 1 and 
2% under the unsustainable and sustainable policies, respectively.  
The major impact of climate change falls on agriculture and the environment, 
which sustain the costs of adaptation. The reason is the large cutbacks in agriculture 
allocations coupled with depleted water stocks and river flows. Agriculture gets more 
benefits under the unsustainable policy because this policy increases both surface and 
groundwater extractions, drawing from the water stocks in reservoirs and aquifers, and 
river flows. Under mild climate change and the unsustainable policy, reservoir depletion 
is 10 Mm
3
 per year, and aquifer depletion is 65 Mm
3
 per year. 
The sustainable policy, which avoids water stocks depletion and assures minimum 
river flows achieves higher environmental net benefits (about 8%) compared to the 
unsustainable policy. The aquifer discharge to the river increases under the sustainable 
policy compared to the unsustainable policy and the baseline scenario. This increase in 
aquifer discharges to the river enhances river flows available for water users  
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Table 5.3. Hydrologic, land use and economic outcomes of the mild climate change scenario and unsustainable management policy. 
 Region/basin location Castilla La Mancha/Upstream Valencia/Downstream Basin 
Sector Agriculture Urban Agriculture Urban 
Agriculture Urban Environment Total 
Demand nodes NEM CEM SEM Albacete CJT ESC ARJ RB Valencia Sagunto 
Hydrologic outcomes (Mm3/year)                             
     Headwater inflows                            949.0 
     Aquifer recharge                            255.2 
     Water demand  16.4 161.4 53.6 15.3 108.9 18.0 82.8 210.8 87.7 6.2 651.8 109.3   761.0 
           Surface water diversion  0.0 0.0 0.0 15.3 65.2 18.0 82.8 210.8 87.7 6.2 376.7 109.3   486.0 
           Groundwater pumping  16.4 161.4 53.6 0.0 43.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 275.1 0.0   275.1 
     Storage change (storage depletion if ˂0)                             
           Reservoirs                            -10.1 
           Aquifers                          -64.7 -64.7 
     Aquifer-river discharge (river gains if ˃0)                            44.9 
     Outflow to Mediterranean Sea                          98.1 98.1 
     Inflows to Albufera wetland                          83.6 83.6 
Land use outcomes                              
     Irrigated area (1000 ha/year) 6.2 36.3 14.3   16.7 2.9 11.8 14.8     103.0     103.0 
           Cereals 2.5 19.2 8.8   0.2 0.0 1.3 8.2     40.1     40.1 
           Vegetables 0.5 9.4 3.1   0.6 0.0 0.5 0.2     14.4     14.4 
           Fruit trees 3.3 7.7 2.4   15.8 2.9 10.0 6.4     48.5     48.5 
     Irrigation technology distribution (%)                             
           Flood 1.4 2.9 3.1   22.1 37.2 43.7 68.4     21.0     21.0 
           Sprinkler 39.3 52.8 61.5   0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1     29.6     29.6 
           Drip 59.2 44.3 35.4   77.9 62.8 56.0 31.5     49.4     49.4 
Economic outcomes                              
     Gross benefits (million €/year) 10.5 87.1 29.7 75.1 86.6 15.1 58.9 48.5 430.6 30.6 336.3 536.3 122.7 995.3 
     Production costs (million €/year) 6.9 53.8 18.6 19.8 64.5 11.8 44.4 37.7 113.1 8.0 237.6 141.0 2.1 380.7 
     Net benefits (million €/year) 3.7 33.3 11.1 55.3 22.1 3.3 14.5 10.8 317.5 22.5 98.7 395.3 120.6 614.6 
     Marginal value of irrigation water (€/m3) 0.11 0.11 0.09   0.09 0.03 0.04 0.01     0.07       
     Urban water price (€/m3)       1.29         1.31 1.31   1.30     
Note: see note to table 5.2.  
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Table 5.4. Hydrologic, land use and economic outcomes of the mild climate change scenario and sustainable management policy. 
Region/basin location Castilla La Mancha/Upstream Valencia/Downstream Basin 
Sector Agriculture Urban Agriculture Urban 
Agriculture Urban Environment Total 
Demand nodes NEM CEM SEM Albacete CJT ESC ARJ RB Valencia Sagunto 
Hydrologic outcomes (Mm3/year)                             
     Headwater inflows                            949.0 
     Aquifer recharge                            236.9 
     Water demand  6.3 104.3 31.3 15.3 100.5 16.1 63.8 212.9 87.6 6.2 535.2 109.1   644.3 
           Surface water diversion  0.0 0.0 0.0 15.3 56.8 16.1 63.8 212.9 87.6 6.2 349.6 109.1   458.7 
           Groundwater pumping  6.3 104.3 31.3 0.0 43.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 185.7 0.0   185.7 
     Storage change (storage depletion if ˂0)                              
           Reservoirs                            0.0 
           Aquifers                          0.0 0.0 
     Aquifer-river discharge (river gains if ˃0)                            51.2 
     Outflow to Mediterranean Sea                          148.9 148.9 
     Inflows to Albufera wetland                          76.3 76.3 
Land use outcomes                              
     Irrigated area (1000 ha/year) 3.0 24.4 8.6   15.5 2.6 9.9 15.0     79.0     79.0 
          Cereals 0.3 9.1 4.2   0.1 0.0 0.3 8.3     22.3     22.3 
          Vegetables 0.3 8.1 2.5   0.6 0.0 0.5 0.2     12.2     12.2 
           Fruit trees 2.4 7.2 1.9   14.8 2.6 9.1 6.4     44.5     44.5 
     Irrigation technology distribution (%)                             
          Flood 0.0 0.8 0.5   21.0 36.1 37.8 68.6     23.3     23.3 
          Sprinkler 9.8 37.1 48.9   0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1     17.2     17.2 
          Drip 90.2 62.0 50.6   78.9 63.9 62.0 31.4     59.4     59.4 
Economic outcomes                              
     Gross benefits (million €/year) 6.9 73.1 23.2 75.1 82.2 13.9 53.1 48.7 430.4 30.6 301.0 536.1 130.3 967.4 
     Production costs (million €/year) 3.9 40.7 12.7 19.7 60.4 10.7 39.5 37.9 113.0 8.0 205.7 140.8 0.0 346.5 
     Net benefits (million €/year) 3.0 32.4 10.5 55.3 21.8 3.2 13.6 10.8 317.5 22.5 95.3 395.3 130.3 620.9 
     Marginal value of irrigation water (€/m3) 0.14 0.12 0.10   0.09 0.03 0.05 0.01     0.08       
     Urban water price (€/m3)       1.30         1.31 1.31   1.31     
Note: see note to table 5.2.  
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downstream, and therefore puts less pressure on the water stocks in reservoirs that can 
be maintained.  
Compared to the baseline scenario, the water flowing to the Mediterranean Sea 
decreases considerably under climate change for the two policies (up to 76%), but this 
water flow is higher under the sustainable than under unsustainable policies. 
Nevertheless, outflows to sea under both policies comply with the small minimum 
environmental flow threshold. The inflows to the Albufera wetland decrease under the 
mild climate change compared to the baseline scenario. The wetland receives larger 
inflows under the unsustainable than the sustainable policy. The reason is that the 
Albufera wetland is fed by irrigation return flows in the lower Jucar, which are reduced 
under the sustainable policy as a result of the decline in water extractions.  
5.4.3 Severe climate change scenario   
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show the outcomes from severe climate change under the two 
alternative policies. Under this scenario, headwater inflows are reduced by 48%. 
Aquifer recharge is reduced by 43 and 52% under the unsustainable and sustainable 
policies, respectively. Water demand falls by 19 and 43% under the unsustainable and 
sustainable policies, respectively. 
The severe climate change scenario reduces basin net benefits between 133 and 147 
million € per year (up to 21%) compared to the baseline scenario. The sustainable 
policy results in larger benefit losses compared to the unsustainable policy because the 
gains in environmental benefits (+15%) do not cover the agricultural benefit losses (-
30%). Urban benefits for both policies remain almost unchanged because of the small 
reduction in urban water supply. Urban water prices rise slightly by 3 and 5% under the 
unsustainable and sustainable policies, respectively. 
The impacts of severe climate change on agriculture are considerable with benefits 
dropping between 15 and 40%, compared to the baseline. The cost of achieving 
sustainability under severe climate change is supported by agriculture with benefits 
falling 30% in comparison to the unsustainable policy. Without sustainability 
requirements, the depletion levels in reservoirs and aquifers are 10 and 92 Mm
3
 per 
year, respectively. The marginal value of irrigation water increases under severe climate 
change scenario, and it is even higher for the sustainable policy where less water is 
available for irrigation.  
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Table 5.5. Hydrologic, land use and economic outcomes of the severe climate change scenario and unsustainable management policy. 
Region/basin location Castilla La Mancha/Upstream Valencia/Downstream Basin 
Sector Agriculture Urban Agriculture Urban 
Agriculture Urban Environment Total 
Demand nodes NEM CEM SEM Albacete CJT ESC ARJ RB Valencia Sagunto 
Hydrologic outcomes (Mm3/year)                             
     Headwater inflows                            706.5 
     Aquifer recharge                            184.9 
     Water demand  15.9 137.7 48.6 15.3 86.7 12.5 49.2 185.4 87.3 6.2 536.1 108.8   644.9 
           Surface water diversion  0.0 0.0 0.0 15.3 55.9 12.5 49.2 185.4 87.3 6.2 303.0 108.8   411.8 
           Groundwater pumping  15.9 137.7 48.6 0.0 30.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 233.1 0.0   233.1 
     Storage change (storage depletion if ˂0)                               
           Reservoirs                            -10.1 
           Aquifers                          -92.4 -92.4 
     Aquifer-river discharge (river gains if ˃0)                            44.2 
     Outflow to Mediterranean Sea                          31.5 31.5 
     Inflows to Albufera wetland                          63.5 63.5 
Land use outcomes                              
     Irrigated area (1000 ha/year) 5.8 29.7 12.3   12.6 1.9 7.4 12.7     82.3     82.3 
           Cereals 2.1 13.5 7.2   0.0 0.0 0.0 6.4     29.2     29.2 
           Vegetables 0.4 8.6 2.9   0.5 0.0 0.4 0.2     13.0     13.0 
           Fruit trees 3.3 7.5 2.2   12.0 1.9 7.0 6.1     40.0     40.0 
     Irrigation system distribution (%)                             
           Flood 1.1 1.6 1.9   18.8 32.1 32.5 64.4     17.4     17.4 
           Sprinkler 36.2 45.6 58.4   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1     27.7     27.7 
           Drip 62.7 52.8 39.6   81.2 67.9 67.5 35.5     54.8     54.8 
Economic outcomes                              
     Gross benefits (million €/year) 10.1 79.4 27.4 75.1 73.8 11.9 45.6 44.6 430.1 30.5 292.7 535.7 89.7 918.1 
     Production costs (million €/year) 6.6 48.4 17.2 19.7 53.5 9.0 33.2 34.3 112.6 8.0 202.1 140.3 3.0 345.4 
     Net benefits (million €/year) 3.4 31.0 10.2 55.3 20.3 2.9 12.3 10.3 317.5 22.5 90.6 395.3 86.7 572.6 
     Marginal value of irrigation water (€/m3) 0.11 0.12 0.10   0.10 0.04 0.06 0.01     0.08       
     Urban water price (€/m3)       1.30         1.34 1.34 
 
1.33     
Note: see note to table 5.2.  
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Table 5.6. Hydrologic, land use and economic outcomes of the severe climate change scenario and sustainable management policy. 
Region/basin location Castilla La Mancha/Upstream Valencia/Downstream Basin 
Sector Agriculture Urban Agriculture Urban 
Agriculture Urban Environment Total 
Demand nodes NEM CEM SEM Albacete CJT ESC ARJ RB Valencia Sagunto 
Hydrologic outcomes (Mm3/year)                             
      Headwater inflows                            706.5 
      Aquifer recharge                            155.6 
      Water demand  0.0 12.2 18.3 15.3 74.5 9.2 38.3 193.1 87.1 6.2 345.6 108.5   454.1 
           Surface water diversion  0.0 0.0 0.0 15.3 43.7 9.2 38.3 193.1 87.1 6.2 284.2 108.5   392.7 
           Groundwater pumping  0.0 12.2 18.3 0.0 30.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 61.4 0.0   61.4 
       Storage change (storage depletion if ˂0)                               
            Reservoirs                            0.0 
            Aquifers                          36.2 36.2 
       Aquifer-river discharge (river gains if ˃0)                            58.0 
       Outflow to Mediterranean Sea                          73.9 73.9 
       Inflows to Albufera wetland                          61.3 61.3 
Land use outcomes                              
       Irrigated area (1000 ha/year) 0.0 2.5 4.4   10.9 1.4 5.8 13.1     38.1     38.1 
            Cereals 0.0 0.0 1.3   0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7     8.1     8.1 
            Vegetables 0.0 2.5 2.0   0.5 0.0 0.3 0.2     5.5     5.5 
            Fruit trees 0.0 0.0 1.0   10.4 1.4 5.6 6.2     24.6     24.6 
       Irrigation system distribution (%)                             
            Flood 0.0 0.0 0.0   17.2 27.2 28.0 65.3     32.7     32.7 
            Sprinkler 0.0 1.6 30.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1     3.6     3.6 
            Drip 100.0 98.4 70.0   82.8 72.8 72.0 34.7     63.8     63.8 
Economic outcomes                              
        Gross benefits (million €/year) 0.5 20.8 18.1 75.0 66.2 9.7 38.5 45.3 429.8 30.5 199.3 535.3 99.6 834.2 
        Production costs (million  €/year) 0.4 9.9 9.3 19.7 46.9 7.2 27.4 34.9 112.3 8.0 135.8 140.0 0.0 275.8 
        Net benefits (million  €/year) 0.2 11.0 8.9 55.3 19.3 2.6 11.2 10.4 317.4 22.5 63.5 395.3 99.6 558.4 
        Marginal value of irrigation water (€/m3) 0.24 0.17 0.11   0.11 0.04 0.06 0.01     0.11       
        Urban water price (€/m3)       1.32         1.36 1.36   1.35     
Note: see note to table 5.2.  
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Policymakers in arid and semiarid regions worldwide are constantly searching for 
policies leading to the sustainable use of water resources, mostly linked to reductions in 
overall basin extractions. The cost of such policies are given in terms of benefits losses 
(or gains) sustained by the groups of stakeholders. For policy success, the costs of these 
policies should be acceptable to stakeholders, eventually through compensation of 
losers. Otherwise, stakeholders will oppose any sustainable measure, leading to policy 
failure.  
Table 5.6 shows how to meet sustainable outcomes under severe climate change in 
the Jucar basin. The objective is finding water allocations which have reasonable policy 
costs, measured by reduction in the present value of the stream of benefits along the 
planning horizon. Results indicate that the best way to achieve that is by substantially 
reducing groundwater pumping in the upper Jucar, and increasing the surface water 
available to downstream users.  
Pumping in the upper Jucar under the sustainable policy is reduced by 85% 
compared to the unsustainable policy, down to levels well below aquifer recharge. This 
occurs because the aquifer head rises when pumping is less than recharge, allowing 
larger discharges from the aquifer to the river. Therefore, higher amounts of water are 
available in the river satisfying environmental flows requirements, and at the same time 
providing water to downstream surface water users that cannot get water by depleting 
reservoirs. Benefits of irrigation districts in the upper Jucar under the sustainable policy 
fall by 55% compared to the unsustainable policy. However, the benefits of irrigation 
districts in the lower Jucar are slightly reduced under the sustainable policy compared to 
the unsustainable policy. Water flowing to the sea decreases substantially under severe 
climate change, between 82 and 92% compared to the baseline scenario. Under the 
unsustainable policy, outflows are below the minimum environmental flow requirement, 
while the sustainable policy satisfies this requirement. Inflows to the Albufera wetland 
are also reduced under severe climate change compared to the baseline scenario. 
Inflows to the wetland are lower under the sustainable policy compared to the 
unsustainable policy, because the smaller water extractions reduce also the return flow 
feeding the wetland.   
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Table 5.7. The present value of benefits by climate and policy scenario (million €). 
Policy 
scenario 
Climate 
scenario 
Municipal Agriculture Environment 
Total private 
benefits 
Total social 
benefits 
Base Normal 5101.1 1389.6 2653.6 6490.7 9144.3 
Unsustainable   
policy 
Mild 5101.1 1285.7 1569.1 6386.9 7956.0 
Severe 5100.9 1162.1 1125.1 6263.0 7388.0 
Sustainable 
policy  
Mild 5101.1 1236.9 1714.6 6338.0 8052.6 
Severe 5100.7 792.2 1326.0 5892.9 7219.0 
Note: Total private benefits are the sum of municipal and agricultural benefits, while total social benefits 
are the sum of private and environmental benefits.  
 
5.4.4 Tradeoffs among policies 
The comparison between climate and policy scenarios shows the environmental and 
economic tradeoffs among policy choices. This information could be useful for the 
design of sustainable climate change adaptation policies at basin scale. Table 5.7 
displays the present value of benefits for the climate and policy scenarios. Results 
indicate that climate change will have negative effects on the basin social benefits for 
the considered climate and policy scenarios. Benefits decline between 12 and 21% 
under climate change. However, the losses of private benefits are less than 10%. The 
impacts vary by group of users, with urban uses not very affected, and agricultural and 
environmental users bearing quite large damages. 
Results show that the impacts of climate change depend on policy choices. The 
adaptation of stakeholders can be economically efficient, but this does not guarantee 
sustainable outcomes. In absence of regulations protecting the natural environment and 
the stock resources, water users will strategically deplete reservoirs, aquifers and river 
flows to better engage the impacts of climate change. But this involves serious damages 
to water-dependent ecosystems and also threatens future human activities. Conversely, 
the inclusion of sustainability objectives within the adaptation policies reduces the 
climate change impacts on the environment, but leads to very costly impacts on current 
economic activities. 
For agriculture, there is a substantial gap between the benefits obtained under 
severe climate change and sustainable policy, and all the other scenarios. This negative 
impact of combining severe climate change with sustainable policy is too detrimental to 
farmers, and the costs of the policy become prohibitive. Therefore, additional policy 
instruments are needed to compensate farmers for their large benefit losses such as 
providing them with payments for the water released to support ecosystem services.  
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Figure 5.2. Streamflow in different river gauges under the climate and policy scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: B=Baseline scenario; MU=Mild climate change and unsustainable policy; SU=Severe climate 
change and unsustainable policy; MS=Mild climate change and sustainable policy; SS=Severe climate 
change and sustainable policy; MEF=Minimum environmental flows.  
 
For environmental uses, the sustainable management policy reduces the negative 
impacts of climate change by increasing river flows and avoiding the depletion of 
aquifers and reservoirs. However, the Albufera wetland does not benefit from the 
sustainable policy because the Albufera depends on the irrigation return flows which 
diminish under the sustainable policy. A possible solution to recover water for the 
Albufera wetland could be the direct allocation of some river flow gains to the wetland.   
Figure 5.2 shows the average river flow over the 20 year planning horizon in 
different river gauges under alternative climate and policy scenarios. River flows, which 
are the main drivers to maintain the river‟s good ecological status, decline under all 
climate change and policy scenarios compared to the baseline. The decline is especially 
remarkable in the downstream gauges (from Antella to Cullera) where the basin‟s major 
surface water users are located. However, river flow is higher in all gauges under the 
sustainable policy compared to the unsustainable policy. Non-compliance with the small 
environmental flow requirements occurs only in the Antella and Cullera gauges. Non-
compliance in Antella occurs under mild or severe climate change for the unsustainable 
policy. Non-compliance in Cullera occurs only under severe climate change for the 
unsustainable policy.  
 
                                                                                                                               Chapter 5 
131 
 
620
622
624
626
628
630
632
634
636
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
H
e
a
d
 (
m
)
Time (years)
B
MU
SU
MS
SS
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
D
is
c
h
a
r
g
e
 a
q
u
if
e
r
 t
o
 r
iv
e
r
 (
M
m
3
)
Time (years)
B
MU
SU
MS
SS
Figure 5.3. Aquifer head (right) and discharge to the river (left) under the climate and 
policy scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: See note to figure 5.2. Aquifer head and discharge in each year are average values for the three sub-
aquifers.   
 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the paths of the aquifer head and discharge from the aquifer to the 
river along the 20 years planning horizon for the climate and policy scenarios. Results 
from tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5 indicate that without sustainability requirements, 
groundwater pumping in the upper Jucar is very high compared to aquifer recharge. 
Pumping extractions amounts to 98% of recharge for the baseline scenario, 109% of 
recharge for the mild climate change, and 131% of recharge for the severe climate 
change. The consequence of the unsustainable policy is a steady drop in both the water 
table level and the aquifer discharges to the river. Under the sustainable policy, the 
water table recovers and discharges from the aquifer to the river increase, because 
farmers reduce pumping down to 74 and 25% of recharge for the mild and severe 
climate change, respectively.  
5.5 Conclusions  
River basins in arid and semiarid regions worldwide face important water scarcity 
challenges, which will be aggravated by climate change in the coming decades. 
Policymakers in these basins have to make difficult decisions on water management and 
policies that involve complex environmental and economic tradeoffs. Solving these 
challenges requires better analytical tools to advance more sustainable management and 
policy options. A key task is the integration of the complex interrelationships between 
hydrological, economic, institutional and environmental components in basins.   
Hydro-economic modeling is an emerging tool for implementing comprehensive 
basin scale analysis that could inform the design of sustainable water management 
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policies. However, hydro-economic models have to be capable to adequately reproduce 
the physical behavior of the basin, with a realistic representation of the different water 
sources and uses, including the interaction between surface water and groundwater, as 
well as the value of the alternative water allocations. This paper has addressed that 
challenge by developing an integrated hydro-economic model which is applied to the 
assessment of climate change scenarios and policy choices in the Jucar basin of Spain. 
The contribution of this paper to previous hydro-economic modeling efforts stems from 
the improvement of the river basin dynamics. A groundwater flow framework similar to 
the MODFLOW groundwater model is added to the standard hydro-economic 
formulation of basins. This improved methodological approach is capable of simulating 
the spatial and temporal heterogeneity of real-world aquifers, and most important the 
linkages between aquifer systems and river flows.  
Results of applying the modeling framework to the Jucar basin demonstrate the 
model capabilities to assess the climate scenarios and policy choices, and also its 
potential for integrating the multiple dimensions of water resources. The results of the 
climate change and policy scenarios provide information on the spatio-temporal impacts 
of climate change on hydrology, land use and economic values. Results illustrate how 
adaptation to climate change could be strategically undertaken at basin scale, showing 
also the economic and environmental tradeoffs among the water policy choices. Such 
information, which could be provided only by hydro-economic models, is crucial to 
assist policymakers in arid and semiarid basins in the design and implementation of 
sustainable water management policies.       
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5.7 Appendix  
5.7.1 Tables 
 
Table B1. Intercept of the yield function (maximum yield) by irrigation district, crop 
and technology (Ton/ha). 
Crop 
Irrigation 
technology 
Castilla La Mancha/Upstream Valencia/Downstream 
NEM CEM SEM CJT ESC ARJ RB 
Rice Flood 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.86 0.00 7.86 7.86 
Wheat Sprinkler 4.85 4.77 4.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Barley Sprinkler 5.25 5.22 5.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Corn Sprinkler 11.45 11.41 11.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other cereals 
Flood 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.48 0.00 11.48 11.48 
Sprinkler 21.87 22.59 21.88 12.45 0.00 11.66 11.53 
Garlic Drip 8.68 8.66 8.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Onion Drip 92.64 92.37 92.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other 
vegetables 
Flood 4.48 4.70 4.21 51.55 0.00 51.55 51.55 
Drip 5.17 5.48 4.89 54.10 0.00 52.31 51.92 
Citrus 
Flood 0.00 0.00 0.00 26.37 26.37 26.37 26.37 
Drip 0.00 0.00 0.00 26.95 26.54 26.56 26.46 
Grapes Drip 10.27 10.19 10.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other fruit trees 
Flood 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.61 13.61 13.61 13.61 
Drip 2.41 2.40 2.42 14.00 13.70 13.71 13.66 
  
 
 
Table B2. Linear term of the yield function (marginal yield) by irrigation district, crop 
and technology (Δ(Ton/ha)/Δha). 
Crop 
Irrigation 
technology 
Castilla La Mancha/Upstream Valencia/Downstream 
NEM CEM SEM CJT ESC ARJ RB 
Rice Flood 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.52 0.00 -0.57 -0.20 
Wheat Sprinkler -0.74 -0.06 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Barley Sprinkler -0.77 -0.06 -0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Corn Sprinkler -4.64 -0.20 -0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other 
cereals 
Flood 0.00 0.00 0.00 -17.80 0.00 -12.49 -14.38 
Sprinkler -7.15 -0.69 -1.75 493 0.00 -21.04 -133.87 
Garlic Drip -22.13 -1.00 -3.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Onion Drip -162.69 -7.82 -25.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other 
vegetables 
Flood -5.59 -0.23 -0.67 -61.37 0.00 -104.34 -272.18 
Drip -20.33 -0.63 -1.72 -31.66 0.00 -27.68 -70.05 
Citrus 
Flood 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.41 -3.19 -0.94 -2.26 
Drip 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.40 -2.21 -0.80 -0.99 
Grapes Drip -0.81 -0.34 -1.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other fruit 
trees 
Flood 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.74 -240.91 -21.39 -62.32 
Drip -3.84 -0.46 -0.30 -1.77 -27.43 -2.44 -15.76 
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5.7.2 Mathematical appendix 
The groundwater flow is calculated with a finite-difference groundwater flow equation 
based on the principles of water mass balance and Darcy‟s law. The formulation 
(equation 5.14) is similar to that used in the MODFLOW groundwater model 
(McDonald and Harbaugh 1984). Equation (14) is derived in the following way: 
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that   aquifer cells or sub-
aquifers are represented by 1 row and   columns, where the set     consists of   
elements: 1,2,…,  . These aquifer cells are connected serially to each other and to   
river reaches, The set       also consists of 1,2,…,   elements, where every cell is 
connected only to one river reach. Think of the river as a multi-colored ribbon, with a 
separate color for each reach, flowing on top of a series of blocks below (aquifer cells) 
in which both the river and aquifer are divided into   contiguous cells. The water mass 
balance for each aquifer cell is defined by:  
                                                                                                (A1) 
where equation (A1) states that the sum of all flows into and out of sub-aquifer,    , in 
time,  , must be equal to the rate of change in storage within that sub-aquifer,        , 
where        is the recharge of that sub-aquifer,        is the net groundwater pumping 
from that sub-aquifer,        is the water flow between that sub-aquifer and adjacent 
sub-aquifers, and              is the water flow between that sub-aquifer and the 
corresponding river reach.    
The rate of change in storage,        , in each sub-aquifer is defined as a function of the 
sub-aquifer head as follows:  
                                                                                               (A2) 
where parameters      and      are specific yield and area of that sub-aquifer, 
respectively. Parameter    is the time step, and variables        and          are the 
head of that sub-aquifer in the current and previous time period, respectively.  
The water flow between adjacent sub-aquifers        is defined by equation (A3), 
and the water flow between sub-aquifers and the corresponding river reaches              
is defined by equation (A4). Equations (A3) and (A4) are formulated using the Darcy‟s 
law as follows: 
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                                                                          (A3)                        
                                                                                                      (A4)                                      
where equation (A3) states that the water flows between the sub-aquifers,    , and 
adjacent sub-aquifers,       and      , depends on the sub-aquifer heads,  , and 
the hydraulic conductances between sub-aquifers,  , with        being negative 
(positive) if water is flowing out of (in) sub-aquifer,    . Equation (A4) states that the 
water flow between the sub-aquifer,    , and the corresponding river reach,      , 
depends on the sub-aquifer and river heads,  , and the hydraulic conductance between 
the sub-aquifer and the river,  , with              being negative (positive) if sub-aquifer 
is discharging water to (receiving water from) the river reach.   
The mass balance equation (A1) can be written using equations (A2), (A3) and (A4) as 
follows: 
                                                                  
                                                                           (A5)        
Solving for        yields the groundwater flow equation (equation 5.14 in the text): 
                                                             
                                                              
                                                                                                               (A6)                                                                                                             
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Chapter 6 
 
Summary and conclusions  
 
 
Global water resources face new challenges that suggest a renewed role for water 
resources modeling in the design of water management policies. Scarcity, growing 
populations, and massive water developments have led to keen competition over water 
resources. Climate change is expected to further reduce the availability of water 
resources and increase the variability in water supplies in some regions, especially in 
arid and semiarid basins. Emerging social demands for the protection of water 
dependent-ecosystems benefiting the society are increasing competition for already 
scarce water resources. Water disputes among sectors and regions are expected to 
increase, giving rise to complex social conflicts.  
During recent decades, hydro-economic modeling is becoming an emerging tool to 
assist decision makers in the design and implementation of sustainable water 
management policies in basins. Despite the significant advancement in integrated 
hydro-economic modeling over the last three decades, several gaps are not yet settled in 
the literature, and much more progress is expected. Facing these gaps, this thesis 
presents the development and application of several integrated hydro-economic 
modeling approaches. The four main chapters of this thesis suggest selected 
methodological approaches to fill the gaps related to the dynamic and stochastic 
dimensions of hydro-economic models, and to the inclusion of the strategic behavior of 
stakeholders within those models.  
6.1 Summary 
The first article of this thesis (chapter 2) “Modeling water scarcity and droughts for 
policy adaptation to climate change in arid and semiarid regions”, presents the 
development and application of an integrated hydro-economic model for the Jucar 
basin. The contribution of this chapter to previous hydro-economic modeling efforts 
stems from the development of a reduced form hydrological component. The idea is 
basically that when a detailed hydrological component is not available (which is the 
case in many basins worldwide), a calibrated reduced form can be used to represent 
water flows. Furthermore, the hydro-economic model includes a detailed regional 
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economic component, and it accounts for ecosystem benefits in a way that makes them 
comparable with the benefits derived from other water uses. This modeling approach 
could be easily applied to most basins around the world.   
The model has been used to assess the economic and environmental effects of 
alternative drought management policies (policy of cooperation, water market policy, 
and environmental water market policy) under various drought scenarios (mild, severe, 
and very severe drought). The implementation of a pure water market policy in the 
Jucar basin show modest gains compared to the current institutional setting. In addition, 
the water market entails a reduction of the water available to the environment, causing 
faster ecosystem regime shifts compared to what may happen under the current 
institutional setting. The reason is that water is mostly a common pool resource with 
environmental externalities, and markets disregard these externalities leading to 
excessive water extractions and damages to ecosystems. 
 The inclusion of the basin authority in the water market to acquire water for the 
environment seems to be an attractive policy to keep up with the basin‟s increasing 
demand for water and to correct the failure of pure water markets. This policy improves 
social and private benefits of the basin, reduces the vulnerability of irrigation districts to 
droughts, and protects ecosystems. The empirical results show the value of negotiation 
and stakeholders‟ cooperation, which is the current institutional approach to water 
management in Spain. This institutional approach achieves almost the same economic 
outcomes and better environmental outcomes compared to a pure water market policy. 
The policy implications of these findings highlight the importance of cooperation in 
water management, and call for a reconsideration of water policies used at present in 
most arid and semiarid regions. Current water policies are based on command and 
control instruments or pure economic instruments, disregarding the potential of 
stakeholders‟ cooperation and participation in decision making.  
The second article (chapter 3) “Cooperative water management and ecosystem 
protection under scarcity and drought in arid and semiarid regions”, develops a game 
theory framework. This framework is used to analyze the likelihood of cooperation over 
sharing water resources, and the options for protecting ecosystems in arid and semiarid 
basins under scarcity and drought. The use of cooperative game theory to account for 
the strategic behavior of individual stakeholders is essential for testing the acceptability 
and stability of policy interventions aimed at promoting the joint management of water 
                                                                                                                              Chapter 6 
141 
 
resources. The chapter shows how the strategic behavior of individual stakeholders 
could be incorporated into hydro-economic modeling.  
The empirical results of this chapter indicate that drought damage costs in the Jucar 
basin could be reduced through the cooperation of stakeholders within the right 
institutional setting. The results indicate also that cooperative management may have 
little effect on ecosystems protection without additional incentives or regulations. The 
analysis performed suggests that cooperation is a feasible option in the Jucar basin, but 
the basis for cooperation is fragile, leading to a weak acceptability and stability of 
cooperative arrangements. The reason is the different interests of users among the 
various cooperative solutions. The internalization of environmental damages seems to 
provide more stability to cooperation. This finding has important policy implications 
because it demonstrates the difficulties in selecting a mix of policy instruments that 
could address scarcity and droughts in highly-stressed basins, and the risk of policy 
failure.  
The third article (chapter 4) “Efficient water management policies for irrigation 
adaptation to climate change in Southern Europe”, evaluates the economic and 
environmental effects of two incentive-based water management policies to address 
climate change impacts on irrigated agriculture in Southern Europe: water markets and 
subsidies on irrigation technologies. These two policies are of particular interest for 
policymakers in Spain and in Southern Europe. The analysis is undertaken in the lower 
part of the Jucar basin using a two-stage stochastic hydro-economic model. Several 
crop-water production functions are used to allow for the modeling of deficit irrigation 
strategies. Model results provide information on farmers‟ responses to climate change 
and policy interventions in terms of long-run choices of capital investment in cropping 
and irrigation systems, and short-run decision to irrigate or fallow land.  
Results of this chapter indicate that climate change will have harmful effects on 
farmers‟ profits. However, the severity of these effects depends on government policy 
settings and farmers‟ adaptation responses. Water markets and irrigation technology 
subsidies are policies that provide good incentives to farmers for investing in irrigated 
agriculture, reducing land abandonment, and intensifying land and water use. In 
addition, the deficit irrigation strategy is found to be a valuable response to climate 
change, reducing significantly farmers‟ damage costs. However, the environmental 
impacts of these policy interventions are adverse, generating considerable 
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environmental costs for society. The policy implications of these results suggest that the 
European water and agricultural regulations should be oriented towards enhancing farm 
level adaptive capacity, improving farmers‟ knowledge of climate change impacts for 
better long-run investment decisions, and promoting the uptake of adaptation policies 
that minimize both private and social benefit losses.  
The last article (chapter 5) “Hydro-economic modeling with aquifer-river 
interactions for sustainable basin management”, presents the development of a dynamic 
hydro-economic modeling framework, which is applied to the assessment of climate 
change scenarios and policy choices in the Jucar basin. The contribution of this paper to 
previous hydro-economic modeling efforts is the incorporation of a groundwater flow 
equation, similar to the MODFLOW groundwater model approach, into the standard 
hydro-economic model formulation. This improved methodological approach is capable 
of simulating the real-world behavior of aquifers and the stream-aquifer interactions.  
The results of this chapter demonstrate the capabilities of integrated hydro-
economic models to accurately assess a wide range of climate change scenarios and 
policy choices. The empirical results provide detailed information on the spatio-
temporal impacts of climate change on the hydrology, land use and economic outcomes. 
Results show also how water users in arid and semiarid basins could strategically adapt 
to climate change, and the economic and environmental tradeoffs among their 
adaptation strategies. This information can be only generated through integrated hydro-
economic modeling, and it could be useful for the design of sustainable climate change 
adaptation policies.  
6.2 Conclusions and future research  
This thesis addresses some of the most important challenges facing water resources in 
arid and semiarid regions. These challenges are the growing water scarcity, the climate 
change impacts on water resources, and the pervasive degradation of water-dependent 
ecosystems. The main four chapters present the development of several hydro-economic 
modeling approaches that integrate hydrologic, economic, institutional and 
environmental components. These models are applied to the specific case of the Jucar 
basin in Spain, and the chapters provide a detailed description of the modeling process, 
the analysis undertaken, and the main findings and implications. However, the modeling 
frameworks are designed to be adaptable for other arid and semiarid basins. The 
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methodology developed in this research constitutes a very promising tool for conducting 
integrated analysis of climate and policy scenarios. The obtained results could provide 
useful insights to policy making for sustainable water management.  
This thesis considers some methods for improving the performance of water policy 
models. These methodological advances are related to the process of integrating the 
different aspects of water resources, the improvement of the stochastic and dynamic 
aspects of modeling, and the inclusion of the strategic behavior of individual 
stakeholders. Few studies in the literature address jointly the issues of both modeling 
and implementation of water policies. The empirical results highlight the potential of 
integrated hydro-economic models for assessing the environmental and economic 
tradeoffs among policy choices under climate scenarios. Partial modeling based only on 
economic relationships but without a realistic biophysical underpinning, cannot catch 
accurately these policy tradeoffs which are crucial for the sustainable management of 
water resources.  
The findings in this thesis have important policy implications because they 
demonstrate the range of difficulties in achieving a more sustainable management of 
water resources in arid and semiarid regions. The sustainability challenges are how to 
deal with the impacts of water scarcity, droughts and climate change on the economic 
activities and ecosystems in river basins. Governments could implement several policy 
interventions to mitigate those impacts such as promoting the cooperative management 
of water resources, allowing for water trading, and providing economic incentives for 
water conservation. However, policymakers should be aware of the unintended 
consequences of poor policy planning, such as the third party effects of policy 
interventions which are found to be quite negative for the environment. They should 
also consider the acceptability and uptake of policy interventions by stakeholders to 
avoid policy failure.  
For instance, the results of this thesis show that the cooperative management of 
water resources and the implementation of water markets could be attractive policies to 
reduce the economic damage costs of scarcity, droughts and climate change, but they 
could have devastating effects on valuable aquatic ecosystems in the absence of 
adequate regulation or well-functioning water institutions. In addition, the acceptability 
and stability of policy interventions aimed at basin-wide climate change mitigation are 
not evident, given the different preferences and interests of groups of stakeholders. 
                                                                                                       Summary and conclusions 
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Overcoming these impediments is not an easy task in basins around the world. The 
sustainable management of water resources in arid and semiarid regions requires 
shifting water policies from coercive governance based on command and control 
instruments or from governance based on pure economic instruments, towards new 
governance rules based on the involvement of stakeholders coupled with the ancillary 
use of carefully designed economic instruments that bring about cooperation.        
The results obtained in this thesis could be improved in future research work. It 
would be interesting to analyze the detailed impacts of regionalized climate change 
scenarios within a stochastic framework, especially those linked to the change in the 
probability distributions of key climatic variables and the occurrence of extreme events. 
This type of analysis could be undertaken using a hydro-economic model together with 
Monte Carlo simulations and the Markov switching model. Additional research might 
also focus on analyzing the synergies and tradeoffs between water, energy use and food 
production. Society is well aware of food, energy and water challenges, but researchers 
have so far addressed them in isolation, within sectoral boundaries. Integrated hydro-
economic models could simultaneously address these challenges. A final direction for 
future research could be linking hydro-economic modeling to computable general 
equilibrium approaches. But this would have to overcome the challenge of dealing at 
the same time with the biophysical complexity of basins and with the whole economic 
activities, a quite exacting endeavor. The reward would be the capability of evaluating 
the economy-wide effects of policy interventions at basin scale.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
